Decemb. 6. 1676.

I do allow the Printing of this Book.

Fra. North.

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Advice to Grand Jurors
IN
Cases of Blood.

Asserting from
LAW and REASON
THAT

At the King's Suit in all Cases (where a person by Law is to be Indicted for killing of another Person) that the Indictment ought to be drawn for *Murther*, and that the *Grand Jury* ought to find it *Murther*, where their Evidence is that the Party intended to be Indicted had his Hands in Blood, and did kill the other Person.

By *ZACHARY BABINGTON* Gent.

GEN. IX. 6.
Quicunque effuderit humanum sanguinem, fundetur sanguis illius; ad imaginem quippe Dei creatus est homo.

NUM. XXXV. 33.
Nec aliter expiari potest, nisi per ejus sanguinem qui alterius sanguinem effuderit.

LONDON, Printed for *John Amery* at the *Peacock* against St. *Dunstans* Church in *Fleet-street*. 1677.

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B114

Rec. Mar. 9, 1900.

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THE AUTHOR TO THE Reader.

HE that reads the ensuing Tract, will soon find that much of the beginning of it is by way of Introduction to the Subject-matter

of the Book, and might well (if not better) have past under the Title of A Preface, *and therefore might have excused this: in which I shall endeavour to shew the Grounds and Reasons that put me upon this Argument; answering all Objections that may be made against the Author, for being a Sanguinary Person, in treating so positively upon this Subject; shew the necessity of determining the Law herein, in point of practice by* Grand Jurors *in Cases of Blood; give some satisfaction to such as may object against the length of it, whereas the Question is so short; explain the* Grand Jurors *Oath; and lastly, endeavour to remove all Difficulties made by them upon the said Oath.*

Two Reasons principally moved me to this Undertaking; The one was, The great Contests and Differences I have too often observed between the Judges *and* Grand Jurors *about finding*

of

of Bills in Caſes of Blood, whereby the whole matter of Fact, with all its Circumſtances, might receive its full diſquiſition in Court, and not in a Grand Juries *Chamber; the* Grand Jurors *(as if they were Judges both of the Law and the Fact, which is ſufficiently demonſtrated in the enſuing Diſcourſe they are of neither) finding the Indictment ſometimes Manſlaughter, when they ſhould find it Murther, contrary to the ſenſe and direction of the Learned Judge, and of the King's Council, whereby a Murtherer many times eſcapes.*

The ſecond Reaſon was, That if the Law were not determined in this point, betwixt the Judges *and* Grand Jurors, *the Conſequence muſt needs be, That* Grand Jurors *(that hear but one ſide) would in the end take the matter of Fact from the Second Jury, that are proper Judges of it, and ſhould try it; and the*

ter of Law from the Learned Judge, that ſhould give the Judgment of Law upon it; and this is ſo plainly proved in the enſuing Diſcourſe, and hath been ſo often in practice, that I know nothing can be ſaid againſt it.

Peradventure ſome may ſay, Sure he that wrote this Book is *Vir Sanguinis*, that deſires ſuch ſevere Juſtice againſt every man that kills another man unlawfully, that he muſt be Indicted of Murther. *Certainly this is a very great miſtake, which a conſiderate Reader, or one that delights not in ſpilling of Blood, cannot be guilty of; here is no more deſired or intended, but that every Perſon that hath had his Hands in Innocent Blood, receive a full and a legal Trial, according to the Laws of the Land, and the Liberty of a Subject, to be tried at the King's Suit. And I know no Kingdom or Nation in the World, whoſe Subjects have a fairer, more impartial,*

partial, and indifferent Trial in ſuch Caſes, than the Subjects of England *have; who, except (as I have ſhewed) they become their own Accuſers, muſt be accuſed by a* Grand Jury, *and convicted or acquitted by another; and afterwards (if guilty) receive Judgment from a Learned and Merciful Judge, according to the Law of the Land.*

I know by the Law of God, amongſt the Jews there was a certain Inſtitution, which we call Lex Talionis, An Eye for an Eye, a Tooth for a Tooth, Life for Life; *and that there were Modifications and Qualifications, to abate the extremity of it, in ſeveral Caſes to be conſidered, as I have ſhewed there, is by the Laws of* England *very parallel to them: This is ſo far from being Sanguinary, that I conceive it would rather prove a Remedy, than a Miſchief, rather prevent ſhedding of Blood, than occaſion it; rather*

ther be Lex Præveniens, *than* Puniens. *And certainly, whoever oppoſeth this Opinion, and propoſeth a milder and lighter way of Trial againſt one that hath had his Hands in the Blood of his Fellow Creature, will hardly himſelf avoid the Imputation of a Sanguinary Perſon. This way propoſed, will prevent that evil practice (too much uſed) of labouring and packing* Grand Jurors, *in point of favour, when they are aſſured before, that all Accuſations, by* Grand Jurors, *for the unlawful killing of a Reaſonable Creature, muſt be Murther. It would conduce very much to the diſpatch of the Buſineſs in Court, and be a great eaſe to* Grand Jurors, *that now ſpend very much unneceſſary time in Queſtions about the Law, in ſuch Caſes, which were better ſpent in examining the Fact, and leaving the matter of Law to the Court.*

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Concerning the neceſſity of this point to be determined, he is a Stranger to the Engliſh Laws, and to the Engliſh Nation, that over-looks the juſt and profitable Conſequence thereof; there being nothing in this enſuing Tract aſſerted, but what is agreeable (as I conceive) to the Statute, and Common Laws of this Kingdom, the beſt allowed Practice, and the Opinions of all the Learned Judges, (at whoſe Feet I have had the happineſs to ſit many years, both before the late Civil Wars, and ſince the happy Reſtauration of our moſt Gracious Soveraign) and agreeable to ſound Reaſon, the fulleſt and beſt Diſquiſition after Innocent Blood.

And who can but allow the neceſſity of it, as to the Engliſh Nation at preſent, when Duels are ſo frequent in England; *it being made matter of Triumph for one* Hector

Duellum, quaſi duorum bellum.

Done without Authority, is a war againſt Authority.

(as

(as they call him) to kill another, if it be but for not pledging a Health, or ſomething that looks like an Affront to his Miſs, *in placing her at a Ball, in a Playhouſe, the Tavern, or the like; and this muſt not only engage the two differing Parties (although Perſons of Quality) to ſacrifice their own Lives, and ſometimes two Seconds, or more, Perſons of as equal quality, to loſe their Lives in the Conflict, or by the Law, (if Death enſue to any of them) in which Conteſt they are no more concerned, than to ſecond their Friend, and with their own lives to juſtifie the Quarrel between the two differing Parties, as if both of them had a good Cauſe, and were in the right, when as ſometimes the Occaſion is ſo trivial, not fit for two Boys to diſpute.*

That which the Victor thinks to be his honour, proves his diſhonour. His Life, his Lands, and Goods, are by Law forfeited, and his Blood corrupted.

Infœlix pugna, ubi majus periculum incumbit victori quam victo.

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As to what may be Objected to the length of this Tract, I have only this to ſay, That it is no more than I have accuſed my ſelf for, and did endeavour to have abſtracted and omitted much of it; but when I began to do it, I was overcome by theſe Conſiderations, That it was the firſt Eſſay of this kind that had been written as a Book; That it was not like to meet with all Readers of like Capacities; ſome perhaps might gather much out of a little, whereas others would gather but a little out of much, and the whole not of many hours reading, which might be worſe ſpent, and therefore was willing to leave it, as I had firſt framed it, although I expoſed my ſelf to be cenſured for it.

And becauſe Grand Jurors *put ſo great an Obligation upon the Oath they take as* Grand Jurors, *and from that (as they conceive) frame ſo ſtrong an Objection*

ction, That they are ſworn to preſent all ſuch things and matters as ſhall be given them in charge; and that the Judges uſually, in their charges, dilate and declare the Law, as to all the ſeveral Species and Degrees of Murther, Manſlaughter, &c. what every unlawful killing of a man is in Law, according to the ſeveral Circumſtances of the Fact: and therefore they, as Grand Jurors, *are bound by their Oath to obſerve the Circumſtances of every Fact before them, what it is in Law as well as in Fact, and ſo preſent to the Court both the Law and the Fact* (Judice inconſulto). *This being the greateſt Objection that I have heard from any of them againſt what is here Aſſerted; although ſomething is ſaid, as to this Objection, in the enſuing Diſcourſe, I ſhall here add ſomething more, to clear the point, and anſwer fully that Objection, by ſetting down the*

Oath

Oath of a Grand Juror, in terminis, *as alſo the Oath of a* Juror *of Life and Death, and explain them both:* † You ſhall diligently inquire, and true preſentment make of all ſuch things and matters as ſhall be given you in charge, or ſhall come to your knowledge, concerning this preſent Service. The King's Counſel, your Fellows, and your own, you ſhall well and truly keep ſecret. You ſhall preſent nothing for malice, or evil will you bear to any perſon; neither ſhall you leave any thing unpreſented for love, favour, affection, reward, or any hopes thereof; but in all things that ſhall concern this preſent Service, you ſhall preſent the truth, the whole truth, and nothing elſe but the truth: So help you God.

† *The Oath of a Grand Juror.*

In the firſt place you ſee by the Oath, they are ſworn to be diligent in their Inquiry, not to be ſloathful or negligent, being quickned by their Oath: this diligence

ligence is to be exerciſed in an Inquiry, and this Inquiry is to be made amongſt themſelves, in what they know of their own knowledge, or ſhall be brought unto them by the Teſtimony of others. As to the matter of their Inquiry, which next follows in the Oath, and from which they frame their main Objection, (viz.) all ſuch things and matters as ſhall be given them in charge: *theſe words are general* (things and matters) *and certainly, in the cleareſt Underſtanding, are intended the general Heads of all Offences by them Inquirable; As all Murthers, and that comprehends all manner of unlawful killing: All Felonies, and that comprehends all manner of ſtealing; and ſo of other general Heads of Offences here Inquirable, as Perjuries, Forgeries, Miſdemeanours, &c. although the Learned Judge (where he hath time and leiſure) doth in his Charge, when he ſpeaks*

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ſpeaks of Murther, declare the ſeveral Species and Differences in that Offence by Law; and ſo of Felony, the ſeveral manners of Felonies, ſimple and compound. And ſo of other Offences, the words of the Oath ſo much inſiſted upon by them do no way oblige them by reaſon of ſuch a Charge, to determine (by their preſentment) every nicety in Law, that may ariſe upon every Fact before them, otherwiſe than in that form and matter (according to the nature of the Caſe) the Court and the King's Council have framed and preſented it to their Inquiry, where the ſingle Fact of unlawful killing another, &c. by the hands of ſuch a one, is proved unto them ſo far, as in their Judgments it is fit matter of Accuſation, to bring the whole matter of Fact, and all that may depend upon it, to a farther and more full examination (as is more fully manifeſted in

the enſuing diſcourſe) for ſhould the Judge only give them general heads of Offences in charge (as he well may, and many times doth) without diſtinguiſhing the ſeveral kinds of them, the Grand Jurors *would then want a ground for this Objection; beſides I have ever taken it, that not only that which is orally delivered unto them by the Judge, but that alſo that is delivered unto them from the Judge in writing, to be by them enquired of, is part of their charge, and that is every* Indict-ment *that is preſented unto them, or other matter in Writing commended by the Court to their Enquiry.*

The Juſtices in Eyre, that formerly were Itinerant over the Kingdom (in whoſe rooms theſe Learned Judges ſucceed) ever giving their charge, and whatever was enquirable by the Grand Jurors *in writing; which if ſo underſtood (as I know not how it will be avoided) they are then*

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by their Oath, to preſent all ſuch things as ſhall be given them in charge, and ſo every Indictment of Murther delivered by the Court unto them, is to be found by them, where (as hath been often ſaid) the unlawful killing is ſo far proved unto them as to make up an Accuſation. Then it follows in the Oath [The Kings Counſel, their Fellows, and their own they ſhall keep ſecret;] *By the* Kings Counſel, *is to be underſtood any directions the Judge ſhall in Court give unto them in any matter before them; as alſo the Evidence of Witneſſes, that ſhall be produced to them on the Kings behalf in any fact (for no other Witneſſes muſt be heard by them) and likewiſe ſuch Counſellors learned in the Law as ſhall manage the matter on the Kings behalf (for no other Council is to be heard by them againſt the Bill) none of this muſt be revealed or diſcovered by the* Grand Jurors, *but faithfully kept ſecret accord-*

ing to their Oath from the party concerned, his friends, and all others, except the Court demand any queſtion from them upon their Evidence; ſo likewiſe muſt they keep their Fellow Jurors Counſel, and their own, *that is, they are not to diſcover what any one of themſelves have together counſelled, adviſed, or debated, in the buſineſs before them againſt ſuch a perſon. They are the Kings great Council upon this account, and all ſuch great Councils where the King is ſo much concerned, take an Oath of Secrecy, for otherwiſe by revealing ſuch Counſels, a Traytor, a Murtherer, and the greateſt Felon may eſcape, to the endangering of King and Kingdom; and this offence in ancient time was holden for Treaſon or Felony.*

Stamf. fol. 36. 27. lib. Aſſ. *In* George's *Caſe in* Anno 27. lib. Aſſ. *upon his Indictment was acquitted; but the Lo.* Coke *in his* third Inſtitutes fol. 107. *ſays,* Certain it is, that ſuch diſcovery is accompanied with Perjury, and a great

great Miſpriſion to be puniſhed by Fine and Impriſonment. *And it is well provided by the Oath, that each Juror is ſworn to keep his own Counſel alſo; for he that will not keep his own ſecrets, will hardly keep anothers.*

So much for the matter of the Oath, what they are to do; It follows in the Oath, with what Integrity they ought to do their duty, They are to preſent no perſon for any offence, through any malice they have to the perſon, nor omit any meerly for any favour they have for the perſon: *This is ſo plain, it needs nothing but practice; theſe two ſeem very eaſie, but indeed are very difficult to fleſh and blood, Not to take revenge when one hath power to do it, and not to ſhew favour when there is power and opportunity to expreſs it; not but that a Grand Juror may preſent another he is at difference withal, if there be a real and true cauſe for it, but it muſt not*

be done from malice, and by way of revenge, in preſenting ſuch a perſon, before another as guilty. Malice *and* Favour (*two great enemies to Juſtice*) *are to be excluded all Courts of Juſtice, as too partial; and therefore the Oath well concludes,* That they ſhall preſent the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth: *all theſe three expreſſions of* truth *have relation to the fact of Murther, or unlawful killing* (*for I ſhall in this place apply it to that Offence*) *in a legal ſenſe, as to legal proceedings;* The truth, *that is, Truth ſufficient to make an accuſation againſt a nocent perſon;* The whole truth, *not concealing any part of it wilfully, but ſo preſenting it, that the whole matter of fact concerning the unlawful killing another may come in queſtion to another Jury, which cannot be unleſs it be found Murther; the Common Law accounting all felonious and unlawful killing a reaſonable Creature* Murther

ther, *until the difference and distinction appear upon the Verdict of another Jury, that are to try it, and the Judgment of the Court in point of Law upon that Verdict. Observe the Note in the Margent, what that Statute says;* adjudicetur coram Justiciar. *It shall be adjudged by the Judges or Justices (not the Grand Jury) what is Manslaughter* per Infortunium; *and it can never be adjudged by the Judges, but when it is tried before them, which cannot be upon an Indictment of* per Infortunium *only (as is more fully observed in the following discourse;) Observe likewise what follows in that Statute,* Sed locum habeat Murdrum de interfectis per feloniam. *So that by this* Statute, *all felonious killing is Murther still, as it was at the Common Law before, and that* Statute *is not to be repealed by* Grand Jurors.

Murdrum de cætero non adjudicetur coram Justiciar. ubi infortunium tantummodo adjudicatum est, sed locum habeat Murdrum de interfectis per feloniam tantum, & non aliter. *Statut. de Marlebridge* 52 H.3.c.26.

And as there must not be in the Grand Jury, Suppressio veri, *a suppression or lessening of the truth; so there must not be* Expressio falsi, *a false Accusation; both are to be avoided, and therefore it follows in the Oath,* And nothing but the truth, *that is, no known falsity, no false Accusation against any person must be presented, whereby to bring an Innocent person to trial, where there is nothing of the fact to be proved against him, or any probable Accusation; if these three* Truths, *in this Oath mentioned, are not to be understood in this legal sense, and according to the common practice of legal proceedings in these cases; I must confess I am to be instructed how any* Grand Juror *(that hears but one side) can satisfie his* * *Conscience, that in a plain literal and Grammatical sense, he can swear that every Presentment and Indictment that comes from the* Grand Jury *with*

* Utramque partem, ni audias, ne judices.
Qui judicat aliquid (parte inaudita altera) licet æquum judicaret haud æquus est. *Yet* Grand Jurors *take themselves to be Judges of the Fact.*

with a Billa vera, *contains in it,* the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; *and this is cleared by the laſt words of the Oath,* [According to their beſt skill and knowledge] *for this muſt be underſtood, skill and knowledge in the Law and Fact, as to the practice and nature of the proceedings of the Law in ſuch caſes, for it is rather* diſcretio legis *than* hominis.

And thus have I, according to my beſt ſenſe and underſtanding of the Oath, explained it, and anſwered the common Objection to it, by making it appear, that there is nothing in the Oath that any way obligeth them againſt what I have either here, or in the enſuing diſcourſe, adviſed them unto. And that this may yet be more evident (becauſe I would make it as plain as I can, though with too many Tautologies and Repetitions) I ſhall alſo in terminis *ſet down the Oath of the* Jurors *of Life and Death,*

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by which it doth appear, that they only ſtand charged with the Priſoner (as it is expreſt in the Oath) and the Grand Jury *only with the Accuſation againſt him;* [You ſhall well and truly try, and true deliverance make between our Sovereign Lord the King and the Priſoner at the Bar (whom you ſhall have in Charge) and a true Verdict give according to your Evidence; So help you God.] *Which is to be formally and legally drawn up in the nature of a Declaration at Law at the Kings ſuit, the King being Plaintiff and the Priſoner Defendant, which the Priſoner upon his Arraignment either confeſſeth, and then he is convicted without hearing of any Evidence againſt him, or otherwiſe pleads* Not guilty *to it, to which the King (by the Clerk of the Crown) joyns Iſſue by* Cul prit, *viz.* that he is ready to prove him guilty; *and ſo the Iſſue being thus joyned, Evidence for the King is given againſt*

againſt him upon Oath, to which he makes his defence in perſon, or by * *Council (if any point of Law ariſe to which he deſires Council, and the Court approve of it, the Judge being as well of Council for the Priſoner as the King) calls his Witneſſes (if he have any) who ſpeak upon their Credits, and not upon their Oaths, which is much for the advantage of the Priſoner, the Law preſuming (in favour of life) the Affirmative proof to be ſo clear againſt the Priſoner, that nothing in the* † *Negative can be proved (upon Oath) againſt it; and after a full trial of what can be ſaid and proved on both ſides, and a convenient time taken by the Jury to conſider of it, they bring in their Verdict, either convict him or acquit him; either find him guilty according to the Indictment found*

* If he have Council, he muſt pray it before he plead *Not guilty*, he cannot after. 3. *Inſt. fol.* 129.

† And that is one reaſon why regularly he cannot have Council. The ſecond reaſon is, the Court ought to ſee the Indictment, Trial, and other proceedings good in Law, leſt by an erroneous Judgment they attaint the Priſoner. 3. *Inſt.* 137. *fol.* 29.

found by the Grand Jury *by hearing of one ſide, or ſpecially as they find the fact by hearing of both ſides; for they are not bound ſtrictly to the matter and form of the Indictment, as the* Grand Jury *have found it, for they may by Law extenuate it to the leaſt degree of offence, that can be in that kind, but they cannot aggravate it, or exceed above what the* Grand Jury *have found; for if they might do ſo, they would become Accuſers as well as Tryers, which would be againſt the Laws and liberty of the Subject: And therefore the* Grand Jurors *have the greater reaſon, to enlarge in their Declaration or Accuſation for the King (as in all Declarations at Law is uſual) as far as the Law will heighten all offences in Blood, ſince the other Jury have ſo much liberty to leſſen the damages, and extenuate the Crime, whatever the Accuſation is.*

Secta pacis *is by Indictment, which is the King's Suit, and as it were his Declaration. The King formerly did not pardon* homicidium, *but* Sectam pacis noſtræ quæ ad nos pertinet de homicidiis. 3. *Inſt. fol.* 235.

Now

Now upon what I have written in this Preface, and the Book, I am not ignorant how much I have ſubjected my ſelf ad captum Lectoris, *to the various cenſures of the ſeveral Readers, eſpecially ſuch as uſe to ſerve, or may ſerve on Grand Juries, Gentlemen I know of the beſt quality next to the Peers of the Realm, and in which Employment for their King and Country it is an honour to ſerve; And I hope it will be no diſhonour nor indignity to any of them to entertain, or at leaſt to peruſe this Advice, how they may with the greateſt prudence and fidelity paſs through an Enquiry after Innocent Bloodſhed, when they are called unto it, and leave nothing therein (of this Crying Sin) to be repented of, that it was not fully Enquired of by them, that ſo their exact care and Juſtice may keep themſelves ſecure from the guilt of Innocent blood.*

The Author

I doubt not but it will meet with ſome Readers ſo poſſeſſed with the contrary Opinion, by an erroneous practice or miſunderſtanding of the Laws, and of the Grand Jurors *Oath, that ſo ſoon as they read the Title will caſt away the Book and cry, a Paradox; Others happily more unbiaſſed in their Opinions, and of more moderation and ingenuity (if they diſlike) will publickly confute it, with ſtronger arguments and grounds of Law and Reaſon, and better experience in point of practice, and ſo determine the point; and in that I ſhall have my end.*

I am very certain, that I entred not upon this Subject with an offenſive mind, but cum moderamine inculpatæ tutelæ, *not with a direct deſign to kill any, but rather to fright, weaken, and drive away that* Dæmon *of Paſſion in man to commit Murther, and to give the beſt advice to* Grand Jurors *in Caſes of Blood.*

to the Reader.

A ſmall thing, oft times, hath the power to redreſs a great Inconvenience, yea, to take up a cruel Feud; as Virgil *ſaith, of that of* Bees *when they are actually engaged in battel,*

Hi motus animorum atque hæc certamina tanta,

Pulveris exigui jactu compreſſa quieſcent.

ADVICE

ADVICE TO Grand JURORS IN *Cases of Blood.*

IT is the great happineſs, freedom, and liberty of the *Engliſh* Nation, that (in all common and ordinary Trials) of offences Criminal and Capital, as Treaſons, Murthers, Felonies and Miſdemeanors, each Freeman (and ſo are all the people,

of *England*, as to this) ſhall receive his Trial *per pares*, by his equals; which is well provided for by the great Charter of the Liberties of *England*, in theſe words; *No Freeman ſhall be taken, or Impriſoned, or diſſeiſed of his Freehold, Liberties, or Free-cuſtomes, nor be Outlawed, baniſhed, or in any manner deſtroyed, &c. but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land.* This Chapter of *Magna Charta* is partly repeated in a later Statute, (*a*) and there *Law of the Land* is expounded [*Indictment*] proceſs by Writ original, and courſe of the Law: Another Statute recites it, and inſtead of the words *Law of the Land*, puts in Proceſs of the Law, as *equivalent* and *Synonimous*, ſignifying the ſame thing. And again, a Statute of that King ſays, (*b*) *No man ſhall anſwer without Preſentment before the Juſtices, or matter of Record, or by due Proceſs and Writ original*, according to the old Law of the Land, (*c*) as it is well obſerved

(a) 25 E. 3. 4. 5 E. 3. 9. 42 E. 3. 3. *Vit. Abbot St.* Alban. 143.

(b) 37 E. 3. 18.

(c) Cook 3. *Inſt. Tit.* Indict. 136.

ſerved by the Lo. *Cook* (that Oracle of the Law) *In pleas of the Crown, and other Common offences and Nuſances, the King cannot (in an ordinary way) put any man to anſwer; but he muſt be appriſed by Indictment, or other matter of Record.* For, by the Law of the Land, a Felon or a Murtherer cannot be convicted (*d*) or attainted (though he confeſs the Felony or Murther) until a grand Jury have preſented the offence; nor can any perſon (generally and ordinarily be convicted or attainted, or have Judgment of life, or Member) upon any Criminal accuſation; but there muſt be two Juries paſs upon him, at leaſt 24 perſons, the one a Grand Jury (*ex parte Regis*) to preſent the offence fit for a trial; the other a petit or leſſer Jury, *inter Regem, & perſonam accuſat.* to try the truth of that Preſentment (*e*). The Grand Jury coming from all parts of the Coun-

(d) *Except by utlawry.*

(e) *No Peer, or Subject, can be Convicted by Verdict; but the Offence muſt be found by twenty four.*

ty (*f*), the other Jury of the very neighbourhood *de vicinetto*, where the offence was committed; for, *vicini vicinorum facta optime præsumuntur scire*; and so in probability of Law, are presumed to know something experimentally (besides what they have by Testimony) both of the quality of the person, truth, and nature of the offence, with all its circumstances, and happily the credit of the Accuser and his Witnesses. It is not sufficient that they dwell in the County, but they are to be of the Neighbourhood, nay, *le plus procheins* to the place of the fact, as by *Artic. super cap.* 9. it is appointed; They must be most near, most sufficient, and least suspicious, *ibid.* The first being called a *Grand Jury*, or a Great Jury, either in respect of their number, being above twelve, (the general certainty of all other Juries) and may be as many as the

(*f*) *It is not sufficient, that they dwell in the County, but they are to be of the Neighbourhood; nay,* le plus procheines *to the place of the fact; as by* Artic. super *cap.* 9. *it is appointed, They must be most near, most sufficient, and least suspicious.* ibid.

the Court pleaſe, but uſually exceed not 23, and in good prudence (when there is much, or weighty buſineſs) there ought not to be a leſſer number, for if there be leſs or more, they may be ſo divided, that there can be no verdict (as by experience hath been obſerved) for leſs than twelve agreeing, cannot make a Legal verdict: Or they are called *Grand* in reſpect of the quality of their Perſons, and greatneſs of their Eſtates, ability of their Judgments (being of good Education) or laſtly (which I conceive the beſt reaſon) that, *propter excellentiam*, they are ſtyled (*g*) *Juratores pro Domino Rege pro Corpore Com.* Jurors for our Soveraign Lord the King for the County of *S.* and as the Commons in Parliament are to the whole Kingdom, they have an unlimited power to preſent all offences committed in their County, that are *contra Pacem, Coronam, & dignitatem Regis*, againſt the Peace, the Crown, and dignity

(g) The Kings Jury.

of the King, againſt either Statute or Common Law, they being the great and grand Spring, or *Primum mobile* of the Court, that gives motion to all the other wheels; their Preſentment being the key, that either opens or ſhuts the proceedings of the Court in every offence. And therefore it is that the Law of *England* takes care, that as well the Grand Jury, as the other Jury, conſiſt of perſons that are *probi*, & *legales homines*, good and lawful men; each man muſt be *probus*, *quaſi probatus*, an approved honeſt man; *vel a Græc.* προσάγειν, & *qui progredi poſſit prægredi debet*, he that will go on in vertue, certainly ought principally to be choſen to attend the Courts of Juſtice. It is called, *Juſtitia, quaſi juris ſtatio, vel ſtatus, quod per Juſtitiam, jus ſtat*, i. *exercetur*. (*h*) It is called *Juſtice* becauſe it is the Standard of Right, *miſera ſervitus ubi Jus vagum*. *Juſtice* being one of the Cardinal vertues ought to be attended

(*h*) *Jus à Jovis nomine. Jus qu.* Jovis *os; omne enim Jus eſt. Juſtitia à Jure eſt.*

attended by none but the *virtuoso*, the most vertuous, pious, and ingenuous persons; *probi* signifying, not only *faithful*, but *skilful*; none can be presumed to be faithful in keeping an Oath, (*i*) that wants skill to know how to perform his duty; What expectation can there be of a good Verdict, from a bad or ignorant man? Can he that is not capable to understand a Cause, ever make a right Judgment of it? Will a Liar present a truth; a Thief convict his fellow thief; a Man of blood a Murtherer? or, Who can expect Justice from him who neither to his God nor to himself is just, or true? He that believes Judges are *quasi Dei*, *Gods* (as the Scripture calls them) or that God sits amongst, and is present with Judges in Judgment (as in the Scripture sense it is truth, and ought to be believed) cannot

(i) v. Statut. 3 Ed. 1. c. 11. *Forasmuch as many being indicted of Murther, and Culpable of the same, by favourable Inquests taken by the Sheriff, and by the Kings Writ of* Odio & Atia *be replevied unto the coming of the Justices in Eyre. It is provided such Inquests shall be taken by lawful men chosen out by Oath (of whom two at the least shall be Knights) which, by no affinity with the prisoner, or otherwise, are to be suspected.*

5 H. 7. fol. 5. Coke l. 9. f. 56. 9 H. 3. c. 26. 6 Ed. 1. c. 9. Regist. fol. 133.

but apprehend how unreaſonable it is, to bring ſuch a Jury before ſuch a preſence, to act in a concernment of ſo high a nature, as the life of a Man; *whoſe* verdict ought to be *veredictum*, a true ſaying, *quoddam Evangelium*, as theGoſpel they ſwear upon, *dictum veritatis*, the ſaying of Truth it ſelf (eſpecially as it is the verdict of the Jury of life and death) who have the advantage of hearing, not only the Accuſer and his Witneſſes, but alſo the party accuſed, and his Witneſſes face to face. They are called, although a (*k*) Petty Jury, yet a Jury of life and death, which the Grand Jury are not; although they enquire of the ſame offence, from the great power in their hands to acquit or condemn the life of a man, according to their evidence. Upon whoſe verdict, the Judge according to Law grounds the Judgment of life or death, of acquittal or condemnation; and as a Jury may give a juſt verdict (as to themſelves) upon

Juramentum quod mente Juratur.

(k) *In reſpect of the Grand Jury.*

upon a false Testimony given to them, so may the Judge (as to himself) give a just Judgment upon a false verdict given by the Jury. For as the Jurors are excusable, that give their verdict, *secundum allegata, & probata, per sacrum Testimonium*, by what is alledged and proved to them by the Oaths of Witnesses, or confession of the party; even so that Judge is excusable (*in foro Conscientiæ*) that gives Judgment upon a verdict (though false) for he doth not therein *Jus dare*, but *Jus dicere secundum veredict. Jur.* upon the verdict of the Petit Jury and presentment of a Grand Jury, and this is fully verified in two remarkable (*l*) Cases noted in the Margent; a sufficient caution to all Judges, not to try any for Murther, where they have not an infallible evidence of the death of the party slain.

(*l*) Coke *Instit.* 3. *fol.* 232. Glouc. *Assizes xiij.* Car. 2. *Regis* (Harrison's *Case*) *Nimia præcipitatio & morosa cunctatio*; two dangerous extreams.

And as every Juror ought to be *probus homo*, an honest and a skilful

ful man, ſo ought every one to be *legalis homo*, a perſon ſo qualified that the Law allows of; for a man may be an honeſt, prudent, and juſt man, and yet in the eye of the Law not a lawful Jury-man; for in one ſenſe he is not *legalis homo*, that is not *ligeus & ſubditus Dom. Regis Angliæ*, for the Law provides that the Kings Liege people ſhall be tried *per pares*, by their equals, their fellow Subjects: In a proper ſenſe he is ſaid, in Law, not to be *legalis homo*, that is *homo utlagatus*, an outlawed perſon, one that is *extra legem poſitus*; who is no better than one that is *extraneus*, an alien, a ſtranger, one not only put out of the protection of the Law, but ſuch a one as the Law will have nothing to do with (as he ſo ſtands) in Courts of Juſtice, to ſerve as a Juror; nay, ſuch a perſon being a Juror, will make the verdict void, and it is a good exception in arreſt of Judgment, that any of the Jurors were outlawed. But in a larger ſenſe he is not

vi. Coke 3. *Inſt. fo.* 32. *tit.* Petit Treaſon.

not *legalis homo*, ſuch a legal and indifferent perſon (as the Law requires) who is either in ſuch a degree of blood to the priſoner, as the Law preſumes him partial, or in ſuch an evil reputation, as the Law preſumes him unjuſt; for as it is not fit for a Father to be of a Jury to try his Son, or the Son the Father; Brothers, Uncles, or near Relations to try one another, ſo it is not fit that he that is *particeps criminis*, or indeed *criminalis homo*, a man that ſtands judicially accuſed, indicted, convicted, or attainted for Felony, to try another for Felony (or indeed to be a grand Juror to preſent it) the Law provides that each Juror ought to be a perſon, *rectus in Curia*, that ſtands right in Court, above and againſt all natural, rational, and legal exceptions. *Qui accuſat integræ famæ ſit & non criminoſus*; for certainly, to clear the matter of fact (as a Juror of life and death) and wiſely to diſcern the Cauſe in queſtion, upon

He is liber & legalis homo, *that is a man of fame and credit, that doth enjoy* liberam legem. Coke 3. *Inſt. fol.* 22. 11 H. 4. Coke 3. *Inſt. fol.* 32.

upon a doubtful and perplext Evidence, many times, requires as great ability in the Jurors of life and death, as in the Judge to examine the cauſe, and to give Judgment upon the Verdict; there being much more of Black-art uſed to darken and obſcure the truth of the fact (in caſes of Bloud) amongſt the Jurors (eſpecially if either a great Perſon, or rich, be concerned therein) than poſſibly can be, to prevent or prevaricate a right Judgment, in the Judge; or by any duſt of gold, power or favour, to put out his eyes, or falſifie his clear ſight, who ſits every way above ſuch a temptation.

The Jurors of *England* (eſpecially in the Circuits) with their unequal yoke-fellows the *Taleſmen*, are (for the moſt part) the very ſcandal of the Laws practical of *England*, who ſeldom ſerve, but to ſerve a turn (*m*), to obey a Superiour, pleaſure a Friend, or to

(*m*) *'Tis hard to get an unbiaſſed Jury. Some ſerving, that had more need to be relieved by the* 8 d. *than diſcretion to ſift out the truth of the fact.*

help

help away (in a hurry) a quick diſpatch of practice: This fault is not in the Laws of *England*, but the male execution of them. The Statute of the 27 *Eliz. c.* 6. provides that each Juror ſhould have at leaſt four pounds *per annum* in Lands, Tenements, or Rents; and this muſt be their ſufficiency, where the (*n*) debt or damages (or both together) amount to forty marks. The general courſe of the world being to eſteem men according to their Eſtates, *Quantum quiſque ſua nummorum ſervat in arca, tantum habet & fidei.* Jurors that have Eſtates to loſe, will be afraid to commit perjury. The beſt things abuſed, alwaies prove the worſt; the ſweeteſt Wine makes the ſharpeſt Vinegar, not that the fault is in the Wine, but in the uſe and abuſe of it: were better care taken in return of Jurors (*o*), I dare ſay, the trial by *twelve*

(*n*) Coke 1. *Inſt.* 272.

(*o*) *In antient time the Jury, as well in Common Pleas as in Pleas of the Crown, were twelve Knights.* Glanvile *lib.* 2. *c.* 14. & Bract. *fol.* 116.

would

would not be more ancient than excellent; the Excellency of it appears, in the long, conſtant, and general uſe of it amongſt the people of *England*. This way of trial, to have all their Eſtates, Injuries, and Lives tried by twelve men, and thoſe Neighbours, of our own degree and parity, and without exception (upon a lawful challenge) certainly nothing can be ſaid more for the commendation of it, than the conſtant practice, and unanimous approbation of it in *England*, to this day, ſince the firſt beginning of it: The trial by *twelve* being very ancient, though Mr. *Daniel*, and *Polydor Virgil* deny it to be ancienter than the *Norman* Conqueſt. *But Polydor* (as ſays the excellent Sr. *H. Savil*) *was an* Italian, *and a ſtranger in our Common-wealth, and ſo deceived!* (*p*) It is of *Engliſh Saxon* deſcent, as by the Laws of King *Etheldred*, *cap.* 4. thus; *In all Hundreds let Aſſemblies be, and twelve Free-men of the*

(*p*) Lamb. *in verbo Centur.* D. Spelman *in Jurat. vide Conſult. de Martic.* Walliæ *v.* 3.

the most ancient together shall swear, not to condemn the Innocent, nor absolve the guilty. It was in use with the *French*, in the Age of *Charlemaine*. They that would see more of this, let them read that learned and ancient Book written by Judge *Forteſcue*, in commendation of the Laws of *England*. I shall leave this Subject, having briefly touched upon the happiness and liberty the Subjects of *England* enjoy, to have their trials for their Estates and Lives, *per pares*, by Juries of twelve men; what manner of persons Grand Jurors and those Jurors ought to be, and of the excellency and antiquity of such trials; in the next place (after I have shewed the heynousness of Murther, both by the Laws of God, and the Laws of this Land, and made some little parallel therein) I shall briefly shew, That it is the duty of all Grand Jurors, in all Cases of blood, touching the death of any reasonable creature, by violence,

violence, or by the hand or act of any other reaſonable Creature, where the Bill of Indictment is brought unto them for Murther, in caſe they find, upon the Evidence, any probability that the perſon ſaid to be killed in the Indictment, was ſlain by the perſon charged to do it in the Indictment) to put *Billa vera* to that Indictment, without foreclоſing the Court, by judging amongſt themſelves the points of Law that may ariſe in that caſe, as whether it be Murther, Manſlaughter, at Common Law, or upon the Statute *Se def. per Infortunium*, Juſtifiable, or otherwiſe; none of theſe ſpecial matters being to be found by them that are but Inquiſitors and Accuſers for the King; not tryers of the offence, hearing but Witneſſes on one ſide, and whoſe preſentment, or verdict, is not final, but muſt be put to Iſſue betwixt the King and the party to be tried by another Jury, whether there be truth in it or no, whatever the practice

practice of Grand Jurors hath been (of late) to the contrary; this being the chief aim and design of this Tract.

I have not met with any amongst Christians, and I believe there is none amongst Heathens, or rational Creatures, but believe, whatever their practices are to the contrary, that the shedding of Innocent bloud is a great offence, a crying sin. To take away the life of a Plant, is but the vigour in the juyce; and the life of a Beast, is but the vigour in the bloud; but the life of a Man is a (r) *spirit*, and spiritual substance, the breath of God breathed into him, and not to be extinguished unjustly by the hand of man. Certainly, *vox sanguinis est vox clamantis*, it is one of the four sins (s) that the Scripture calls, *Clamantia Peccata*, Crying Sins, that cry to God for vengeance (even in this world) upon the Manslayer. Immediately after the Floud God

(r) Gen. 9. 4.

(s) *Sant vox clamorum, vox sanguinis &* Sodomorum, *vox oppressorum, vindices detenta laborum.*

commanded, that blood unjuſtly ſhed ſhould be required by the Magiſtrate of the Manquiller. It is within the *Magna Charta* of God himſelf, and by an Act of Parliament made in Heaven, never to be repealed, It is enacted, that *he that ſheds mans blood, by man ſhall his blood be ſhed. At the hand of every mans Brother will I require the life of man*, ſays God himſelf (t). God many times allowed of *Reſtitution*, and other ſatisfactions in other Felonies, but never in caſe of blood; for, *who can make ſatisfaction for the life of a Man?*

(t) *Solus Deus qui vitam dat vitæ eſt Dominus; nec poteſt quiſquam eam juſte auferre niſi Deus, vel gerens authoritatem Dei, ut Judex.*

And this was the reaſon, that amongſt Chriſtians it was not lawful for the Lord to kill his Villain.

The firſt Murtherer that we read of was the Devil, who the Scripture ſays, *was a Murtherer from the beginning; in quantum traxit in peccatum*, in drawing our Firſt Parents into ſin, and ſo to death. The next that we read of (for

(for the Devil would not be long before he had tempted more to his own ſin) was *Cain*, that kill'd his Brother *Abel*, and it ſeems very deſperately ſhed much of his blood in many parts of his body, for the word is in the Plural number, *vox Sanguinum*, the voice of his *Bloods*; or, becauſe the Bloods of the future poſterity of *Abel* (that he might have had) were ſhed in him, by the Murther of *Cain*. It is true that *Cain*'s blood was not ſhed by that Law, although he kill'd his Brother, the World being not then peopled, nor that Law then ſo poſitively given by God, and the example and terrour to others could not then be ſo great (which is oft the great end of puniſhment, *ut pœna ad paucos metus ad omnes perveniat*;) and therefore *Cain* was to ſurvive by God's ſpecial appointment, not by any favour of God towards him, but that he might have Gods mark (as a Murtherer) upon him, to the Terrour of all

others that ſhould ſee him. What viſible mark and diſtinction this was, is but conjectured at; ſome think it was a horrible ſhaking over his whole body, as the *Septuagint* tranſlate, who, for *Thou ſhalt be a Vagabond and Runagate*, read, *He ſhould* (u) *ſigh and tremble*; or an exceeding ſhame and confuſion, in that he ran from place to place to hide himſelf; or ſome viſible mark in his face, as *Lyranus* thinketh: Some *Hebrews* think it was a horn in his forehead; ſome, a letter; ſome, that a Dog led him. The Scripture is plain, that for this Murther he was to be a *Fugitive, and a Vagabond upon the face of the Earth*; one (as the Text ſays) that *went from the preſence of the Lord*, to whom the Earth was accurſed; and certainly the guilt and ſhame he carried about him, like the bloody *Jews* that murthered Chriſt, and are to this day Vagabonds over the Earth; or thoſe bloody ſurviving Regicides, that mur-

(u) *Occultum flagellum.* The wound of Conſcience.

murthered the best of Kings (*x*) (yet live, with that black mark of King-killing upon them) was, and is, a Judgment greater than death it self; as it is in the *Psalms* (*y*), *Slay them not lest my people forget it: but scatter them abroad amongst the people, and put them down, O Lord, our defence.* And that was the Judgment of *Cain*, who before his natural death (some say) was kill'd by *Lamech*, who shot in a Bush at a Beast, and kill'd *Cain* (*z*). And the *Turks* at this day believe, that at the Day of Judgment, when the Grave and Hell shall deliver up their dead, *Cain*, that Fratricide and murtherer, shall lead, and be as it were the Captain of the damned in Hell.

(*x*) K. Charles the First.

(*y*) Psal. 59. 11.

(*z*) Theod. quæst. 44. in Gen.

Amongst all the Laws of God, which he himself appointed the *Israelites* (his own People) when they were to inhabite *Canaan*, the Land of Promise, there was not any mercy, or City of Refuge appointed for a Murtherer or Man-

ſlayer, but only where it was done unawares; as ſeveral clear Caſes are put in Scripture to make this
35.Numb.23. plain, 35 *Numb.*23.v. *If one throw a Stone that a man die thereof (and ſaw him not) but did it unawares.* So the 19.*Deut.*5. *When*
19.Deut.5. *a man goeth to the wood with his Neighbour* (mark how ſtrongly this Caſe is put, with his Neighbour, his Friend, whom he had no unkindneſs for) *to hew wood, and as his hand fetcheth a ſtroak with the Axe to cut down the Tree, the head ſlippeth of from the helve and ſmiteth his Neighbour that he die*; in theſe, and many ſuch like caſes there put, *he ſhall flee to the City of Refuge, and ſtay there until the Congregation ſhall judge betwixt the Manſlayer, and the Avenger of blood, whether he did it wittingly, or unawares.* The *Hebrews* underſtand by the *Congregation*, the *Senators* and *Chief Judges* of the City; and although it were done *unawares*, and ſo adjudged by the Congregation, yet

yet ſo hainous was the offence of Blood before God (though nothing of mans will in it) that even ſuch Manſlayer was never (during his life) afterwards to depart from the City until it was ſo adjudged by the Congregation, or until the death of the High-Prieſt, (who was a type of Chriſt that ſet us all free ;) for if he did depart, then the Avenger of blood, (who was next Kinſman to the party ſlain) might, if he met him, juſtifie the killing of him. So it is very apparent, that before theſe Cities of Refuge were appointed for mercy to him that had killed another unawares, ſuch a Manſlayer might have been killed by the Avenger of blood, as well as he that had killed another wilfully: and after they were ordained, they could not be intended to ſhew Mercy, or to be an *Aſylum* or Sanctuary for any that had willingly, wilfully, or by a paſſionate aſſault killed another. If it be objected (as what ſin or

offender is there that hath not his Advocate) that it is ſaid in the 19. of *Deut.* 11. v. *But if any man hate his Neighbour, and lay await for him, and riſe againſt him and ſmite him that he die, and then flie to any of thoſe Cities, he ſhall be fetcht thence, and delivered into the hands of the Avenger of blood, that he may die. Thine eye* (though the tendereſt part thou haſt) *ſhall not ſpare him* (how comely ſoever his perſon may ſeem) *but thou ſhalt put Innocent blood from* Iſrael, *that it may go well with thee* (a). If it ſhall be inferr'd from hence, That the Cities of Refuge were ordained for all ſorts of Manſlaughter, but where it was done of malice, forethought, ancient hatred, or with a ſedate and malicious mind; hereby implying, that he that kills another upon a ſudden quarrel, aſſault, or in heat of blood (as it is termed) might flie to a City of Refuge, and find Sanctuary; It muſt needs be upon a very great miſtake.

19. Deut. 11.

(a) i.e. *with the Magiſtrate and People.*

miſtake. Nor can the Judicials of God herein (put into ſeveral plain and illuſtrating Caſes by God himſelf) be reconciled if it ſhould be ſo underſtood: It is ſaid in the 31. *Exod.* 13. *If a man lay not wait, but God deliver him into his hands, then I will appoint thee a place whither he ſhall flie.* The meaning of the *delivering him into his hands*, muſt of neceſſity be underſtood of ſuch a providence that could not be foreſeen, and ſo not poſſible to be prevented by the Manſlayer, wherein there could be nothing of his will, but purely chance and unawares, as in the Caſes put before of caſting the Stone, and killing one he ſaw not; cutting of the wood, and falling of the helm of the Axe, or Bough from the Tree; where many ſuch Examples might be given, which the Law of *England* now ſums up in one head or Reaſon, *viz.* (*b*) Where one is doing

(*b*) *utrum quis dederit operam rei licitæ an illicitæ.* Stamf. lib. 1. fol. 12.

doing a lawful and juſtifiable act in his Trade, Calling, or lawful Recreation, and by chance and unawares, another happens to be kill'd by him, then he ſhall have a Pardon of courſe now inſtead of a City of Refuge (as ſhall be hereafter ſhewed) for it is very plain by expreſs places of Scripture, that all other voluntary killing of a man unlawfully, found no Mercy, no City of Refuge, but there the Manſlayer was to die by the hand of the Avenger of blood (it appearing ſo before the Magiſtrate or Congregation:) As to inſtance in ſome few Caſes out of Scripture. 21. *Exod.* 12. *He that ſmiteth a man that he die, ſhall be ſlain for it:* if any deſtruction follow, there he ſhall give life for life (except it be unawares.) So in the 16, 17, 18. v. of the 31. of *Numbers*, *If any man ſmite another with an inſtrument of Iron that he die, then he is a murtherer, and the Murtherer ſhall die for it. If he ſmite him by throwing a Stone that*

21. Exod. 12.

31. Numb. 16, 17, 18.

that he die, he that ſmote him is a Murtherer, let the ſame murtherer be ſlain; therefore the Avenger of blood himſelf ſhall ſlay the Murtherer. When he meeteth him he ſhall ſlay him (mark the Ingemination,) *he ſhall ſurely ſlay him*, as it is in the 21. *Exod.* 12. *He that ſmiteth a man that he die, ſhall die the death*; that is, *ſhall ſurely die*; for this doubling of the word, *importat majorem certitudinem*, importeth greater certainty; and yet in all theſe Caſes, not one word of *malice*, *lying in wait*, or *enmity*. (c) It is a general Law, He that killeth ſhould be killed again, and this Law is grounded upon the Law of Nature; for like as it is agreeable to Nature, *ut putridum membrum abſcindatur, ut reliqua conſerventur*, that a rotten member ſhould be cut off that the reſt may be preſerved; ſo a Murtherer is to be killed, *ne plures occidantur*, leſt more ſhould be killed. This Law

All theſe ſuddain Actions.

(c) *He that ſmiteth another that he die*; ſive intendat occidere, ſive non, *ſhall die.*

Gen. 9. Law is given unto *Noah*, *Gen.* 9. when the World was reſtored; and here it is but repeated and renewed. The Laws of other Nations herein conſent with *Moſes*: The *Athenians* did ſeverely puniſh Murther, expelling the Murtherer from the Temple of the Gods, and from all Society and Colloquy of Men, till he had his Judgment. And by the Law *Cornelia*, among the *Romans*, He which had killed another with ſword, or poyſon, or by falſe Teſtimony, loſt his head, if he were of the better ſort; if of meaner condition, he was hanged on the Croſs, or caſt unto Wild beaſts, that was himſelf like a Tiger amongſt men; *Simler*. And the reaſon of the ſeverity was, becauſe Murtherers deface the Image of God in Man (*d*), and lay violent hands to take away his temporal

(*d*) *By Murther a reaſonable Creature is loſt, which all the World cannot reſtore. Trees, though they be cut down grow again, but a Man once ſlain can never be recovered.* Pericl. apud Plut. in ipſius vita. *And for the moſt part, unleſs the Mercy of God be the greater, the Soul is loſt with the Body.*

life,

life, for whom Christ died to give eternal life. A King (an inferiour god) would take it ill to have his Image, his Picture, wilfully stab'd through and cut in pieces by any, because it is his. It is very plain, by the Judicials of God, that where there was any wilful smiting, or striking (though suddenly, and from a present passion, occasioned by a sudden provocation) whereby death followed, in which the will, fury (which is a temporary madness) assent, or assault of the Manslayer, might appear, there was no City of Refuge, or Mercy, by Gods Law provided for it; only what was done unawares, and unforeseen (as aforesaid) found a City of Refuge, otherwise what can be meant by those words, *unawares*, and where *he saw him not:* and in these very Cases of killing another, *ex improviso*, unawares, or by misfortune, for whom there was a City of Refuge provided (by God himself) yet there the Avenger

Avenger of blood, if he overtook the Manſlayer before he got to a City of Refuge (and in ſome places it was many miles to one of them) he might juſtifie the killing of him.

During the *Iſraelites* ſojourning in the *Deſert*, the Tabernacle (where mention is made of the Altar) was their Refuge in ſuch a caſe; afterwards in the Land of (*e*) *Canaan* there were ſix Cities of Refuge appointed, three beyond *Jordan*, and three on this ſide. Three other (*f*) Cities of like nature God promiſed the *Iſraelites*, upon condition of their obedience, after their Coaſts were enlarged; but it ſeems their *diſobedience* hindred the accompliſhment thereof, for Scripture mentioneth not the fulfilling of it. The manner of Examination of one that fled to the City of Refuge was

(*e*) Bezer *of the* Reubenites, Ramoth *of* Gilead *of the* Gadites, Golan *in* Baſhan *of the* Manaſſites; *theſe three on this ſide* Jordan, Deut. 4.41, 43. *theſe three appointed by* Moſes.

(*f*) Cadeſh *in* Galilee *in Mount* Naphtali, Shechem *in* Ephraim, *and* Kiriatharba *which is in* Hebron *in the Mountain of* Judah; *theſe three laſt were beyond* Jordan, *and appointed by* Joſhua: Joſh. 20.7. *equally diſtant one from another in* Canaan. *R.* Salom. Jarchi, *Deut.* 19.3.

was thus; The Consistory or Bench of Justices who lived in that quarter where the Murther was committed, (*g*) placed the party, being brought back from the City of Refuge, in the Court or Judgment Hall, and diligently enquired and examined the cause; who, if he were found guilty of voluntary Murther, then was he punished with death; but if the fact were found casual, then he was safely conducted back again to the City of Refuge, where he enjoyed his liberty, not only within the Walls of the City, but within certain Territories and bounds of the City, within such limits until the death of the High-Priest (that was in those days) after whose death he was at liberty; *Josh.*20.6. By this means the offender, though he was not punished with death, yet he lived (for the time, although the offence was involuntary and *præter intentionem*) a kind of Exile for his own humiliation, and for the abatement of his wrath who was

(*g*) Paul. Fag. *Numb.*36. 6.

20. Joshua 6.

was the Avenger of blood. (*d*) The *Areopagitæ* had a proceeding against *casual Manslaughter*, not much unlike, punishing the offender ἀπενιαυτισμῷ, with a years banishment. It is not agreed amongst Expositors, why the time of this Exilement was limited to the death of the High-Priest at that time: but probably thought, that the offender was therefore confined within that City, as within a prison, during the High-Priests life, because the offence did most directly strike against him, as being amongst men, ἀρχιερὸς, *ac Princeps Sanctitatis*, The chief god on earth. These places of Refuge appointed by God, differed from those of *Hercules*, and *Romulus*, and others, Heathens, yea, and Christian Kings formerly of this Nation, because God allowed safety only to those who were guiltless in respect of their intention: but the others were common Sanctuaries (*h*), as well

(*g*) Masius *in* Josh. *cap.* 20.

(*h*) Asylum Sanctuarium. *In the time of King* Henry 8. *these were places of Sanctuary; All Parish Churches, Cathedral and Collegiate Chappels dedicated, and their Church-yards and Sanctuaries to them belonging; and* Wells, Westminster, Manchester, Northampton, Norwich, Darby, *and* Lancaster. *Afterwards, in the same Kings Reign*, Manchester *was determined and* Westchester *appointed*, Westchester *discharged and* Stafford *appointed, by Letters Pat. from the King.* Stamf. *fol.* 116.

well for the guilty as the guiltleſs: If any man did fortuitouſly, or by chance kill another man, in ſuch a caſe, a Liberty was granted unto the offender to flie, at firſt unto the Altar for Refuge, as is implied by that Text of Scripture, *If any man come preſumptuouſly unto his Neighbour to ſlay him with guile, thou ſhalt take him from mine Altar.* Exod. 21. 14. (*i*).

(*i*) *Theſe places of Sanctuary extended not to Treaſon, Wilful Murther, Rape, Burglary, Robbery, Sacriledge, Burning of Houſes and Barns with Corn, &c.* 32 H. 8. 12. 33 H. 8. 15. *It ſeems they did extend to all theſe offences before theſe Statutes. All Statutes made concerning Abjured perſons and Sanctuaries, made before* 35 Eliz. *were repealed by the* 1. *of King* James *c.* 25. *Clergy is ſince taken away by ſeveral* Statutes *for thoſe offences aforeſaid, for which Sanctuary by the aforeſaid* Statutes *was taken away.*

And it is thought that Temples, as they were built, had the like priviledge; as, *Joab fled to the Temple, and took hold of the horns of the Altar.* The Reaſons why the Lord appointed Cities of Refuge are principally theſe; Firſt, leſt that the Innocent party might be ſlain, by the Friends of him whom he had killed, before

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his cauſe was heard, and the manner of the ſlaughter determined by the Judges. Secondly, it was ſo appointed, that he might ſtay there to the death of the High-Prieſt, who was a type of our Bleſſed Saviour, by whoſe precious death we are all ſet free. Thirdly, this was done *ut menti eorum (hac ratione) medeatur, &c.* to heal and allay the mind and fury of thoſe which otherwiſe would delight in murther; for by his abſence and continuance of time, the rage of thoſe that ſought his life would be qualified, and therefore God provideth, that they ſhould not ſtill be provoked by the continual ſight of him. Fourthly, and further by this, that he that killeth a man unwittingly is appointed to flie, it is ſhewed (*quod reus pœnæ efficitur*) that yet he is guilty of ſome puniſhment. So that involuntary killing was puniſhed with a kind of Baniſhment among the *Iſraelites:* So likewiſe amongſt the *Athenians*, ſuch kind of

of Manslaughter was censured with one years Exile. And so among the *Israelites*, he that escaped from the Avenger of blood (for it was but an escape) was not to go out of the limits and bounds of the City, if he did, it was lawful for the kinsman of the man that was slain to kill him.

There is a manifest distinction of voluntary and involuntary Murther or killing, grounded upon the Law of *Moses*: Involuntary killing is of two sorts, there are ἀπροσίματα, *chances unlookt for* and *sudden events*, as when one shooteth an Arrow (upon a lawful account, and killeth one unawares, as *Peleus* killed his Son, being in hunting with him. There are besides these, ἁμαρτήματα, *errours* and *oversights*, as the Father beateth his Child, purposing only to chastise him, and do him good, and he dieth of it. There are likewise two kinds of voluntary or wilful Murther, *ex proposito*, of *purpose*, & *ex impetu*

animi, in *heat* or *rage*; these kind of Murthers are called ἀδικήματα, *Iniquities*, one may be slain *ex proposito*, purposely, *per insidias*, by lying in wait, when one watcheth for the life of a man, and taketh him at advantage, as *Joab* killed *Abner*, and afterwards fled to the Temple, and took hold of the Horns of the Altar, which notwithstanding could not priviledge him; and afterwards killed *Amasa*, they suspecting no such thing; so *Ismael* killed *Gedoliah*: or else *per Industriam*, when one of set purpose picketh quarrels, and seeketh occasions to provoke a man that he may kill him. Both these kinds are touched here, *Tostat. quæst.* 16. Then one may be killed in heat and rage when there was no purpose before, as *Alexander* the Great killed *Clitus*. This kind though not so grievous as the other, yet is a kind of voluntary killing, for whom there was no mercy by Gods Law, as it is in the Margent of the Great Bible, *Wilful Murther*

Murther cannot be pardoned without Gods high displeasure. Nay, as it is more fully in the Text it self, (k) *Thine eye* (though the most compassionate sense) *shall not spare him, but thou, whoever thou be, shalt put away innocent blood from* Israel, *that it may go well with thee.* Now the putting away of Innocent blood is by revenging it on him that spilt it, as it is in the 10. v. of the same Chapter, *That Innocent blood be not shed in the land, which the Lord thy God giveth thee to inherit, and so blood come upon thee*; that is, that the Blood of the party slain be not imputed to thee: This Imputation of blood, which is of more weight than the Imputation of all *Adams* sin, because the command is more immediate and legible to us; it concerned all the *Israelites* in general, but more especially doth it concern those chosen by Law to make Inquisition after (l) Innocent

(k) 19. Deut. 13.

(l) Polluitur & fœdatur terra, *Numb.* 35. 30. 33. *Ye shall take no satisfaction for the life of a Murtherer which is guilty of death, but he shall be surely put to death; for ye shall not pollute the Land wherein you are, for blood defileth the Land, and the land cannot be cleansed of the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it.*

blood unlawfully and wilfully ſhed as principally Grand Jurors are; for whoſe ſakes, and that the following diſcourſe may fix the better upon their Judgments, and thereby make a right impreſſion upon their Conſciences to be more circumſpect and careful in their Preſentments in caſes of Blood, I have premiſed (as I conceive) what was the will and Law of God (as he himſelf hath declared it, and left it upon Record to us in his Judicials to his people *Iſrael*) who received Laws and Judgments from God himſelf for their whole model and ſyſtem of Political Government; agreeable to which I might add the mind of our Saviour Chriſt under the Goſpel (who is the beſt Interpreter of the Law) in bidding *Peter* put up his Sword (*m*), and his interpretation upon the ſixth Command, *He that is angry with his Brother* unadviſedly *ſhall be* culpable *of Judgment* (*n*). I ſhall

(*m*) Matt. 26. 52.

(*n*) Matt. 5. 22. *Qui iraſcitur ſine cauſa, quantum ad voluntatem, homicidium fecit.* Chryſoſt. *hom. in* Matt. *Ira eſt appetitus ultionis.*

in

in the next place endeavour to manifeſt, how parallel the Laws of *England* have been, and are, to the Judicial Laws of God in the puniſhing of Murther and ſhedding Innocent blood, and extending mercy where it is done *præter intentionem*, unawares and by misfortune, or in the neceſſary defence of a mans own life or property, and what *Aſylum* is provided for ſuch; and how the courſe and practice of the Laws of *England* ought to be, in preſenting and making Inquiſition (by Grand Jurors) after the ſame.

Not to look ſo far back to find what the Laws were (in caſe of Felony and Murther) as to the time of the *Saxons* (*o*) Heptarchy in *England*, when the Monarchy had many heads, being *Bellua multorum Capitum*; and ſo for the moſt part had ſo many ſeveral Laws, each Prince either pleaſing his own humor, or adapting his Laws to the condition and quality of the people he had to govern,

(*o*) Kent, South-Saxons, Weſt-Saxons, Eaſt-Saxons, Eaſt-Angles, Northumberland, Mercia.

which as they differed in their qualities, and conſtitutions, as much as the ſeveral Winds differ the ſeveral Climates from whence they blow, out of the four Corners of the world, from whence many of their Kingdoms were differenced and diſtinguiſhed by names; ſo did they differ in the nature and quality of their Laws: ſome of the *Saxon* Kings had excellent Laws, as *Ina*, as ſaith Venerable *Bede* (*p*), who flouriſhed in that Kings time. The mulct or breach of Peace was forty ſhillings in the *Mercian* Law. In the *Weſt-Saxon* Law, fifty ſhillings. The puniſhment of a Free-man was pecuniary, and loſs of liberty, of a ſlave by whipping. Treaſon againſt the Lord was Capital, and could not be appeaſed with mony. Amongſt the Laws of *Canutus* the King it is ſaid, (*q*) *Si quis in Regia dimicaret, Capitale eſto, niſi quidem Rex hoc illi crimen condonarit.* If any ſhould quarrel or fight in the Kings Palace it was Capital, except

(*p*) L. 7. c. 16. & l. 5. c. 4. p. 375.

(*q*) L. *Canut.* fol. 117. c. 56.

except the King remitted the fault. They were unwilling to put any man to death, becauſe of leſſening their ſtrength, being ſo much divided that for the moſt part there was an *æſtimatio capitis*, a certain ſum of mony, or Corporal puniſhment ſet upon every Murtherer and Felon, reſpecting the quality of the perſon killed, or he that killed him; yet amongſt them there was ſtrict inquiry after Blood, by puniſhing the offender according to their Laws.

And to look for it amongſt the *Danes*, and their Laws, would be to as little purpoſe; for as it is well obſerved by Mr. *Lambert* (*r*), *Temporibus vero Regum* Danorum *ſepultum fuit Jus in regno, Leges & Conſuetudines, ſimul ſopitæ, temporibus eorum prava voluntas, vis, & violentia magis regnabant quam Judicium in terra.* In the time of the *Daniſh* Kings, Right was buried, Laws and Cuſtomes were laid aſleep together, the depraved Will, Strength and Violence

(*r*) Lambert *L.* Edw. Confeſſ. c. 16. *de Inventione Murdri.*

lence did reign and rule more than Judgment in the land.

Yet to make ſome amends we have it by good Tradition, that good St. *Edward* the *Confeſſor*, the laſt King of the *Danes* that was King of *England*) yet of *Saxon* blood, Collected out of the *Daniſh*, *Saxon*, and *Mercian* Laws, an univerſal and general Law (whence our Common Law is thought to have had its original) which may be true of the Written Laws, not of the Cuſtomary and unwritten Laws, theſe being certainly more ancient. Some ſay, that *Edward* the Third, before the Conqueſt, ſet forth the Common Law, called the *Laws of Edward* to this day, which St. *Edward* eſpouſed as his Act, and falling laſt upon the work He carries the name. One ſays King *Canute* compoſed our Common Law, which St. *Edward* the *Confeſſor* obſerved. This King *Edward* the *Confeſſor* was in his life of that Holineſs, that he received power

Ranulph. Ceſtr. l. 1. c. 550. *Hov.* 600. *L. Ed.* c. 35. in *Hoved.*

Malmsb. de geſt. reg. l. 2. c. 11.

power from above to cure many Diſeaſes, amongſt others the ſwelling of the Throat (called by us) *The Kings evil*; a prerogative that continueth hereditary to his ſucceſſors, Kings of *England*, to this day; the powerful effect whereof hath been moſt eminently manifeſted by the Touch of our moſt gracious King that now is (ſince his happy Return into *England*) upon very many thouſands; ſome (to my knowledge) that formerly derided that occult perſonal Kingly vertue, inherent to the Imperial Scepter of *England*, being of St. *Thomas* his faith, that would not believe except they felt, now remaining fully ſatisfied of the truth thereof from their own experience of the cure upon themſelves. K. CHARLES the Second.

The aforeſaid St. *Edward*, for his holineſs, charity, and good actions, was Canonized for a *Saint*, having reigned over *England* twenty four years. The Kings of *England* at this day, in their Coro-

Coronation Oath taken at the high Altar, ſwear eſpecially to obſerve and keep the Laws of this St. *Edward*. Theſe Laws ſo collected by this holy King *Edward*, were by *William* the *Conquerer* (to whom he had bequeathed this Kingdom of *England* by Will, though afterwards he was forced
An. Dom. 1087. to get it by the Sword) confirmed in theſe words, *Hoc quoque præcipio ut omnes habeant & teneant legem Regis* Edwardi *in omnibus rebus*, as Mr. *Lambert* hath it, *inter leges Gulielmi*. Notwithſtanding he informs us, that this King *William* (*poſt acquiſitionem Angliæ*) after he had obtained and ſetled the Kingdom in peace, in the fourth year of his Reign,
(s) *Nobilium*. *Concilio* (s) *Baronum ſuorum*, by the advice of his Nobility, he cauſed to be ſummoned throughout *England*, the Nobles, Wiſemen, and ſuch as were skilful in the Laws, Rights and Cuſtomes of *England*, and elected twelve Knights out of every County, who

who were ſworn before the King to make a true Collection of the ſaid Laws and Cuſtomes. *Nihil prætermittentes, nil addentes, nil prævaricando mutantes.* Amongſt theſe Laws we do not find Murther puniſhed with death. It being ſo near the time of the *Danes* and *Saxons*, it ſeems he made no violent alteration of their Laws, but kept their cuſtome of *æſtimatio Capitis*, or Corporal puniſhment. We find amongſt his Laws theſe words, (t) *Interdico etiam ne quis occidatur vel ſuſpendatur pro aliqua culpa ſed eruantur oculi, & abſcindantur teſticuli vel pedes vel manus, ita quod truncus vivus remaneat in ſignum proditionis & nequitiæ ſuæ* (u). I command that none be killed or hanged for any offence, but that his eyes be put out, and his Teſticles,

(t) *Lamb.* inter Leges *Gulielmi* Regis *fol.* 126.

(u) *By the ancient Law of* England, *he that* mahimed *any Man whereby he loſt any part of his body, the Delinquent ſhould loſe the like part; as he that took away another mans life ſhould loſe his own,* Bract. lib. 3. numb. 4. *So if the Defendant in an Appeal of* mahime *ſhould be found guilty, Judgment againſt the Defendant ſhould have been, That he ſhould loſe the like Member that the Plaintiff loſt, by this means, a hand for a hand, &c.* 40 Aſſ. 9. Mirror c. 4 & 5.

or

or feet, or hands be cut off, ſo that the Trunk of his body may remain alive; in token of his Treaſon and wickedneſs: any puniſhment then, but loſs of life and baniſhment, for it is ſaid amongſt his Laws, *Prohibeo ut nullus vendat hominem extra patriam.* I forbid that any perſon be ſold out of his Country.

Now although that theſe kinds of puniſhments are not commenſurate to the offence, or to the Law of God, or to the Laws of *England*, in caſes of Murther, there being not life for life; yet who is there almoſt amongſt the Sons of men, that would not rather chuſe to be hanged, than to have his eyes put out, his Teſticles, feet, and hands cut off, and to ſurvive with ſuch a brand of Ignominy. (*x*) Amongſt the Laws of the Conquerer, in the Title *Lex Murdrorum*, it is there found; If any be found Murthered, the Village in whom he was ſo found, was within eight days

(*x*) *Lamb.* in leges *Edvardi* R.C.15. Lex Murdrorum. v. *Stamf.* lib.1. fol.17.

to

to deliver the Murtherer; *Justiciæ Regis*; if he were not found within one Month and a day, the Village was to pay forty marks; if the Village were not able, then the Hundred was to pay it, and this mony was to be sealed up, under the Seal of a Nobleman of the County, and sent into the Exchequer, there to remain a year and a day, to the end, that if the Hundred or Village could within a year and a day bring the body of the Murtherer to Justice, they should have their mony again; if they could not within that time take him, the Parents of him that was murthered should have six mark, and the King the rest; if he had no Parents, then his Lord or Master should have it; if no Lord or Master, then (*y*) *Selagus ejus*, i.e. *fide cum eo ligatus*, that is, his Pledge or Surety; if he had none of these, then the King should have all the forty Marks (which was as much then as five hundred pounds now) *sub cujus*

(*y*) His Pledge or Surety.

cujus protectione, & pace degunt universi; If the Murtherer were found, and would not defend his Innocency, *Judicio Dei, scilicet aqua, vel ferro*, that is, stand in hot scalding-water, or pass barefoot over hot-bars of Iron, *fieret de eo Justitia*, let Justice be executed up on him; but what this Justice was, or what punishment he should suffer, some doubt there is: (z) Some say it was *ad voluntatem Regis*, or the usual way of *æstimatio Capitis*, or Corporal punishment, and not to suffer death, because (as before is observed) there is found amongst those Laws, *Ne quis occidatur, vel suspendatur, pro aliqua Culpa*; though others are of another Judgment, that it was Capital if the King pleased, whatever the punishment was; you shall not read of any Insurrection or Rebellion before the Conquest, when the view of Frank-pledge, and other

(z) *That is, so much as one paid for the killing of a man; by which it appeareth, that such Government was in those days, as slaughters of men were most rarely committed, as Mr.* Lambert *collecteth.* Lamb. Expositio verb. *Estimatio.* Flet. *lib.* 1. *c.* 42. Hoved. *fol.* 344.

other ancient Laws of this Realm were in their right uſe.

There are many that are full of Sr. *Thomas Moore*'s kindneſs, and think it too much that a man ſhould loſe his life for crimes under Murther, as for Theft, &c. (but none ſo kind to a Murtherer) for which anciently a loſs of a Hand, Eye, Leg, or other member was in uſe; yet the party taken in the manner, *hand habend.* having the ſtoln thing in his hand, in his poſſeſſion, might be killed amongſt the *Saxons*, he could not buy his Crime out; and the *Spaniſh* condemning to the Gallies, is thought by ſome the only way. Mr. *Daniel* will have it, that *as yet* (writing of King *Henry* the Second's time) *they came not ſo far as Blood*, which is not ſo; for King *Henry* the Firſt (*a*) (abrogating the *were-gilde*) by which a man might have bought out his offence, made a Law, ſays *Hoveden*, *Ut ſi quis in furto*

(*a*) Hoveden *ſaw.* 471. *in* H. 1. *Concil.* Birghamſtead. *Concil.* 197. *L. K.* Canut. *c.* 61. *L. K.* Ina 5. 37. Æthelſt.

furto vel latrocinio deprehenſus fuiſſet ſuſpenderetur; to hang the Thief: with whom *Vigornienſis* and *Rad. Niger* agree. And the Lo. *Coke* obſerves in the third *Inſtitutes*, that before the Reign of King *Henry* the Firſt the Judgment for Felony was not alwaies the ſame, but King *Henry* the Firſt ordained by Parliament, that the Judgment for all manner of Felonies ſhould be, that *he ſhould be hanged by the neck until he be dead:* After, in the latter end of the Reign of King *Henry* the Third, we find a Thief who had ſtolen twelve Oxen beheaded. Capital puniſhments have not only been in uſe againſt Homicides and Felonies, but other Tranſgreſſors alſo, and amongſt thoſe who worſhipped God rightly (as is well obſerved) we meet with no Divine precept before *Judah*, which makes Whoredom worthy of death, yea, when he is told, Tamar *thy Daughter in law hath played the Harlot*, he anſwers, *Bring*

9 H. 1.

Matth. Pariſ. *continuat.* 1005.

Bring her forth and let her be burnt. (*b*) Amongſt the *Britains*, if the Wife killed her Husband ſhe was to be burnt; ſo are the *Engliſh* Laws to this day. *We may proceed* (ſays *Grotius*) *by conjecture of the Divine will, with the help of Natural reaſon, from like to like, and that which is a Law againſt Felonies and Murthers, may be extended to others as dangerouſly miſchievous: It is a hard diſpute, whether there be more mercy in death, or putting out of Eyes, cutting off Legs, Arms, &c. or in the Gallies. It is believed, that the boldneſs and number of Malefactors begot the Law of death, and thoſe whom Death with ſo much Infamy (ſo often reiterated before their eyes) cannot fright, will never think any Torment whatſoever (where life is left them, though with more miſery than can be ſpoken) terrible.*

(*b*) Cæſar's *Comment.* l. 6. *ante Chriſtum natum* 1600 *annis.*

It is well obſerved by the Lo. *Coke*, that, *Videbis ea ſæpe committi, quæ ſæpe vindicantur.* Thoſe offences are often committed, that are often puniſhed; and he gives his Reaſon for it, That the frequency of the puniſhment makes it ſo familiar, as it is not feared. *For Example* (ſaith he) *what a lamentable caſe it is, to ſee ſo many Chriſtian men and women ſtrangled on that curſed Tree of the Gallows, inſomuch, as if in a large field a man might ſee together all the Chriſtians, that but in one year, throughout* England, *come to that untimely and ignominious death, if there were any ſpark of Grace, or Charity in him, it would make his heart to bleed for pity and compaſſion.* I my ſelf have known at one Aſſizes in the County of *Monmouth*, where one hath had Judgment to die for ſtealing a Horſe, and Reprieved, in order to procure his Pardon; another narrowly acquitted of a Felony, and made

Coke 3. Inſtit. Epilog.

Sta. perlegeplor.

uſe

uſe of by the Goaler, to be the Common-Hangman at the ſame Aſſizes; that both theſe perſons (the one breaking the Goal, the other having his liberty, as being acquitted) were both taken in one Felony and Burglary before the next Aſſizes, committed to the Goal, and received Judgment of death, and were both hanged together. So little doth favour, terrour, or example work a Reformation upon thoſe that are hardened in their ſins, and want grace to make good uſe of them.

But it is thought horrible and grievous, that a mans life (the life of a Chriſtian) or any of the Members of his body, ſhould be taken away for ſo ſmall a value as thirteen pence (I take twelve pence to be but petit Larceny, for which he ſhall be whipt) it is very plain that the Statute of 3 *Ed.* 1. *c.* 15. declaring what Priſoners are Mainprizable, or Barable, ſays amongſt other offences (*viz.*) *or* 3 Ed. 1. 15.

for Larceny, which amounteth not above the value of twelve pence: nay, for leſs. King *Æthelſtanes* Laws begin with Thieves, and ſpeak thus; *Firſt, that a man ſpare no Thief who is in the manner, having in his hands taken above eight pence* (it ſeems eight pence then was in the nature of a Petit Larceny;) a Ram in the *Saxons* time was worth but four pence: that which was heretofore ſold for twelve pence, would now be worth forty ſhillings.

In the Aſſize of Bread (long after the *Saxons*) in the 51*th* of *H.* 3. eight Buſhels of Wheat are valued but at twelve pence. In *Edward* the Third's time a Buſhel of Wheat was but ten pence; a Haymaker had but a penny a day, Reapers of Corn two pence, an Acre to be mowed for five pence, Threſhing a quarter of Wheat or Rie but two pence, a Maſter-Carpenter three pence a day, and his man two pence, a Free Maſon four pence, others three pence, their

their Boys one penny, Plaiſterers and their Knaves (ſo named in the Act) the ſame manner, and to find themſelves meat and drink. See the Statute 25 *E.* 3. *c.* 1, and 3. And by the Statute made the *6th* of *H.* 8. of much later time, the wages of a Bayliff of Husbandry was but ſixteen ſhillings eight pence, and for Cloathing him five ſhillings with meat and drink, a Chief Hinde or Shepherd twenty ſhillings, and for his Cloathing five ſhillings, every Common Servant ſixteen ſhillings eight pence, for Cloathing four ſhillings, no Woman Servant above ten ſhillings, her Cloathing four ſhillings, and no Maſter might have given more. 25 Ed. 3. *c.* 1, 3.

And although *twelve pence* keeps not the old Rate, but the Modern, yet things are prized in trials of Life far below their worth, and no man loſeth his life (in a ſingle and ſimple Felony) but where the thing ſtoln riſeth to more than many twelve pences

(eſpecially after the Old eſtimate) but indeed the quality of the Offender, circumſtances of the offence, and of the times, are mainly conſiderable in our Law, where any mans life is taken away in ſuch a Felony.

But to return to our proper Subject, and to manifeſt what the Laws of *Engl ind* were (in Caſes of blood) not long after the Conquerer, and how tender a regard the Law of *England* (anſwerable to the Law of God) had of the Life of man. By a Canon of our Old *Engliſh* Church, he that killed a Man in publick war (though juſtifiable) was enjoyned a Penance of forty days. (*c*) By the Common Law killing by miſadventure, unawares, or in a mans own defence was Murther, founded upon the Judicial Law, before the Cities of Refuge; and the forfeiture and puniſhment of both was, as in caſe of Murther, as appears plainly by the Statutes of *Marlebridge* and

Concil. Saxon. 383.

(*c*) Miſadventure *at the Common Law adjudged Murther*, Stamf. *fol.* 16. *c.* 8.

and *Glouceſter*; the Forfeiture of Goods and Chattels remains as yet: The words of the Statute of *Marlebridge* 52 *H.* 3. are as fol- 52 H. 3.
loweth, *Murther from henceforth ſhall not be adjudged before our Juſtices where it is found Miſfortune only*; which ſhews, before that Statute though a man were killed by Misfortune, he had the ſame Judgment in Law as for Murther: So that after the making of that Statute until the *6th* of *Edw.* 1. Writs were granted 6 Ed. 1.
of courſe, where there was a ſurmiſe that the man was killed by Misfortune, or, *ſe defendendo*, or in any other manner, where the killing was not Felony, and thereupon a Pardon of courſe, or Grace, was granted to the party, who only forfeited his Goods and Chattels, and by benefit of that Pardon, had only his liberty out of priſon, which without he could not have.

This

This way of Mercy it ſeems did ſtretch too far, and covered too many guilty perſons (as I fear yet it does) under her wings, when as their ſeveral Caſes were not judicially examined, indicted, and tried, before hand, by a Grand Jury, and a Jury of Life and Death before a Learned Judge (as in ordinary Trials of Criminals) whereby it came to paſs that many Murthers and Manſlaughters eſcaped under the favourable ſurmiſe of a *per infortunium*, or *ſe defendendo*, as if it were done by misfortune, or in his own defence, and ſo came off from a foul Murther by a Pardon of Courſe. Now for remedy in this caſe came the Statute of *Glouceſter*; the words of which Statute are as followeth;

6 Ed. 1. c. 9.

The King commandeth, that no Writ ſhall be granted out of Chancery for the death of a man, to enquire, whether a man did kill another by Misfortune, or in his own defence, or in any other manner

manner, without Felony; but he ſhall be put in priſon until the coming of the Juſtices in Eyre, or Juſtices aſſigned to the Gaol-delivery, and ſhall put himſelf upon the Country before them for good and evil (that is, for life or death;) *if in caſe it be found by the Country that he did it in his defence, or by misfortune; Then by the Report of the Juſtices to the King, the King ſhall take him to his Grace (if it pleaſe him.)* The Report to the King is, to Certifie the Record into the Chancery, where the King is alwaies preſent; and therefore it is called a *Pardon of Courſe*, Stamford *fo.* 15. whereas the Kings own *hand* and *fiat* is to other Pardons. So that here it is very plain, that he that will be acquitted and diſcharged out of Priſon for Manſlaughter, *per infortunium*, or *ſe defendendo* (*ex Gratia Regis*) muſt firſt put himſelf, *ſuper Patriam*, upon the Country *de bono & malo* (the very words of the Act) and that is upon

Stamf. *fol.* 15.

upon a Jury of Life and Death; and this he cannot do except the Grand Jury find the Bill of Indictment, Murther or Manſlaughter, let the matter of fact be what it will; for if the Grand Jury ſhall but find the truth of the fact, as it appears in evidence to them, or from their own knowledge (which is that which they now ſo much ſtand upon, that is the very ſpecial matter that makes it Manſlaughter, by misfortune or *ſe defendendo*) the party can never come to be Arraigned upon ſuch an Indictment, for that is not Felony, and if he ſhall be charged with it (the Grand Jury having only found the ſpecial matter in the Indictment or Inquiſition) the party muſt either plead *guilty*, or *not guilty*, either confeſs and juſtifie the Fact, or deny it; if he confeſs, he cannot Juſtifie it, for mens lives are ſo precious in the eye of the Law, that the death of a man cannot be Juſtified, except in courſe of

of Justice, in a lawful War, or in a just defence of a mans life and property, against such as would rob, or designedly murther him. The Defendant in Appeal cannot Justifie the death of a man at his own suit, *se defendendo*, but must plead *not guilty*. Nay, a Verdict of the Jury of Life and Death, that *A* killed *B se defendendo*, or *per Infortunium*, is no good Verdict; the special matter must be set down in writing by them, that the Court may judge the killing to be upon inevitable necessity; neither Grand Jury that hears but one side, nor Jury of Life and Death (that hear both sides) are Judges in this case. For, upon the special matter found by the Jury of Life and Death, if the Court shall not adjudge that special matter good in Law to acquit him of Murther or Manslaughter, it may be either murther or manslaughter in him, and the party may be hanged notwithstanding such Verdict of the Jury of Life and

Br. *Appeal* 122.

Coron. 302.

43. *lib.* Ass. *p.* 31.

Stamf. *lib.* 3. *c.* 9. *fol.* 165.

and Death, how can the Court be judge of the matter in Law, when they hear not the matter in fact from the Witneſſes on both ſides, and the Parties defence for himſelf, which they can never do, if the Grand Jury ſhall take upon them (as they preſume they may) to find the Special matter themſelves, whereby the Party cannot be Arraigned, that ſo he may put himſelf *de bono & malo ſuper patriam*, as the Statute of *Glouceſter* before-mentioned eſpecially requires. If the Party charged with ſuch an Indictment from the Grand Jury (where they will find only the Special matter) ſhall confeſs it, when he is charged with it (as ſure he may) then the Evidence can never be heard in Court, whereby the Judge may determine the point in Law, whether the offence upon the whole matter be Murther or Manſlaughter, or as they find it, and that is meer matter of Law, whether *ſuper totam materiam* of the Evidence (and

(and that must be Evidence on both sides) it be murther, Manslaughter in general, Manslaughter upon the Statute *per Infortunium*, *se defendendo*, justifiable as against a Thief, or *in loco & tempore belli*; and how exceeding dangerous and inconvenient were it for Grand Jurors, so far to anticipate the Judgment of the Court, and to take upon themselves (upon the hearing only of Witnesses on one side, and perhaps not all of them neither) the sole Judgment of Law in all these Cases, by not finding the Indictment (which is but the Kings Declaration for the loss of his Subject, in the same manner as it is advised by the Kings Council Ingrossed, sworn in Court, and delivered to them) especially (for that is alwaies intended) where they have probable Evidence (for they need no more) to prove such a person killed by the hands of such a person, such a day, year, and place. Nay, by the Statute of *Glouceſter*, they must either find the

the Indictment in such a case Murther, for all Indictments (about the killing of a man) were so before that Statute, and no Law since to alter it, or the party can never have a *Certiorari* out of Chancery for his Pardon of Course, whereby he may be discharged out of Prison; for by the strictness of Law, he ought to remain in Prison without Bail until his pardon be procured, which Pardon saves not his Goods or personal Estate, but only pardons his Offence, his violation of the King's Peace (which is violated in the loss of a Subject) according to the Statute of *Glouce-ster*, and procures his liberty, and discharge out of Prison.

The words contained in the Writ of *Certiorari* out of Chancery, in order to the obtaining of a Pardon of Grace, and removing the Record into Chancery, that there the King may see by the Record the truth and nature of the offence, according to the Statute of *Glouce-ster*, being well observed make it very

very plain, that the Special matter of Fact must be found by the second Jury, the Jury of Life and Death, and which is so suggested in Chancery before the Issuing forth of such Writ, as by the Writ more fully appears, viz. *Quia ut accepimus, quòd* A. B. *indictatus, & per Inquisitionem patriæ compert. extitisset, quod idem* A *interfecit prædict.* C. *se def. & non per feloniam aut malitiam præcogitat. unde dictus* A. *Gaol. nostr. prædict. remiss. est ad gratiam nostram inde expectand. vos ea de causa super tenor. Record. & proces. Inquisitionis præd. Certiorari volentes, vobis mandamus quod si ita est, tunc tenor. Record. pro proces. prædict. cum omnibus ea tangent. in Cancell. nostram sub sigillis vestris distincte & aperte mittatis.* Observe how this ancient Writ complies with, and explains the Statute of *Glouc.* in this case; here is in it *Indictatus*, that is, by the Grand Jury, and *per Inquisitionem patriæ compert. extitisset*, that is, the Jury of Life

Certiorary out of Chancery.

and Death; for that is the only Trial in our Law, by the Country, *per Patriam*; and whoever is tried by that Jury, *posuit se de bono & malo super patriam*, which must be for Felony and Murther, the very words of the Statute; for this Jury is to find, in their Writ, that it was *se defendendo & non per felon. aut malitiam præcogitat.* as it is in the Verdict; and observe by the Writ, he is not to be discharged out of Gaol before his pardon of Course procured, for it is in the Writ, *Gaol. nostræ præd. remiss. est* (it seems he was there before) *ad gratiam nostr. inde expectand. &c.* and further, observe the *Mandamus* in this Writ (*si ita est*) if it be so, that the Offence hath received such a trial by two Juries, then Certifie the Record, otherwise not; and what Judge that doth not truly understand this (*si ita est*) which he can never truly do from a Grand Jury, will Certifie such a Record in Chancery, to the King himself, in Cases of Blood.

By

By this it may appear, to all that are rational and unprejudiced, that have not formerly asserted the contrary Opinion, and therefore like the Opiniators of this Age, will (for no other reason) maintain it, That Grand Jurors are not left so free herein, to find what they please, or as they would have it, strictly according to their Evidence, as the Gentlemen of these latter times have taken upon them to do, and even to stand upon it, against the Learned Judges themselves, and their Directions and Advice. Besides, how greatly do they injure the party accused; for if he be Guilty of no higher an Offence than Manslaughter *per Infortunium*, or *se Defendendo*, and the Grand Jury will not find it Murder, whereby he may put himself (as the Statute of *Glouceſter* directs, *de bono & malo ſuper patriam*) he can never by a pardon of course, receive a total and final discharge from the said Offence. For if he should be Indicted at any

time again of Murder for the death of that Party (as he may be at any time after, during his life, notwithſtanding ſuch pardon, where it was not found Murder or Manſlaughter at the firſt) he can make no Plea to ſuch Indictment, in diſcharge of it: he cannot plead *autre fois* Acquit, or Convict, or Attaint of the ſame Offence, becauſe he never put himſelf *de bono & malo ſuper patriam*, upon his Country, his life was never in hazard for it: whereas, if he have been once preſented by the Grand Jury for Murder, and thereupon Arraigned, received a full Tryal, and according to the Statute of *Glouceſter*, had been acquitted of the Murder, and the ſpecial matter of *per Infortunium*, or *ſe Defendendo* found in their Verdict (which by the Law ought to be ſo found by the Jury of Life and Death) under their Hands, that the Judge (upon hearing the whole matter) may be ſatisfied it is found according to Evidence given

given in Court, and thereupon adjudge what that Offence is in Law. If in this case the party that hath received such a full Tryal, and hath sued out a *Certiorari* out of Chancery; and upon the Return of that, hath had the Special matter, the whole Record of proceedings certified by the Judge, before whom the Record remains, and thereupon hath procured his pardon of course out of Chancery; such person can never be called in question again for the same Offence, but he may plead that Record and Verdict of Acquittal from the Murder or Manslaughter, notwithstanding it might happen to be proved afterwards either Murder or Manslaughter, it shall discharge and acquit him for ever.

And if the Grand Jury (as in this case) ought to find every *per Infortunium* Murder (notwithstanding by the Evidence it appear no more to them) *à multo fortiori*, they ought to find every

Offence (that appears to them upon Evidence to be but Manſlaughter) Murder. For the (*d*) *Bill* of Indictment, as it comes from their hands, is but the Kings Declaration of the matter of Fact, to which the Priſoner may plead, *Not Guilty*; and joyn Iſſue with the King, and have it tryed, Whether he be Guilty, or not? *modo & forma*, as it is laid in the Indictment, or may confeſs and juſtifie, as he ſhall find cauſe. For this Indictment or Preſentment of the Grand Jury in the behalf of the King againſt the Priſoner, ſets forth an Act done, *Vi & Armis*, againſt the Kings Peace, his Crown, and Dignity, all which are violated, diſhonoured, & weakned in the loſs of a Subject, in the ſhedding of Innocent Blood, by which his Land is defiled, and his Laws violated; and this according to the Laws of God and Man (*prima facie*) may be Murder, and therefore ought as

(d) *As in the two Houſes of Parliament it is but a Bill whilſt in their hands, the Royal aſſent makes it an Act. So it is but a Bill in the Grand Jury's hand, the other Jury makes it an Act.*

as well (as all Declarations at Law) to be ſet forth in the fulleſt circumſtances of aggravation a Fact of Blood (which far exceeds all other Facts) will bear, eſpecially in laying the ground work and foundation of the Charge, becauſe it cannot heighten or increaſe, but may leſſen and decreaſe, like the Moon in the full, to its loweſt wane, even to nothing, upon a full Examination and Debate of the whole matter, by hearing of Parties and Witneſſes on both ſides, and receiving in the face and audience of the Court ſuch a ſcrutiny and narrow ſearch (as blood requires) into all circumſtances and aggravations of the Offence, that are laid in the Indictment, by the Learned Judge (who is of Counſel as well for the Priſoner as the King, and muſt not let the Priſoner ſuffer for want of Counſel in Law) that a Grand Jury cannot poſſibly do, they hearing but only Witneſſes on one ſide, and not the Priſoner; beſides their want of Judgment

and Knowledge in the Law in all Cases of Blood: whereas, if the Grand Jury shall take upon them (which they ought not to do) to put out of the Indictment and Declaration of the King, the words *Ex malitia præcogitata*) the only words that make it Murder, the Court can never Judicially examine the malice, which is commonly a secret latent thing, carried on with a great privacy and cunning, and appears not in all cases of Murder expres, (and no Evidence can prove further to a Grand Jury) whereas the Law in many cases implies a malice to make it Murder (although the Parties never saw or heard of each other before) which lies not in proof of Witnesses, but ariseth as a point of Law upon the circumstances of the Fact, which, not a Grand Jury, but the Court is Judge of, being matter of Law, which Judgment in Law is wholly frustrated and taken from the Court, when the Grand Jurors put

put out these words, *Ex malitia præcogitata*, which only make it Murder, out of the Indictment. And by such favour, indulgence, or wilfulness in Grand Jurors, many times the greatest Murder escapes by a *per Infortunium*, *se Defendendo*, or at least by a Manslaughter. For if the Grand Jurors shall only find it Manslaughter, the Prisoner upon his Arraignment, presently (if he can but read, get any one to help him, or corrupt the Ordinary, no great difficulty to do) confesses the Indictment, and prevents all further tryal upon that Offence, and so neither the Judge, nor Court, can ever come to understand (although there be twenty Witnesses against the Prisoner) what Evidence the Grand Jury had to find it no higher than Manslaughter; nor shall ever come judicially to examine the nature, quality, or malice (if any be) circumstances, and truth of the Fact, although in it self the foulest

eſt Murder that can be (as my own above Forty years experience, attending the Crown Court in one Circuit under many Learned Judges, hath too often experienced) together with the common practice of labouring Grand Jurors to ſuch a Preſentment, and contriving with the Priſoner to confeſs the Manſlaughter, leſt the truth and foulneſs of the Murder ſhould too clearly manifeſt it ſelf (as truth ever will) upon a Judicial, faithful, and careful Examination of the Fact by the Learned Judge, upon hearing the Party, and Evidence on both ſides.

4 H. 4. 2.
37 H. 8. 8.

It is true (as appears by two ſeveral Acts of Parliament noted in the Margent) that at the making of thoſe Acts there was a complaint in Parliament, That Indictments were ſtuffed with more words than the Offence required, and that of purpoſe to aggravate the Offence more than it was grievous in it ſelf.

ſelf. For as it is well obſerved by Mr. *Poulton*, *That the circumſtances of every Offence do augment or diminiſh it according to the qualities thereof.* And by thoſe two Acts of Parliament it may be obſerved there was a reformation and redreſs made therein, by leaving out ſome formal aggravating words (but then material) uſed in thoſe times in all Indictments of Felony and Murther, as by the Statute of the 4th of *H.* 4. 2. the words then conſtantly uſed in all Indictments of Felony (without which the Indictments were not good) were [*Inſidiatores viarum & depopulatores agrorum*) provides that thoſe words ſhould be left out in all ſuch Indictments, and yet the Indictments ſhould be good without them: And well they might leave them out; for how uſeleſs and impertinent (as to the Eſſence of the Indictment) were thoſe words, and yet the effect of them muſt be ſtill obſerved. As alſo

(e) Poulton *de Pace Regis & Regni*, fol. 167.

4 H. 4. 2.

37 H. 8. c. 8. alſo by the Statute of the 37 *H.* 8. *c.* 8. the words, *Vi & Armis*, *viz. cum baculis*, *cultellis*, *arcubus & ſagittis*, or ſuch other like words (before time commonly uſed and compriſed in all Indictments and Inquiſitions of Treaſon, Murther, Felony, Treſpaſs, and other Criminal Offences) ſhall not of neceſſity (for they were ſo before) be put or compriſed in any Inquiſition or Indictment; but it ſhall be good only with theſe words (*Vi & Armis*, &c.) leaving out the other againſt any advantage that may be taken (as formerly it was) by Writ of Error, Plea, or otherwiſe; for theſe words were to very little purpoſe, to be of neceſſity uſed in every Indictment: For as to ſome Indictments, there could be nothing of pertinency or congruity to the Offence in them. And yet let it here be obſerved by the way, That in thoſe times, and before thoſe Statutes formerly mentioned, continually (in all In-

Indictments) thoſe words were uſed, and the Indictments found by the Grand Jurors, without any proof made to them of ſuch circumſtances (then eſſential) as [*Inſidiatores viarum, depopulatores agrorum*] liers in wait to deceive upon the High-ways, and deſtroyers of Husbandry; or, as in the other Statute, *Cum baculis, cultellis, arcubus & ſagittis, viz.* with Staves, Knives, Bows and Arrows; when perhaps he that committed the Offence had not one of theſe Weapons about him, or was guilty of the leaſt of theſe circumſtances of Aggravation, which were then held neceſſary to every Indictment; which ſhews how obſervable (at that time) Grand Jurors were to the directions of the Court, and to the Kings Council, in drawing the Indictments and Circumſtances of it, Whether ſuch Circumſtances lay in proof, or no? But in neither of theſe Statutes, nor any other Statute, is there any

any Exceptions made to these words, in any Indictment for the killing of a man (*Ex malitia præcogitata*) then used in all Indictments for the killing of any person unlawfully, which (as is said before) are of great consequence and use to be put into all Indictments against any person that hath shed innocent blood. For, as Mr. *Poulton*, in the very Folio before quoted, saith, (*f*) (writing upon the two former Statutes last mentioned;) *If one be Indicted of Murther or Manslaughter, there must be of necessity in the Indictment, a stroke supposed, viz. tali die, & anno felonicè, & ex malitia præcogitata interfecit & murdravit.* Here it is plain, that the Indictment of Manslaughter, as well as Murther, must have these words, *Ex malitia*, &c. in it. Neither let any think that it is prest further, *in foro legis*, than it will bear *in foro conscientiæ*; or that by this means Grand Jurors are used but

(*f*) Poulton *de Pace, &c. fol.* 167.

Poult. *ut supra*, 1. m. Dier. 59.

as

as Cyphers (like the Ordinary at the Assizes) *pro forma tantum*, and that the Arguments of Law and Reason here used, seem'd to perswade them (like those of the Church of *Rome*) to be of an implicite Faith, to believe as their Leaders would have them, and to do as they require them, and yet to be under the Obligation of an Oath to present the truth of the matter of Fact. It is far otherwise (being rightly considered) they are not sworn to try the whole truth of the Offence, so as nothing may be altered in what they find, for then there would be no need of another Jury; they are neither to convict the Party, nor determine the Law, Whether it be Murther or Manslaughter? or of what kind or *Species* it is, as it appears to them upon the hearing of but one side, and that but of Witnesses, not of the Party, that is left (as is said before) to the second Jury, who are properly Tryers of the

the Offence *de vicineto*) of the very Neighbourhood; not Inquirers only (as Grand Jurors from every part of the County) where Parties, and Witneſſes, and Council, on both ſides (if occaſion be) may be lawfully heard. (g) The Grand Jury are only ſworn to inquire, and true preſentment make of all ſuch things and matters as ſhall be given them in charge, to preſent nothing for malice, &c. nor leave any thing unpreſented for favour, &c. From hence often Grand Jurors frame an Argument to themſelves, that it is part of their Oath to preſent all ſuch things as ſhall be given them in charge, that generally the Judges in their charges dilate upon the ſeveral *Species* and differences in Murther: As, what Offence the Law makes Murther? what Manſlaughter at Common Law? what upon the Statute? what

(g) *Jurato creditur in Judicio. And to ſay the truth,* ſaith the Lord *Coke, we never read in any Act of Parliament, ancient Author, Book-caſe, or Record, that in Criminal Caſes, the party accuſed ſhould not have Witneſſes ſworn for him, and therefore there is not ſo much as* Scintilla Juris *againſt it.* Cok. 3. Inſt. fol. 79.

what *per Infortunium*? what *se Defendendo*? what is malice expreſſed? and what is malice implied; and therefore wherever they find theſe ſpecifical differences by their Evidence, they are ſo to preſent it, and not otherwiſe.

This is upon a great miſtake, nor is it, or can it be ſo intended by the Judges; for although it is true that the Judges (for the moſt part, not all of them) in their charges to the Grand Jury (which I humbly conceive were better omitted) do, uſually mention and branch out the ſeveral ſpecifical differences and diſtinctions the Books of Law make in ſhedding of Blood, in Murther, and Manſlaughter, I conceive, more to inform the whole Country, and to ſhew their Learning, and the Law therein, than intentionally that the Grand Jury ſhould preſently (ſome of them perhaps never ſerving before, *uno intuitu*) take it into the conſide-

ration of their Oath, and make it the nice Duty of their Inquiry, which indeed they can never attain unto, or determine the Law therein, by only hearing of an Accusation of one side, from which they are only to prepare fit matter for the Court to proceed further upon, and to make a more diligent inquiry after. Such distinctions and directions from the Judge being much more proper for a Jury of Life and Death, when any Question of Blood comes before them to be considered of, and to be tryed and determined, who have the only means to do it, by hearing all Parties, all Evidence on both sides; as also the directions of the Court, as to the quality and nature of the Offence, to give them a true light to make a right distinction therein.

Finch 25. *Case of presentment and Indictment.*

It is well said by a Learned Writer of the Law; *An Indictment is an Inquiry finding some Offence against the King. It was the*

the Kings Action whereupon the Party ſhall be Arraigned, or put to Anſwer by the King, and tryed by another Jury. Every ſtrong ſuſpicion of ſuch an Offence, though it be in caſe of Felony appearing of Record, hath the force of an Indictment, as in an Action of Treſpaſs for Goods carried away; if the Defendant plead, Not Guilty, and be found Guilty, he is a Felon, &c. (h) *So in an Appeal of Murther, if the Plaintiff, after Declaration be Nonſuit, the King ſhall proceed upon that Appeal, as upon an Indictment found:* So He. And as it is in (*i*) *Doctor* and *Student*; The Grand Jury is only charged with the effect of the Bill (*viz.*) whether he be guilty of the Felony or Murther in the Indictment, within the Shire, and not whether he be guilty, *modo & forma*, as in the Bill is ſpecified. And ſo when they ſay *Billa vera*, they ſay truly

(h) *In ancient time it was uſual to Arraign one taken in the manner without any Appeal or Indictment.*

(i) *Doctor & Student, lib. 2. cap. Abridgment.*

ly (as they take the effect of the Bill to be) ſo it is though the Bill vary from the day, year, and place, ſo it vary not from the Shire; as if there were falſe Latin in the Bill they might well ſay, *Billa vera*, for their Verdict ſtretcheth but to the Felony, not to the truth of the Latin.

There is very much difference in Law betwixt an Inquiry and a Trial, betwixt a Preſentment and a Conviction; beſides, the Judges do now give it in charge to the Grand Jurors, and ſo part of their duty (if not of their Oath) that when they have ſuch an Indictment of Murther come to their hands, if they find upon their Evidence, that the party ſaid to be ſlain in the Indictment, by the perſon there charged with it, with the time, and place, and manner how, they are to enquire no farther into the nature of it (what offence this is in Law) but to find it as it ſtands in the Indictment, which (for ought they know, upon

on a further and more clear discussion of it in Court) may appear as full, as it is laid in the Indictment; however it passeth fairly out of their hands, they may more clearly than *Pilate* wash their hands in Innocency from the Innocent blood of such a person, and very well discharge their Oath, the Law, and a good Conscience, letting it pass from them with the Indorsment of *Billa vera*, a Bill that hath truth in it, fit to be considered further by the Court and another Jury.

And as Indictments at the Kings Suit do succeed Appeals, at the parties Suit, so ought they to be drawn and presented as large and as full for the King, as an Appeal of death for the party, which ever was for Murther (if the party Appellant would so have it) and that may very reasonably be applied to Indictments that the Statute of *Glouceſter* directs in Appeals, *viz.* That no Appeal shall be abated so soon, as they

have been heretofore: But if the
6 E. 1. 9. Appellant in an Appeal do declare the Deed, the year, the day, the hour, the time of the King, and the Town where the Deed was done, and with what weapon he was ſlain, the Appeal ſhall ſtand in effect.

Now ſo great an exactneſs of the year, day, and hour, is not required in an Indictment, as in an Appeal (being the only violent proſecution of the party) in favour of life, many Niceties were ſtood upon more than in other Actions. And Mr. Juſtice *Stamford* ſays, A man is not of neceſſity compellable at Common Law at this day, to put into his Declaration the hour; the day was neceſſary to be put down in an Appeal; for if the Appellee can prove by certain Demonſtrations and Teſtimony of credible Witneſſes, that he was the ſame day at another place, at ſuch a diſtance as it was not poſſible for him to be there the day of the committing

ting of the fact, or twenty miles off the ſame hour the murther was committed, the Appeal ſhall abate. Yea, ſo many were the Niceties of Appeals, which formerly were in uſe, not only in Murther, but in all caſes of Felony, and ſo full of Bribery and corruption in the eaſie compoſition of all ſorts of Murthers and Felonies, and did ſo much delay the Kings proſecution by Indictment (which was not to begin until the year and day paſt, after ſuch Felony and murther) in which time commonly the Appellant grew ſlow in his proſecution, and was many times agreed with, and by the end of the year Witneſſes were dead and gone, all was cold and forgotten, as alſo that the Appellant muſt ſue in proper perſon, which ſuit was long and coſtly, and made the party Appellant weary to ſue.

For remedy whereof the Statute of the third of *H.* 7. was made, That *the King ſhall not* 3 H. 7. c. 1.

ſtay until the year and day were paſt, but proceed at any time after the Murther *committed*; as alſo, that *the Appellant ſhall proceed in his Appeal by Attorney*; (all helps the Law could deviſe to prevent delays in caſes of Murther, and to find out and puniſh the blood-guilty perſon) obſerve the penning of that Statute (were there nothing elſe to be ſaid in this Argument) how neceſſary it is that all Indictments be made *Murther*, that are brought at the Kings ſuit within the year and day (as the King by this Statute is enabled to do, the words whereof are as followeth, *And if it happen, that any perſon named as principal, or acceſſary, be acquitted of any ſuch Murther at the Kings ſuit within the year and the day, that then the ſaid Juſtices ſhall not ſuffer him to go at large, but either remit to Gaol, or Bail him, at diſcretion, until the year and day be paſt.* And further in the ſaid Statute it is ſaid,

MURTHER.

3 H. 7. c. 1.

If

If the MURTHERER *escape the Town shall be amerced*; as also, that *the Coroners shall return their Inquisitions before the Justices of Gaol-delivery, and they shall proceed against such* Murtherers; and as it is before in the said Statute, *The King shall not stay until the* year and day *were past, but proceed at any time after the Murther committed:* So that (*prima facie*) the Statute looks upon all Manslayers (unlawfully) to be guilty of *Murther*. And so the Indictment ought to be drawn, or they cannot be continued in Gaol, nor Bailed by this Statute until the year and day be out, nor the Town amerced for such escape, nor the offender proceeded against by the King, within the year and day by Indictment.

Now generally (in these days) since the making of that Statute, all proceedings in Murther and Felony are by Indictment at the Kings suit, not but that the prosecution by Appeal is still in force, and

the

the party hath his election which way he will proceed, either by Appeal at his own ſuit, or by Indictment at the Kings ſuit; yea, even after the Trial had by the Kings ſuit (in ſome caſes) although at the Kings ſuit they have been acquitted of the murther (but that the abuſe of theſe and many other obſolete Laws) hath taken away the frequent uſe of them; except it be through the miſcarriage of Grand Jurors, and Jurors of life and death, in caſes of murther, the one in not fully preſenting the murther, the other in not conſcientiouſly giving a Verdict according to their Evidence, and thereby provoking the party (whoſe Relation is ſlain) to the nice and chargeable remedy of an Appeal; upon ſuch Appeals ſeveral have been executed after they have been acquitted by trial at the Kings ſuit upon Indictment, one Woman in my time in *Berkſhire*, for petty Treaſon for killing her Husband, after ſhe had

had been acquitted for the ſame fact at the Kings ſuit by Indictment, was convicted upon the Appeal, and burnt at a ſtake.

Look how high the Appellant ſhall draw his Appeal againſt the Appellee or Defendant, as if for Murther; in this caſe, if the Appellant ſhall ſurceaſe to proſecute ſuch Appeal, as by Nonſuit, Releaſe, Retraxit, the Woman by marrying a Husband, *pendente lite*, or by the Act of God, as if the Appellant die, or by the Act of the Law, as if the Appellant take the priviledge: Now in all the former Caſes, where the Appeal ceaſeth by the Act of the Appellant (that is, he that proſecuteth the Appeal, after declaration in the Appeal) the Defendant ſhall not go at liberty, but ſhall be Arraigned upon the ſame Declaration at the Kings ſuit, for that it doth appear by the Declaration there is a Murther committed, and the year, day, and place, when, and where the ſame was committed, and the

ſame

ſame is not tried; and the Law will not allow ſuch great Offences (whereof it taketh notice) to be concealed and remain unpuniſhed, neither will the King at his ſuit ſuffer it to be extenuated into a leſſer degree of Murther, than the Appellant did: ſo careful have the Laws ever been in puniſhing of Murther, and revenging Innocent blood, which it ſeems (and as before is obſerved) whilſt Appeals were in uſe, and the Kings ſuit muſt ſtay until the year and day were paſt, many Murtherers eſcaped unpuniſhed, and the killing of men was made (as now it is) a trick of Youth, Valour, Hectoring, and Jeſt, in regard of ſo great impunity it found, by frequent Pardons, Indulgence of Grand Jurors, and others.

And truly, it is much with us in this Age, as it was in thoſe daies when Appeals were in uſe, and had the preheminence of the Kings ſuit; Never more killing of men by Duels, Tavern, and Game-

Game-houſe Quarrels, and yet never more impunity to ſuch Mankillers, ſuch valiant murtherers of their fellow Chriſtians, eſpecially if the Mankiller have either a fame for Honour or Valour, Mony, or Intereſt of Friends, to procure pity, or pardon and compaſſion from the Grand Jury, to find it Manſlaughter (if they will go ſo high) where it is Murther, and then (through that falſe glaſs) to repreſent it to a moſt Merciful King, and thereby obtain a Pardon for the whole offence; or elſe, upon his Arraignment ſhall confeſs the Manſlaughter, and procure a reſpect of his burning in the hand (becauſe a Gent-hand killed the man) and afterwards procure a Pardon for that burning in the Hand, which the King may grant, it being no part of the Judgment, but a notifying the Perſon, that by that Mark he may be known again, once to have had his Clergy, that he may not have it a ſecond time.

Many

Many Recent, and freſh Inſtances (in particular Caſes of blood) might be given (were it ſafe or ſeaſonable to make reflections) of divers Murthers, that have too eaſily ſlipt through the hands of Juſtice, by the averſneſs, ignorance, or partiality of Grand Jurors in not obſerving the direction of the Judges in this particular of finding Bills Murther, inſtead of Manſlaughter, yea, and that many times upon directions given in Court, after open Evidence, which open Evidence to a Grand Jury (eſpecially in Caſes of blood) ought to be avoided as much as may be, in regard it doth too much lay open and betray the Kings Evidence, to ſtanders by, it may be Friends of the Priſoner, that may make too much uſe of it for the benefit of the Priſoner, and prejudice of truth; beſides, many Witneſſes, although upon their Oath) will not ſpeak ſo fully in Court before the Bill found, and happily in the preſence of

of the Party, or his Friends, as in a Grand Juries Chamber; more private besides, where it is beforehand known, what witness-pinching endeavours will be used to keep him off, or by some sinister way to be complied with to lessen or hinder his Testimony to the second Jury (if there be occasion) besides, the Kings Evidence (before Issue joyned betwixt the King and the Prisoner) is alwaies to be secret, only open to the Grand Jurors, who are alwaies styled, *Juratores pro domino Rege*, the Kings Jury, and are sworn to keep the Kings Counsel, their Felons, and their own: now the Witnesses for the King are said to be of the Kings Council, which would abate much of their Oath, if Evidence, and the Kings Informations (in Cases of Bloud) should be open and common.

And as you have heard, what great Inconveniences were in the use and abuse of Appeals in the Reign of King *Henry* the Seventh, so

ſo indeed as many (if not more Inſtances of miſchief and inconvenience might be given of Grand Jurors in this Age (the beſt things corrupted proving the worſt) you may conceive what great complaints have formerly been made againſt Grand Jurors in Parliament in erring upon both hands, by taking too much liberty to themſelves, and not obſerving the directions of the Court, that there was a neceſſity of making an Act of Parliament, in the 3 *H.* 8. (immediately after Appeals began to fall off) as you may read in that Act of Parliament made to reform them, and to reform the Sheriffs power in retorning them; the whole Authority of retorning Inqueſts (to take Indictments) being by force of the Statute of the 11 *H.* 4. in Sheriffs and Bayliffs of *Franchiſes*. It is obſerved by the Statute of the 3 of *H.* 8. that by reaſon of Bribing of Sheriffs, and their Bayliffs and Officers, many true and ſubſtantial perſons

3 H. 8.

persons were divers times wrongfully indicted of Murther, Felonies, and other Misdemeanours, to the utter loss of their Lives, Goods, and Lands. And sometimes also great Felonies and Murthers were concealed, and not presented by the Grand Jurors, partially returned by the Sheriffs or their Ministers; for the prevention whereof, it was established by the said Act of the 3 *H.* 8. That *all Pannels of Grand Jurors, put in by any Sheriff before any Justice of Goal-delivery, and Justices of Peace, one being of the* Quorum, *in the open Sessions to enquire for the King, shall be reformed, by putting to, and taking off the Names of the persons which so be impannelled by every Sheriff, at the discretion of the said Justices, before whom such Pannel shall be returned, and the Sheriff upon pain of twenty pound shall allow of such Pannel, so reformed and returned by the Justices, the one half to the King, the*

other to him that will ſue for the ſame, and the Kings Pardon ſhall not be a bar to his part that ſo ſues. So careful were the Law-makers to have faithful Jurors, that ſhould neither accuſe the Innocent, nor excuſe the Nocent, and that eſpecially (in Caſes of Blood) ſhould make no concealment.

And leſt all this care and reformation of Grand Jurors ſhould do no good, but that they ſhould ſtill eſpouſe their own opinions, and make head againſt the Court, and wilfully conceal Offences they were charged to enquire of, there
3 H. 7. is a Statute yet in force, 3 *H.* 7. in which it is ordained, That *the Juſtices of Peace may (in their diſcretions) cauſe an Inqueſt to be Impannelled, to enquire of the concealments of other Inqueſts taken before them, of ſuch matters and offences as are to be enquired and preſented before Juſtices of Peace, whereof complaint ſhall be made. And if any conceal-*

concealment ſhall be found by any Inqueſt, within one year after the ſaid concealment, every perſon of the ſaid Inqueſt, that made ſuch concealment, ſhall be amerced or fined at the diſcretion of ſuch Juſtices of Peace, the ſaid Amerciaments ſo aſſeſſed in plain Seſſions. And theſe Amerciaments or Fines may be very high, according to the nature of the Concealment and quality of the perſon. This Statute only concerns and remedies Concealments by Grand Jurors, before Juſtices of the Peace, at the Seſſions of the Peace, as conceiving Grand Jurors would be bolder there, and take more liberty in their Preſentments than they durſt before Juſtices of Aſſize, Oyer, and Terminer, or Goal-delivery; as alſo, that ſuch Juſtices and Judges knew better how to deal with them, if they made any ſuch concealments or miſpriſion before them: For the Grand Jurors being immediate and ſubordinate Miniſters and

Officers in, and to the Court, and anſwerable for their Duty there, as Coroners, Conſtables, and other Miniſters of the Court, they may and muſt ſtand to the Judgment of the Court; and in caſe of any wilful contempt, miſdemeanor, and concealment, may, without Indictment, (for how can they be indicted at the ſame time by themſelves) be fined by the Court, as any other Officer and Miniſter of the Court.

And let Grand Jurors take heed, leſt by their remiſneſs and peeviſhneſs, they give not occaſion to the making of the like Statute as was made in the 11. of *H.* 7. *c.* 3. upon the ſurmiſe in the Statute, *That whereas many great Offences, as Riots, unlawful Aſſemblies, Extortions, Maintenances, Imbraceries, and other Offences, could not be duly puniſhed by the due Order of the Law, except it were firſt found and preſented by the Verdict of Twelve men thereto duly ſworn, which will*

11 H. 7. c. 3.

will not find, nor yet preſent the Truth (obſerve here what occaſions Grand Jurors had then given through their neglect) It was therefore provided and enacted by this Statute, *That Juſtices of Aſſize, and Juſtices of Peace, upon Information for the King* (that is meerly upon the Teſtimony of Witneſſes, without Indictment, or uſe of Grand Jurors) *ſhould proceed to make out Proceſs, Puniſh and Condemn Offenders by their Diſcretion, as if it were upon Indictments found by Grand Jurors.* Which Statute was a great Infringment of the Common Law, and the Liberty of the Subject of *England*, who ought not by *Magna Charta*, and the Law of this Land, to be proceeded againſt, or condemned in their Perſons or Eſtates (in Criminals) but by Indictment firſt had and found againſt them by Grand Jurors. It is true, that Treaſons, Murthers, and Felonies, and ſuch Offences (for which life and member ſhould

be loſt) are excepted out of this Act (although they ſtand upon the ſame Reaſons as the other Offences named in the Act). For by this Act and new Law, the Subject might loſe his Liberty, ſuffer Ranſom, Stigmatizing, Pillory, Impriſonment, loſs of Lands and Eſtate (things very near to Life and Member). And the Lord *Coke* tells us, *That* Empſon *and* Dudley (*two Judges* (*by reaſon of this Act*) *committed upon the Subjects inſufferable Oppreſſions:* and therefore this Statute was juſtly Repealed after the Deceaſe of *H.* 7. by the Statute of the 1. of *H.* 8. *c.*6. *A good Caveat to Parliaments* (ſays the Lord *Coke*) *to leave all Cauſes to be meaſured by the Golden and ſtreight Metewand of the Law, and not to the uncertain and crooked Cord of Diſcretion.* And as good a Caveat it is to Grand Jurors in caſes of Blood, not ſo much to be led by the crooked Cord of Diſcretion, as the ſtreight Rule of the

the Law, and Directions of the learned Judges, who ſhould beſt know the Law, and the trueſt meaſure thereof: For if the Rule be true (as indeed it is) *Quod nihil relictum eſt arbitrio Judicis*) that nothing is left to the Will of the Judge, much leſs, *arbitrio Juratorum*, to the will of Grand Jurors, they having been (through too much connivance) by an evil practice, corrupted herein. But *errores ad ſua principia referre, eſt refellere*, To bring Errors to their beginning, is to ſee their laſt.

Now, haply Grand Jurors may conceive, and argue thus; *That to extenuate an Offence, is not to conceal it, if they find it not Murther, yet they find it in ſome degree of Manſlaughter, &c. Beſides, if the Kings Council will put into the Indictment the words* (Ex malitia præcogitata, &c.) *which only make it Murther, and which is matter of Fact, they muſt make it out to us, that there*

was malice, either from our own knowledge of it, or that it is clearly proved to us from words or deeds expreſs, by ſuch an act, that lies in proof, or we are not bound to find thoſe words, but muſt ſtrike them out of the Indictment, or find an Ignoramus: *Or if the Witneſſes themſelves ſhall inform us, that it was a ſudden falling out, or done by misfortune,* Se defendendo, *in his own defence, or to defend himſelf againſt one that would have robbed him, in his Houſe, or upon the Highway; or that he that did it was a Watchman, a Conſtable, or lawful Officer, or Keeper of a Park or Warren, and in doing his Duty; or that he that did it was a natural Fool, one not* Compos mentis, *a Mid-man, or a young Child that did it, and by his young and tender years not capable of malice, and ſo could not be guilty of Murther; or if there had been former fallings out and differences betwixt them, yet all was reconciled,*

ciled, and they good friends again, and this only a casual and sudden difference betwixt them upon a new occasion, and exceedingly provoked unto it by him that was slain, so that we cannot be satisfied to find it Murther in any of these cases, being upon our Oaths to make true Inquiry, and if we find not the malice (being matter of Fact) another Jury cannot try it. Besides, we have former practice of our side, other Grand Jurors have had, and taken the same Liberty, and why should not we? The Judges likewise in their Charges inform us of all the specifical differences in Manslaughter, which we conceive they intend we should take notice of, as it comes in proof before us, in our Inquiry. This, I conceive, is as much as Grand Jurors have said, or can alledge for themselves (where they are not positively partial, and go clearly against their Evidence) why they do not, or will not (for such is some

ſome of their Language) find it Murther in all Caſes, as the Court directs, and as the Bill of Indictment is drawn and ſent to them as the King's Declaration.

To ſatisfie theſe reaſonings and miſtakes (though ſufficient hath been ſaid already to ſatisfie a wiſe and ſober Grand Jury-man, eſpecially in a Caſe of Blood, which can never receive too ſtrict an Inquiſition by a Grand Jury, the firſt Inquiſitors of it in Court) let them obſerve, that neither themſelves, nor the party accuſed, can be prejudiced by what they ſhall ſo find, be it never ſo high: Firſt, not themſelves; they do but preſent a probable Accuſation (no Conviction) againſt ſuch a perſon that hath had his hands in Blood, hath kill'd a man, is *Vir ſanguinis*: And here certainly it will be the beſt ſatisfaction to Conſcience (and that is the beſt Friend we can ſatisfie) to have all the Circumſtances of the Fact (as they are laid in the Indictment) to be more judicially

dicially and circumspectly examined, sifted, and tryed out, by another Jury, by a Learned Judge, in a publick Court, to the parties face, where the King's Witnesses, and the party himself, and his Witnesses, may be fully heard, and the whole matter fully tryed and debated, which cannot be done in a Grand Juries Chamber, but is altogether stifled and obstructed, if the Grand Jurors suffer it not to come to this Judicial Test and Tryal, but shall put out the words, *Ex malitia præcogitata*, or otherwise alter the King's Declaration and Indictment, which already hath had proceedings in it, and that in Court of Record, where it hath been advised by the Kings Council upon perusal of Informations and Examinations from Justices of Peace or Coroner, in that Case certified to the Court, and upon hearing the Prosecutor and his Witnesses, and so drawn and presented to the Court, Witnesses sworn to it, and Indorsed, *Jurat.*

in

in Curia, ſworn in Court, and ſo become ſomething more than an ordinary Declaration or Writing in Parchment, to be altered by any, without advice or direction of the Court; for if it might be ſo, the King's Council and their Advice (together with the Judges in ſuch Caſes) would ſignifie very little in drawing or adviſing any Indictment of Murther, if Grand Jurors in their Chamber may (from their own advice) alter it as they pleaſe, the Judges themſelves being as well concern'd, in Conſcience, to do right to the Priſoner and Party accuſed, as Grand Jurors can be. And alſo admit that the Witneſſes ſhall inform the Grand Jury that it was a paſſionate and ſudden falling out, or that it was done unawares, or in his own defence, it is but what they apprehend it to be; they can inform but what they ſaw, or heard, or believe; they are in the Affirmative only, and can prove but for that inſtant the Fact was done;

done; they dare not swear that there had been no falling out before: and as they cannot, or haply will not, prove an expres malice, so neither can they swear that there was none at all, or not such a malice as the Law implies; neither can the Witnesses judge in all Cases, what is Manslaughter at Common Law, what upon the Statute, what *per Infortunium*, what *se Defendendo*, what is Justifiable, or what is Murther: neither indeed in all these Cases, can the Grand Jurors, nor is it convenient for them to judge of all the specifical differences, each Circumstance may so much alter a Case; and will they then, by their uncertain Judgments, in case of Murther, conclude and precloſe the Court, and determine the Law, that this Fact of Blood shall go no higher than they please to adjudge it; as in the case put of a Child that kills another, not the Grand Jury (who see not the Child) but the Court, and the

the other Jury ſhall inſpect the Child, ſhall judge whether the Child could do ſuch an Act, *felleo animo, ex malitia præcogitata*, and ſo be guilty of Malice and Murther; the Court, and not the Grand Jury, being to judge, *an malitia ſupplebit ætatem*, whether upon hearing him ſpeak, he may be thought capable of malice (as ſome at more tender years are than others) ſo in the caſe of a Fool, or a Lunatick, a Dumb or Deaf perſon; ſo in the caſe of a Reconcilement after a falling out, and then a killing; can either Jurors or Witneſſes, or any that hears but one ſide, ſtate the caſe aright, or judge whether the Reconciliation were perfect or not, ſo as to take away all the ſeeds of malice, revenge, or diſcontent? And Mr. Juſtice *Stamford* ſayes, *That thoſe that are Dumb and Mute, and Infants, ſhall be diſcharged upon Arraignment*. Which ſhews that they are to be Indicted of Murther: But how ſhall they be

be Arraigned, when they cannot hear, or ſpeak, and plead? I conceive by the Inſpection and Judgment of the Court upon their Arraignment, I mean, upon the Indictment found by the Grand Jury; which plainly ſhews that the Judges (not the Grand Jurors) are Judges of the Law, and of what ſhall be Murther. So in the caſe of killing a Thief that attempts to Rob or commit Murther, (which is juſtifiable) this muſt judiciouſly and certainly appear ſo upon the Tryal, that the Court may judge whether there were an intention to Steal, or to commit Murther, or Rape; and not let ſuch a Surmiſe only, *That there was no ſuch intention*, lead the Grand Jury to acquit him, when haply there was ſuch intention. And the Statute of the 24. of *H.* 8. ſaith, *That the Party ſo Indicted or Appeal'd of ſuch Offence for killing a Thief, or one that intended to Murther (by Verdict ſo found and tryed) ſhall*

not

not loſe or forfeit Lands or Goods, but ſhall be diſcharged as one acquit of Felony; and none can be acquit of Felony that is not tried for it; the doubt being before this Statute, Whether he ſhould forfeit his Goods and Chattels as one that kill'd another by Chance-medley? So that there was no doubt but ſuch a one was Indicted of Murther before this Act, as one that had kill'd another by Chance-medly muſt, and yet is to be Indicted; Chance-medly being Manſlaughter at Common Law.

Sure in all theſe caſes, and all other the like caſes of Blood, it is moſt prudent and ſafe for every wiſe and conſcientious Grand Jury-man (that is ſatisfied there is Blood ſpilt, and the life of a reaſonable Creature unjuſtly taken away by ſuch a perſon charged in the Indictment) rather to preſume it probable, all other Circumſtances may be true, as they are laid in the Indictment (ſo far as to make

make an Accusation against a guilty person) then that they are not, and so to leave it fairly to the Court to judge thereof, and themselves free from the imputation of Blood by concealment; and thereby put the whole matter, with all its circumstances, upon a most legal and impartial Tryal, many times that appearing upon Tryal that appeared not before.

And the reason why a Petit Jury, or Jury of Life and Death, may extenuate an Offence, and make it less than the Grand Jury, is because (hearing of both sides) they may inquire of Circumstances which a Grand Jury cannot. Besides as the (*k*) Lord *Coke* informs (that Oracle of the Law) *An Indictment is no part of the Tryal, but an Information or Declaration for the King; and the Evidence of Witnesses to a Grand Jury, is no part of the Tryal: For by Law the Tryal in that case is not by Witnesses, but*

(*k*) Coke 3. Inst. fol. 25. 1. Inst. Sect. 194. Forteſcue c. 26. 72. Stamford l. 2. fol. 90.

by the Verdict of Twelve men, and ſo a manifeſt diverſity between the Evidence to a Jury, and a Tryal by a Jury. If the Indictment were part of the Tryal, then ought he that is a Noble-man and Lord of Parliament, to be Indicted by his Peers, for the Tryal of him ought to be by his Peers; but the Indictment againſt a Peer of the Realm is always found by Freeholders, and not by Peers.

The French word *Enditer* ſignifies in Law, an Accuſation found by an Inqueſt of Twelve, or more, upon their Oath; and the Accuſation is called *Indictamentum.* And as the Appeal is ever the Suit of the party, ſo the Indictment is always the Suit of the King, and as it were his Declaration, as the Appeal is the Declaration of the party. Some derive it from the Greek word ἐνδείκνυμι, to accuſe, and as properly may it be called *Indictamentum ab indidicando, quia aliquid notum facit dicendo,*

dicendo, he that Accuſeth or Appealeth another man, or brings his Crime into queſtion, *indictatus*, *quaſi indicatus*, one that hath his cauſe ſhewed out in publick; (*deferre nomen alicujus, judicare*) to Indict, is to Accuſe or Impeach. It ſignifies in our Common Law as much as *accuſatio* in the Civil Law, though it have not the like effect: *Accuſabilis*, i. e. *accuſatione, aut reprehenſione dignus*, one worthy of Reprehenſion. An Indictment being like the precious Stone of *India*, called *Indica*, which (as *Pliny* notes) in rubbing it breaketh forth into a purple ſweat: So doth an Indictment of Murther, which though it ſeem white and pale in the Grand Jurors hands, afterwards by rubbing and preſſing hard in Court, breaks out into a purple or bloody ſweat (as my ſelf have very often ſeen experienced, when Grand Jurors have many times made great ſcruple even to find the Indictment at

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all) what comes from the Grand Jury is more properly called a Preſentment. For the conſtant form and words in all Bills are, *Juratores pro Domino Rege ſuper ſacramentum ſuum præſentant*; obſerve, they are ſtiled *Juratores pro Domino Rege* only; nor can they be otherwiſe: for they are to hear none but the Kings Evidence, upon his own Declaration: And whoever is to advance (as the Grand Jurors are) but the Intereſt of one ſide, ought as rationally to be permitted, to raiſe and advance it to the higheſt pitch (that by any reaſonable preſumption it will bear) as the other ſide have liberty to extenuate it to the loweſt degree and mean that art and cunning (which in theſe caſes of Blood are ſeldom wanting) can bring it unto; the one being upon an Accuſation againſt a criminous perſon, who hath had his hands in Blood, and is certainly guilty in truth of ſomething in the crime he is accuſed of: The other only upon

upon his own excuſe, who can never (upon the whole matter) excuſe himſelf, *à toto*, from the whole Crime of Blood. If they are ſatisfied that it is an Offence againſt the King's Peace, his Crown and Dignity, and the life of another perſon; it is enough for them to preſent the whole matter to the Court, as the Court hath directed and adviſed the Bill to them: For every Bill of Indictment, that is formally and legally drawn up, is preſumed to have been ſeen, adviſed, and directed (as before is ſaid) by the Court and the King's Counſel, upon an Information of the Fact taken by them (*l*), (as for the ſubſtance of it, is meet and fit to be put into ſuch formal and legal terms for the King) as it is by the Judges ſent out of Court to the Grand Jurors; it being a common practice for the Judges (according to the matter of Fact) to direct upon what Statute and Law, and in what manner

(*l*) *The Judges did adviſe in drawing the Indictment againſt* Leak, 4 Jac. Coke 3. Inſt. Tit. Treaſon, fol. 16.

ner and form the Indictment ſhall be drawn and ſent to the Grand Jury, that if they find only probable matter contained in it of accuſation in any kind, they may ſo preſent it to the Court, as their Preſentment or Accuſation; the word *Preſentment* coming from the Latin word *Præſentio*, to ſmell or ſcent before, *præſentire in poſterum*, to have a ſenſe of that which is to come: ſo if they have any ſenſe or ſmell of Blood in the Indictment, it is enough for them to leave it to a further queſt of what ſhall come after: the Grand Jurors being like the good Huntſman, that obſerving where the Hare hath lately prickt, or the Deer lately ſtruck, or hath dropped blood, lays in his Hounds, and leaves them to make the diſcovery: ſo indeed ſhould the Grand Jurors do the Jury of Life and Death, in Caſes of Blood, and that the Blood of their fellow Chriſtians. And thence likewiſe the Grand Jurors Preſentment is called

called an *Inquiſition*, and themſelves *Inquiſitors*, from the Latin word *Inquiro*, *inquirere*, *quod vulgo dicitur facere Informationem*, for every Inquiſitor is as an Informer, a promoter of the Accuſation to the Court, in the behalf of the King, that it may be more judicially enquired into and determined, which is much like a Citation of a perſon into the Eccleſiaſtical Courts for a publick fame, which is either fit to be enquired further into and puniſhed, or the party purged or pronounced Innocent: or like the Maſters of Requeſts to the King (Honourable perſons) that view all Petitions and Complaints before they be preſented to the King, and determine what are fit to be preſented unto the King, and what are fit to be rejected.

A ſtrong Suſpicion, and the Fame of the Country may (in many caſes) be Evidence ſufficient for a Grand Jury to find a Bill; and here I will leave to the ob-

ſervation of Grand Jurors, what I find in Mr. Juſtice *Stamfords* Pleas of the Crown, and which he himſelf obſerveth out of *Bracton*, a very ancient and learned Lawyer, as *Bracton*'s order in Caſes of Suſpicion upon Indictments of Felons(*m*) *de ſecta Regum.* The words are theſe, *Nunc autem dicendum eſt de Indictamentis per famam Patriæ, quum præſumptionem inducunt, & cui ſtandum eſt donec indictatus ſe à tali Suſpicione purgaverit; ex fama quidem oritur ſuſpicio, & ex fama & Suſpicione oritur gravis præſumptio. Tamen probationem admittit in contrarium ſive purgationem, Suſpicio quidem multiplex eſſe poteſt, primo, ſi fama oritur apud bonos & graves. Item ex facto præcedenti oriatur ſuſpicio cui etiam ſtandum eſt donec probetur in contrarium, &c.* and ſo goes on, to let us know the ſeveral badges and marks of *Suſpicion*, adviſing, that thoſe that will

(*m*) Bracton's *Order in* le Suſpicion ou Endictments del Felons, *lib.*3. *cap.*22. *paragr.* 1. *fol.* 143. Stamf. *fol.*97.

will take Publick fame for an Evidence, take it from thoſe that are of good Fame, and not of evil perſons; as he goes on, *Non de malevolis & maledicis, ſed providis & fide dignis perſonis, non ſemel ſed ſæpius, quia clamor innuit, & defamatio manifeſtat; Tumultus enim & clamor populi, quandoque fiunt de multis quæ ſuper veritatem non fundantur. Ideo vanæ voces populi non ſunt audiendæ, ut ne dicatur Jeſus crucifigitur*, Barabas *autem liberatur*. The whole Chapter is well worth the reading.

And it may not be amiſs to obſerve, that the ancient forms of Indictments or Bills began thus, *Inquiratur pro domino Rege, Let it be enquired of for our Soveraign Lord the King*, as the offence is laid in the Indictment, whether the offence be ſo (as is there ſuppoſed) which is as much as if the Grand Jury ſhould ſay, *We judge it fit that it be farther enquired of, whether it be truly*

ſo

ſo indeed, as it is here ſuppoſed; for the Offence, as it is laid in the Indictment, as it comes from the Grand Jury (before it receive a farther trial and enquiry of another Jury) is no more but *Crimen ſuppoſitum & impoſitum*, an offence ſuppoſed and laid to ones charge to anſwer; and this clearly appears by the Record of every Acquittal or Conviction of any that is tried upon an Indictment; for the words of the Acquittal or Conviction (as they are drawn up in the Record) are theſe, *viz. Juratores* (that is to ſay, the Jury of Life and Death) *dicunt ſuper Sacramentum ſuum, quod prædictus* A.B. *non eſt (vel eſt) Culpabilis de Felonia & Murdro prædict. in Indictamento præd. ſpecificat. ei ſuperius imponit. modo & forma prout per Indictamentum præd. ſuperius verſus eum ſupponitur:* ſo that *ſupponitur & imponitur*, ſuppoſed and impoſed, is all that can be inferr'd from the Indictment; the Grand Juries Pre-

Preſentment (upon hearing of one ſide) being the *Suppoſition*, and the other Jury (upon hearing of both ſides) the *Impoſition*; or *Supponitur*, and that relates to the *ſubſtance* of the Indictment, as the Grand Jury ſuppoſe it to be; the *Imponitur*, and that relates to the *modo & forma* of the Offence, and the circumſtances of it, as it is laid in the Indictment, as it is found by the Jury of Life and Death; and theſe Circumſtances indeed are the proper enquiry of the Jury of Life and Death, upon the hearing of Evidence on both ſides, as appears clearly by the penning and drawing up of theſe Records, and all this is no more than in every common Declaration at the ſuit of the Party, only this Indictment is as a Declaration upon Oath, and muſt therefore (for the ſatisfaction of thoſe that are ſworn) contain, that which for ſubſtance ſeems to them (*prima facie*) to be a probable truth, and a tranſgreſſion of a Law,

Law, not ſtrictly looking into the matter and form, aggravations and circumſtances of the Fact (as it is laid in the Indictment) for thoſe do but attend and uſher in the Fact; but Grand Jurors are principally to eye and look upon the ſingle Fact and act it ſelf, and finding one that hath had his hands in blood, and that probably (upon a farther Enquiry) may become, *reus*, a guilty perſon, by killing of another perſon, they are to put their *Billa vera* unto it, although they have no proof at all of the Aggravations and Circumſtances that attend the Fact (Evidence many times ariſing out of the parties own mouth (againſt himſelf, upon a ſtrict examination in Court) more than the Witneſſes againſt him have proved.) And it is well obſerved in the Book called, *The Terms of the Law*, upon theſe two words, *Billa vera*, where it is ſaid, that *Billa vera* is the Indorſment of the Grand Jury upon any Preſentment

or

or Indictment, which they find to be probably true, (mark theſe words) *probably true*; nor do I take the Adjective *Vera* in this place to ſignifie *True*, but *meet*, *reaſon*, or *fit*, and ſo it is often uſed in *Terence*, and by the Grammarians, *Verum eſt*, *it is fit*: ſo that *Billa vera* upon the Bill doth not ſignifie, a *true Bill*, that hath nothing but truth in it, but a *meet*, or *fit Bill* for the further enquiry of another Jury, which ever ſucceeds ſuch an Indorſment of *Billa vera* by a Grand Jury; certainly it is upon a great miſtake (although I confeſs it is often uſed in Law-Books, and by wiſe men) to call the Preſentment of a Grand Jury a Verdict, to ſay that their Indorſing *Billa vera*, or *Ignoramus* (which is all they do) is their *Verdict*, there being a great difference between *Billa vera* and *Veredictum*, which ſignifies *dictum veritatis*, and even induceth a Conviction; for nothing can properly be called a Verdict, but where

where it is given by a Jury; after an Iſſue joyned, upon hearing of both ſides, *Veredictum*, is, as it were, *quoddam Evangelium*, like a little Goſpel of Truth, for indeed every Verdict (which convicts a man to the loſs of Life or Eſtate) ought to be as true as the Goſpel the Jurors ſwear upon; for upon the Iſſue of a Verdict, the Lives and Eſtates of all perſons depend: And therefore an Attaint lies in Law againſt thoſe Jurors that give a falſe Verdict, contrary to the truth of their Evidence, which is a Villainous Judgment, a very great Judgment in Law. And this Attaint did never by Law, lie, or was brought againſt Grand Jurors for any falſe Preſentment, for they do but barely preſent an offence, upon hearing of one ſide, and therefore can be no Verdict (as from them) the Grand Jury being for number indefinite, that being properly called a Verdict from ſuch a Jury, where the Law makes a determinate number of

twelve,

twelve, or *twenty four*, and no more: Beſides, it is alwaies ſaid in the *Record*, where ſuch a Jury finds a Verdict, *Juratores ſuper Sacramentum ſuum dicunt*, &c. But where the Grand Jury preſent, *Juratores ſuper Sacramentum ſuum præſentant* (not *dicunt*) there being as much difference between *præſentant* and *dicunt*, as betwixt a known truth, and the report and fame of a fact done.

And this will the better appear, if it be well obſerved what Grand Jurors write or Indorſe upon the back of thoſe Bills they find; for though they Indorſe ſuch Bills (*Billa vera*) yet they never Indorſe upon thoſe Bills they do not find (*Billa falſa*) as if one were true, and the other falſe, for ſhould they do ſo, it would be like an Accuſation againſt the Proſecutor that prefers the Bill, and a great diſcouragement to the Kings Evidence; but they modeſtly write (*Ignoramus*) which ſignifies to the Court, *they are ignorant*

rant of the matter in the Bill, and that they find no cauſe, either from what they have heard from the Witneſſes, or know of their own knowledge, to commend it to a farther Enquiry: the Verb *Ignoro*, coming from *Ignarus*, *not to know, to be ignorant.* And this doth further evince, that the Grand Jurors *Preſentment* cannot properly be called a *Verdict*; becauſe a *Verdict* doth in Law either *convict* or *acquit*, which neither their *Bill a vera*, nor *Ignoramus* doth; the firſt is always put to a farther enquiry, the laſt is no acquittal to the party; for although there be many *Ignoramus*'s againſt any perſon, yet may more Bills be preferred againſt the ſame perſon for the ſame offence; for it may be they did not find the Bill, in regard ſome Witneſſes were abſent or corrupted, or the matter in the Bill miſtaken; happily it may be no Felony, but ſomething done in jeſt, or in the nature of a Treſpaſs, or a Natural death inſtead of a Murther, or the

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Witnesses of no Credit, or the like. But if there be any thing of Truth in the Bill proved to them to make a Crime, although not so fully as is laid in the Bill, they must not in such case write (*Ignoramus*) as if they knew nothing of a Crime; as if it be a Murther in the Bill, and the Proof reacheth but to an *Infortunium*, or *se defendendo*, or to any degree of unlawful killing, they must not write *Ignoramus* upon the Bill; or if Burglary, and the Proof makes it but a single Felony, and no Burglary, they must not Indorse it (*Ignoramus*) but in all such cases, where they are in any doubt, the best way for them will be to advise with the Learned Judge, to move the Court for directions therein. It is too great a Scandal to a Grand Jury (Persons in that quality highly to be esteemed) to say, that their *Ignoramus* (that is, their *Ignorance*) is

their Verdict. It is very ſafe for Grand Jurors, before they find an *Ignoramus*, to examine every Witneſs produced; but if they have many Witneſſes in Murder or Felony, if any one Witneſs induce a ſtrong and pregnant Preſumption it is enough, without perplexing themſelves, in haſt of buſineſs, they need not examine any more, but put *Billa vera* unto it.

If a Grand Jury find, upon an Indictment of Murther, that *A.* killed *B.* what is it to them (as hath been ſaid before) whether it be Murther or Manſlaughter, whether it were done, *Ex malitia præcogitata*, *per Infortunium*, *ſe defendendo*, *in loco & tempore belli*, or otherwiſe, this is Special matter, and Special matter ought to be found when it is at Iſſue by another Jury, and muſt ariſe (I mean the truth of it) *ſuper totam materiam* of the Evidence, or proof on both ſides; which can never be found and determined by a Grand Jury, that hear but one

ſide,

ſide, for very ſeldom is matter of Fact truly ſtated in a matter of difficulty, by one ſide, and therefore (as before is ſaid) the Statute of *Glouceſter* provides, that every Man-ſlaughter, *per Infortunium* or *ſe defendendo*, ſhall be found *per Patriam* after the Priſoner hath joyned Iſſue with the King, and put himſelf *de bono & malo*, of good or evil, that is, either for his Acquittal or Conviction, *ſuper Patriam*, to be tried by his Country.

And the Jurors of Life and Death themſelves are not tied, as not ſtrictly to the form of an Indictment, ſo not to the whole matter of it; not to the form, as it was well urged by Sergeant *Montague* Reader at the Arraignment of the Earl of *Somerſet*, for Murther, by poyſoning of Sr. *Thomas Overbury* in the *Tower*, who told the Jury, That *they muſt not expect viſible Proofs in a work of darkneſs; that many things were laid in an Indictment only for*

form; that they must not look that the proof should follow that, but only that which is substantial, and the substance (in that Case) must be this, Whether my Lord of Somerset *procured, or caused the poysoning of Sr.* Thomas Overbury, *or not.* The Lord *Coke* (then Chief Justice) and other Judges present at the Trial, stood up and said, *The Law is clear in this point, that the Proofs must follow the Substance, not the Form, that the Law gives forms in Indictments, but substance in proofs.* And yet this was spoken to a Jury of Life and Death, who are more carefully to look into Circumstances and Forms (becaufe their error is incurable, if they Convict a man to lose his life wrongfully) than Grand Jurors are. And I cannot but further observe (in this Case of Sr. *Thomas Overbury*) that which I would have all Grand Jurors, and Jurors of Life and Death, observe, as an Instance to guide them in other Cases of like

like nature, that although it was laid in the Indictment, That *the ninth of* May, *Anno* 11 Jac. *Regis*, Richard Weſton (*who was procured by the Earl of* Somerſet) *gave to the ſaid Sr.* Thomas Overbury *a poyſon of green and yellow colour, called* Roſacre, *in Broth; and the firſt of* June, *Anno* 11 Jac. *Regis* ſupradict. *gave him another poyſon, called* white Arſenick, *and that the tenth of* June *Anno* 11. ſupradict. *gave to him a poyſon called* Mercury, *ſublimate in Tarts, and the fourteenth day of* September, *Anno* 11. ſupradict. *gave him a Gliſter mixt with poyſon called* Mercury ſublimate: (*Ut prædict.* Thomam Overbury *magis celeriter interficeret, & murdraret.*) *Et prædictus* Thomas Overbury *de ſeparalibus venenis prædictis, & operationibus inde a prædictis ſeparalibus temporibus, &c. graviter languebat, uſque ad* 15. *diem* Decembris *Anno* 11. *ſupradict. quo die dict.* Thomas *de prædict. ſeparalibus venenis obiit*

venenatus, &c. And albeit it did not appear, or could appear, of which of the ſaid poyſons he died, yet it was Reſolved by all the Judges of the Kings Bench, that the Indictment was good; for the ſubſtance of the Indictment was, *whether he was poyſoned, or not*; and it appeared that *Weſton* within that time aforeſaid, had given unto Sr. *Thomas Overbury* divers other poyſons, as namely the powder of *Diamonds*, *Cantharides*, *Lapis Cauſticus*, and powder of *Spiders* and *Aquafortis* in a Glyſter. And it was reſolved by all the ſaid Judges, that albeit all the ſaid poyſons were not contained in the Indictment, yet the Evidence of giving them was ſufficient to maintain the Indictment, for the ſubſtance of the Indictment was (as before is ſaid) *Whether he were poyſoned, or not.* And when the cauſe of the Murther is laid in the Indictment to be *poyſon*, no Evidence can be given of another cauſe, becauſe they be diſtinct

ſtinct and other cauſes: So if the Murther be laid by one kind of Weapon, as by a Sword, Dagger, Stilletto, Stick, Tobacco-pipe, Knife, Sheers, or other like Weapon, it makes no difference, the Evidence will be ſufficient, if the party be ſlain by any of theſe, becauſe they are all under one Claſſis or cauſe.

v. Mackally's *Caſe, li. 9. fo. 67.*

And afterwards, *Anne Turner*, Sr. *Gervaſe Elwys*, and *Richard Francklyn* a Phyſician (Purveyor of the Poyſons) were Indicted as Acceſſaries before the fact done: And it was Reſolved by all the ſaid Judges, that either the proofs of the poyſon contained in the Indictment, or of any other poyſon (although it were out of the Indictment) were ſufficient to prove them Acceſſaries; for the ſubſtance of the Indictment againſt them as Acceſſaries, was, *Whether they did procure* Weſton *to poyſon Sr.* Thomas Overbury, *or no?* So that it may be obſerved here, what in the Caſe above was

obſerved by the Lo. *Coke*, that *Jurors were not to expect a direct and preciſe Proof in every point laid in the Indictment*; ſhewing, how impoſſible it were to Convict a Poyſoner, who uſeth not to take any Witneſſes to the compoſing of his ſlibber-ſawces; neither do other Murtherers, to the contriving of their malice, and manner of killing another, but keep the fire burning in their own boſoms until it break out.

Nor in all Caſes of *Murther* is it material, that expreſs Malice be proved to the Jury of Life and Death, though they be to Convict the Priſoner, much leſs (or not at all) is it material to prove it to the Grand Jury, who are but to preſent it, not to the Jury of Life and death in any caſe where the Law only implies it, for ſuch proof is in the Judgment of the Court and not in the Jury, which the Jury muſt ſubmit unto and be over-ruled in; much leſs is this implied Malice to be proved to the

Grand

Grand Jury, for it lies not in the proof of Witneſſes, but in the conſtruction of the Law (as is ſaid before;) and yet the Grand Jury muſt find thoſe words, *Ex malitia præcogitata*, &c. as if they were proved expreſly unto them by Witneſſes, or otherwiſe the Jurors of Life and Death cannot enquire of the offence (as (*n*) *Murther*:) And the Jury of Life and Death (in ſuch a Caſe) muſt find thoſe words expreſly, although they cannot be proved unto them, but are only implied and ſupplied by Law, or elſe the party accuſed can never be Convicted of Murther, as might be inſtanced in very many caſes, take ſome for all (*viz.*) One in priſon kills his Keeper, and makes an eſcape, where no malice or falling out can be proved; a ſtranger, or other perſon kills a Watchman, Conſtable,

(*n*) Murther *is a wilful killing of a man upon malice, forethought (but this muſt either be expreſſed in proof, or implied by Law) it ſeemeth to come of the* Saxon *word*, Mordren, *which ſo ſignifieth; and* Mordridus *is*, the Murtherer, *even to this day amongſt them in* Saxony, *from whence we have moſt of our words: Or it may be derived of* Mort eſt dire, *as* Mors dira, *Terms of the Law, title* Murther, *fol.* 207.

ble, or other Officer, that hath good warrant to ſtay him, though happily there be no cauſe for his ſtay, being an Innocent perſon, or another perſon, and not the ſame they intended; heres no Malice, yet this is Murther *ex malitia præcogitata*, &c. One goes into the Street, or High-way, and kills the firſt man he meets, although he did never ſee him before; The Father or Mother takes their ſucking Child, and daſheth out the Brains of it againſt the wall; Two perſons are fighting a Duel together upon cool blood, upon premeditate malice, and a third perſon comes to part them, and is killed by one of them, this is Murther *ex malitia præcogitata*, in him that killed him (if not in both) although neither of them ever ſaw him before, and yet no malice to this man: (o) One wilfully kicks or wounds a Woman great

(o) *Si ſit aliquis qui mulierem pregnantem percuſſerit ſi puerperium non formatum, vel animatum fuerit & maximè ſi animatum, fecit homicid.* Stamf. *fol.* 12. In this fol. you ſhall find Juſtice *Stamford* uſing the words *homicid. & murdrum*, as ſignifying the ſame. v. *Stamf.* fol. 21. c. 13.

great with Child, whereby the Child is wounded in her, ſhe is afterwards ſafely delivered of the Child (the Child alive) the wound or bruiſe by the kick or blow appearing upon the Child mortally, whereof afterwards it dies, this is Murther *ex malit. præcog.* and yet what malice had this man to the Child he never did ſee? Divers perſons are unlawfully hunting in a Park, one of them kills the Keeper (after the Keeper had duly, according to his Office, admoniſhed him to ſtand) all the reſt of the Company (although a mile off in the ſaid Park, and out of ſight) are guilty of wilful Murther of the Keeper, and yet nothing of malice can be expreſly proved. One is ſhooting at a Cock or a Hen, and kills another perſon, this is Murther, his act was unlawful. One finding a Gun or Piſtol charged, lying upon a Table, or other place, takes it up into his hands, draws up the Cock (not thinking it to be charged) and in a jeſting way gives fire at one in the

the Room, the Gun goes off and kills him; this is Murther, he had nothing to do to meddle with the Gun, it was out of his Calling, and none of his, he muſt Jeſt at his peril. A Drunken-man gets upon a Horſe (which a ſober perſon might ride quietly) and in a Fair or Market occaſions the Horſe to run over another perſon, and kills him; this is Murther. *A* gives *B* the lie, with many other provoking words, as Coward, Thief, Murtherer, whereupon *B* ſtrikes *A*, and kills him; this is Murther *ex malitia*, &c. words are not a ſufficient provocation for one man to kill another. If one killeth another without any provocation (actual) of the part of him that is ſlain; this is Murther, the Law implieth Malice. If a man knowing that many People are coming along the Street from a Sermon, throw a Stone over a wall or houſe, intending only thereby to fear them, and thereupon one is killed with the Stone; this is Murther, although

Coke li. 9. fo. 67. 6. in *Mackally's* Caſe.

3. *Inſt.* fol. 57.

though he knew not the party ſlain. If *A* aſſault *B* to rob him, and in reſiſting *A* killeth *B*; this is Murther by malice implied, although he never knew him.

If one meaning to ſteal a Deer in a Park, ſhooteth at the Deer, and by glance of the Arrow killeth a Boy that is hidden in a Buſh; this is Murther, the Act being unlawful, though here was no intent to hurt the Boy, knowing nothing of his being there. *3 Inſt. fol. 56.*

If a Woman being quick with Child, do wilfully with a potion, or otherwiſe, intend the deſtruction of the Child in her womb, the Child being born alive, dieth of the potion, battery, or other cauſe; this is Murther. *22 Ed. 3. Coron. 263.*

If one keep a Maſtiff-dog, that is uſed to bite people, near the Common Highway, or a Bull or Beaſt, that hath hurt any one (after notice) they kill any one, it will be Murther in the Owner, although not preſent when the fact was done; and yet in this, and the

the other precedent Caſes, here is no expreſs Malice to be proved, but what the Law conſtrues to be ſo, which can in no ſenſe be left to the (*p*) Grand Jury to be judge of. But in all theſe Caſes, and many more, muſt be ruled and over-ruled by the Judgment of the Court, in point of Law.

(*p*) *Murther is interpretative in the Law, and not to be left to Grand Jurors opinions.*

Although no Malice in theſe Caſes can be proved to the Grand Jury or petit Jury, (*q*) yet the Indictment muſt be expreſly drawn, and ſo found by the Grand Jury, with theſe words to make it Murther, *Ex malitia ſua præcogitata, &c.* that is, that he killed him out of his malice, fore-thought; not that theſe words make a new offence of Felony and Murther, that was not Felony and Murther before, and ſo eſteemed in all Caſes where it was done voluntarily and by aſſault; and this appears plainly by the Statute of *Marlebridge* (formerly mentioned) 35 *H.* 3. where

(*q*) *Aliquando vero clanculum & nemine vidente, ita ut ſciri non poſſit quid ſit actum, hujuſmodi homicidium dici poterit Murdrum.* Stamf. 6. 1. fol. 12. Hales & Petty Caſe *in his Comment.*

where it is ſaid, *Murther from henceforth ſhall not be adjudged, before our Juſtices, where it is found by Misfortune only, but it ſhall take place in ſuch as are ſlain by Felony, and not otherwiſe.* By this Statute it is plain, that killing one unawares, by misfortune, was Murther before this Statute, and that after this Statute, all other killing, where it is Felony, ſhall be Murther, as before this Statute, *Felony* is a general term, which comprehendeth divers hainous offences, for which the Offender ought to ſuffer death, and loſe their Goods and Lands. They are called *Felonies* of the Latin word *Fel*, which is in Engliſh *Gall*, in French *Feil*, or of the ancient Engliſh word *Fell* or *Fierce*, or becauſe they are intended to be done with a cruel, bitter, fell, fierce or miſchievous mind.

Terms of the Law, Felony 160. *fol.*

So the Statute *de Officio Coronatoris*, made 4 *Ed.* 1. (where the Coroner is well directed his duty) where any perſon is ſlain, or ſuddenly

4 Ed. 1.

denly dead, how he ſhould behave himſelf, which is worth his reading. It follows in the ſaid Act in theſe words, *And if any be found Culpable of the* Murther, *the Coroner ſhall immediately go to his houſe, and Inventory his Goods, Chattels, Lands, &c.* (as in that Act is further directed) I only mention it to ſhew, that all that were found ſo ſlain, the Coroner was to enquire of it, as Murther, or otherwiſe there could be no Inventorying of Goods, valuing, or ſeizing of Lands, &c. or committing the Offender to the Goal by the Coroner, as plainly doth appear by that Act.

2 Ed. 6. c. 24. So the Statute of the ſecond of *Ed. 6.* where one is ſtricken in one County, and dies in another (it being doubtful before where the Trial ſhould be) gives power to the party concerned, to bring an Appeal (who had not power to Appeal in that caſe before) of Murther only in the County where the party dies, and in that caſe

case can bring no Appeal of Manslaughter (as in the streightned sense some would take the word Manslaughter) by this Statute is declared, That *where any* Murther *or Felony* (which word *Felony* here cannot comprehend *Manslaughter*) *shall be committed in one County, and there be Accessaries to the same in another County, upon an Indictment found in the County where such Accessaries are guilty, the Certificate of the Conviction or attainder of the Principal shall be good, to proceed against such Accessaries:* So that if the Principal be not Indicted of Murther, I conceive it is doubtful upon this Statute, to proceed to the Condemnation and Judgment of the Accessary in another County, for by no congruity can the words *or Felony* comprehend *Manslaughter.* A Pardon of all Felonies will hardly pardon Manslaughter, or be allowed of.

4H.7.c.13. So in the 4th of *H.* 7. *cap.* 13. there are theſe words in the Statute, *Whereas upon truſt of the priviledge of the Church, divers perſons have been the more bold to commit Murther, &c. becauſe they have been continually admitted to the benefit of the Clergy as oft as they offended; It is enacted, That every one being once admitted to have the benefit of his (r) Clergy (if not within Holy Orders) ſhall not a ſecond time be admitted for ſuch an offence. And that every perſon ſo Convicted for Murther, to be marked with an* M *upon the brawn of the left Thumb, and for another Felony with a* T.

(r) When Clergy began appears not by any Common Law book, it takes its root from a Conſtitution of the Pope, that the Prieſts ſhould not be accuſed before a Secular Judge.

Co. Magna Charta 636. *It hath been confirmed by divers Parliaments, and ſo favourably uſed by the temporal Judges, that it hath been allowed to all Lay-men that could read, which is more than the Common Law requires.* Stamford *fol.*123. *The firſt that mentions this Priviledge at Common Law is* Bracton, *that wrote in the time of King* Henry *the Third.* Bracton *lib.*3. *ſol.* 123. *The next is the Statute of* Weſtm. 3 Ed.1. c.2. *By the Popes Conſtitutions the Priviledge of* Clergy *extended to all Offences whatſoever; and the Prelates of* England, *by Colour thereof, did claim the ſame as generally.* vide 9 Ed.2. Articuli Cleri. *Yet within this Kingdom Clergy was allowed only in Caſes of* Murther, petty Treaſon, *and* Felony, *not in* Treaſon *againſt the King himſelf.*

Here

Here it is plain that the word *Murther* comprehended all manner of Manſlaughter, all manner of Felonious killing, every Murther being Manſlaughter, and every Manſlaughter then as Murther, they being *Termini convertibiles*, equally ſignifying the Genus of Man-killing, you may perceive by what hath been ſaid before, that *Felony* cannot comprehend *Manſlaughter* or *Murther*, for here the one is to be burnt with an *M* for Murther, the Felon with a *T* for Theft, both which marks, upon the reſpective Convictions, are (as I conceive in thoſe Caſes) by vertue of this Statute, obſerved to this day, although we now apply the Letter *M* to ſuch, as the Jury of Life and Death, upon an Indictment of Murther from the Grand Jury, ſhall Convict of *Manſlaughter*, that is, upon the point ſhall find this Special matter, that is to ſay, that there was no Malice, expreſſe or implied, in him that killed the other; but in

a ſudden heat of blood, occaſioned by an actual (not verbal) provocation in him that was killed. This contradiſtinction betwixt the two words, *Murther* and *Manſlaughter* (as I conceive) came into our Laws only ſince the Statute of the 23 *H.8. c.1.* that takes away Clergy, that is, will not accept of them to be Clerks that kill another maliciouſly. I find not this diſtinction before, either in the *Levitical* Laws (the Laws of God) or the Laws of *England:* No Sanctuary or place of Refuge (as is ſaid before) by the Law of God, being allowed for ſuch a diſtinction, but both ſhould have been pluck't from the Horns of the Altar; and by our Law, in both caſes (notwithſtanding this Novel diſtinction) they were equally admitted to Clergies, I mean by the Common Law.

The ſaid Statute of the 4 *H.* 7. *c.* 13. being the firſt Statute (that I find) that appoints burning in the Hand for Murther and Felony, and

and takes away Clergy for the Second offence of the ſame kind, where Clergy hath been allowed before; and it is obſervable, that in this Statute it is called *Murther*, with, or without the words *Ex malitia præcogitata*, not having reſpect to our Modern diſtinction, which holds only (as is ſaid) in the enquiry of the Jury of Life and Death, who have the whole matter of Fact before them, with all the circumſtances thereof as it ariſeth from both ſides, which the Grand Jurors neither have, nor ought to have.

Then comes the Statute of the 23 *H.* 8. (formerly mentioned) being the firſt Statute that takes away *Clergy* for the firſt offence of Murther, called in this Statute *Wilful Murther* (s), of *Malice prepenſed*; this Statute being made to rectifie the great abuſe in Ordinaries, in ſuffering notorious *Thieves* and *Murtherers* to make purgation, and 23 H.8. c.1.

(s) *That is, voluntary and of ſet purpoſe, though it be done upon a ſudden occaſion; for if it be voluntary, the Law implieth* Malice. Coke 3. *Inſt. fol.* 62.

and provides, That *no person which hereafter shall be found guilty (after the Laws of this Land) of any petit Treason, or for any Wilful Murther of Malice prepensed, Robbing of Churches, Robbing of Persons in their houses, or upon the High-way, wilful burning of Houses, or Barns with Corn, or Accessaries before the same, shall be from henceforth admitted to the benefit of their Clergy, but suffer death as if they had been no Clerks*; it seems all that were, that is, as many as the Ordinary then esteemed so, *Clerks*, although they were guilty of *Murther*, *petty Treason*, and *Felony*, suffered not death, (so great favour and immunity had they in those times for such bloody and crying sins) so prevalent were the Clergy, and those within Holy Orders, in those daies, that this very Act of Parliament, that takes away Clergy from others, that commit *Murther*, *Burglary*, and *Robbery*, and other Offences before-named, excepts

cepts all within Holy Orders (*t*), from the ſame pains and dangers other perſons muſt ſuffer for the ſame Offences; which freedom and Indulgence continued to them in Holy Orders (as they call it) until the 28 *H.*8.*c.*1. which provides, That *they within Holy Orders, as to ſuch and other Offences, (u) ſhall be under the ſame pains and dangers that others be.* Now this Statute makes none of the former offences Felony or Murther, that was not ſo before the making of this Statute, but only takes from them (that commit any of theſe offences) the benefit of their Clergy; certainly there wanted not thoſe that committed wilful Murther of Malice prepenſed (as we now diſtinguiſh it) before the making of this Statute; as thoſe that committed Sacriledge, robbed perſons in their Houſes, and upon the High-way,

(*t*) *Within five years of the time of King* Henry *the Second, there were above a* 100 *Murthers by Prieſts and men within Holy Orders.*

(*u*) *The Exemption of the Clergy taken away by the Laws of* Clarendon, Graft. 1187.

wilfully fired Houſes, and Barns with Corn, and were Abettors to the ſaid Offences: ſo it is very plain, that this Statute makes no alteration as to the drawing and penning of Indictments of *Murther*, *Sacriledge*, *Robbery*, *Burglary*, &c. but only takes away Clergy from every perſon, who after the making of that Statute ſhould be found guilty (as the words of the Act are, *after the Laws of this Land*) for any of the aforeſaid Offences. So that according as the Indictment of Murther was, by the Laws of this Land, before the making of this Act, ſo muſt it be after the making of this Act wilful Murther, in the Statute 32 *H.*8. *c.* 12. and this Statute of the 23. of the ſame King, comprehends as well that which we call *Manſlaughter*, and every killing where the will of man is freely engaged, as it doth wilful Murther of Malice prepenſed; compare them together, in the one you will find Clergy taken away

away for wilful Murther of malice prepenſed, and Sanctuary from wilful Murther, and generally ſuch Offences as were prohibited Sanctuary by former Statutes are now prohibited Clergy by later Statutes. The words *Ex malitia præcogitata, & murdravit* (which now make all this conteſt) before the making of this Statute in any caſe of Murther, neither aggravated nor extenuated the Offence, made it neither more nor leſs penal. But ſince the making of this Act, thoſe words are made neceſſary in all Indictments and Convictions of Murther, and principally and only (in caſes of wilful Murther) to be conſidered and weighed by the Court and Jury of Life and Death, upon hearing and debating the matter, with all its circumſtances (as hath been ſaid before) on both ſides; thoſe words being matter of Law, mixt with matter of Fact, and are not to be expunged by a Grand Jury, becauſe they cannot afterwards be ſupply-

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ed nor implyed by the Court, and Jury of Life and Death after the Arraignment of the Priſoner, ſhould there appear upon Tryal never ſo great cauſe, yet *Felonicè* and ſome other words (though material) may be ſupplyed in a Special Verdict. If upon an Indictment of Murther, *quod Felonicè percuſſit, &c.* the Jury find *percuſſit tantum*, yet the Verdict is good; for the Judges of the Court are to reſolve upon the ſpecial matter, whether it was *Felonicè, &c.* or not? *Coke lib.* 9. 69. And if the Court adjudge it Murther, then the Jurors, in the concluſion of their Verdict, find him guilty of the Murther contained in the Indictment, and to ſhew the power of a Jury of Life and Death (who indeed ſhould have the fulleſt and higheſt Charge can be laid againſt the priſoner, for the Offence he is to be tryed). If *A.* be Appealed or Indicted of Murther, *viz.* that he of malice prepenſed kill'd *B.* *A* pleads that he

Cok.lib.9.69.

he is not guilty *modo & forma*, yet the Jury may find *A* guilty of Manſlaughter, without malice prepenſed; becauſe the killing of *A.* is the matter, and malice prepenſed is but a circumſtance, *Plow. Com.* 101. And generally where *modo & forma*, are not of the ſubſtance of the Iſſue, but words of form there, it ſufficeth, although the Verdict doth not find the preciſe Iſſue, 22 *H.* 8. *c.* 19.

Plow. Com. 101

22 H. 8. c. 19.

The firſt Statute that I find theſe words mentioned in of malice prepenſed, is the 22 *H.* 8. *c.* 14. where it is ſaid, *If any perſon, for any petty Treaſon, Murther, or Felony, have obtained the King's Pardon, or is otherwiſe diſcharged out of Sanctuary, and afterwards commit another petty Treaſon, Felony, or Manſlaughter by Chance-medly (and not Murther of malice prepenſed) and afterwards take Sanctuary again for any ſuch petty Treaſon, Felony, or Manſlaughter by Chance-medly, the ſame perſon ſhall enjoy a ſecond pri-*

22 H. 8. c. 14.

priviledge of Sanctuary: So that he that committed Murther of malice prepenſed, could not enjoy the benefit of Sanctuary a ſecond time,

Then comes the Statute of the 25 H. 8. c. 3. 25 *H.* 8. *c.* 3. and remedies divers defects that were in the ſaid Statute of the 23 *H.* 8. Foraſmuch as the ſaid Act extended only to ſuch perſons as were found guilty, after the due courſe of the Laws of this Land, divers and great Robbers, Murtherers, Burglars, and Felons, did commit thoſe Offences, perceiving, and clearly underſtanding (by the words of the ſaid Statute) that they ſhould not loſe the benefit of Clergy, unleſs they be found guilty, after the due courſe of the Law, upon their Arraignment of, and upon the ſaid Murthers and Felonies ſo by them done and committed, by reaſon whereof divers of the ſaid perſons, upon their Arraignment of the ſaid Offences and Felonies upon their Indictments againſt them, would ſtand

ſtand mute, and ſometimes challenge peremptorily over the number of Twenty, or elſe would not anſwer directly to the ſame Indictments whereupon they were Arraigned according to Law; It was therefore provided by this Statute, *That every perſon that hereafter ſhould be Indicted of petty Treaſon, wilful burning of Houſes, Murther, Robbery, or Burglary, or other Felony, according to the tenour or meaning of the ſaid Statute of the* 23 H. 8. *and thereupon Arraigned, and do ſtand mute of malice, or froward mind, or challenge peremptorily above the number of Twenty, or elſe will not, or do not anſwer directly to the ſame Indictment and Felony whereupon he is ſo Arraigned, ſhall loſe the benefit of Clergy, in like manner and form as if he had directly pleaded to the ſame petty Treaſon, Murther, Robbery, or other Felony whereupon he is ſo Arraigned, (not guilty) and thereupon had been*

been found guilty after the Laws of the Land. Upon the penning of this Act it ſeems clear that all Indictments for the unlawful or wilful killing of any perſon, ought to be made Murther as they were formerly before this Act. For if the Priſoner ſhould be Arraigned upon an Indictment only of Manſlaughter (according to the now diſtinction of Manſlaughter) and upon his Arraignment ſhould ſtand mute, not Anſwer directly, or challenge peremptorily, whereby he could have no Tryal, it would be a great queſtion, Whether he could have Judgment upon this Act? The words are, *petty Treaſon*, *wilful burning of Houſes*, *Murther*, *Robbery*, *Burglary*, *or other Felonies*; For as it is not named here by the term Manſlaughter, ſo it cannot (with any congruity) be comprehended under any of thoſe Heads: Not under the general Head of *other Felonies*, after the commemoration of ſo many ſeveral

Felonies

Felonies next before, as *Burning of Houses*, *Robbery*, *Burglary*, *and other Felonies*, must needs be intended of such like Felonies or Thefts. And what Judge (in case of Life and Death) will proceed upon such a *moot point* (or rather a clear Case to the contrary) to give Judgment and Sentence of Death upon any by this Act of Parliament.

Then comes the Statute made in the 28 *H.*8.*c.*1. and rehearseth all these former Statutes, *viz.* 22 *H.* 8. 23 *H.* 8. and the 25 *H.* 8. and continues them all until the next Parliament; and provides further, *That such as be within Holy Orders, shall be under the same pains and dangers that others be*; (all within Holy Orders being by the 23 *H.* 8. excepted in Cases of Murther, petty Treason, and Felony, from the pains and dangers that Lay persons suffered for such offences). It seems those in Holy Orders then began to lose their esteem, as appears more fully 28 H. 8. c. 1.

fully in the enſuing Act, which perpetuates the former Acts.

32 H.8.c.3. Then comes the Statute made in 32 *H.* 8.*c.*3. and rehearſeth the ſame Acts again, and makes them perpetual; and Enacts, *That all perſons within Holy Orders, which by the Laws of this Realm ought, or may have their Clergy for any Felonies, and ſhall be admitted to the ſame, ſhall be burnt in the hand, in like manner as Lay Clerks in ſuch Caſes, and ſhall ſuffer all ſuch pains, dangers, and forfeitures as Lay perſons in like Caſes.*

1 Ed.6.c.12. Then comes the Statute of the 1 *Ed.* 6. and after it hath declared what Acts ſhall be Treaſon; declares what Offences ſhall be outed of Clergy, *viz. Such perſons, as in due form of the Laws, ſhall be attainted or convicted of Murther of malice prepenſed, of poyſoning of malice prepenſed, of breaking of any Houſe by day or by night (any perſon being put in fear) robbing any perſon in or*

near

near the High-way, felonious ſtealing of Horſes, Geldings, or Mares, or for felonious taking of any Goods out of any Pariſh Church, or other Church or Chappel; all Offenders in any of theſe Caſes ſhall be excluded of the benefit of Clergy, whether they be convicted by Verdict, Confeſſion, or ſtand Mute, &c. and that in all other Caſes of Felony, Clergy may be allowed. Here is no mention of petty Treaſon, burning of Houſes and Barns with Corn, and Acceſſaries before, to be outed of Clergy, as is in the 23 *H.* 8. *c.* 1. So that it ſeems after the making of this Act, they might have had their Clergy; the new Offences added to this Act to be outed of Clergy (that were not in that Act of 23 *H.* 8. are only *ſtealing of Horſes, Geldings, and Mares:* And by this Act *Poyſoning* is made Murther, although no malice be proved, and Clergy taken away.

Poyſoning murther, although no malice be proved.

2 Ed. 6. c. 24. Then comes the Statute of 2 *Ed.* 6. and this Statute gives remedy in ſeveral Caſes of Murther and Felony (where there was none before at Common Law). As firſt, where one is felonioufly ſtricken in one County, and dies thereof in another. Secondly, where one is Acceſſary in one County to a Murther, or Felony in another County; before this Statute, no ſufficient Indictment in any of theſe Caſes, could be taken in either of the ſaid Counties; for that by the cuſtome of the Realm, the Jurors of the County where ſuch party died of ſuch ſtroke, would take no knowledge of the ſaid ſtroke (being matter of Fact) in a foreign County, although the ſaid Counties and Places adjoyned very near together; nor the Jurors of the County where the ſtroke was given, could take knowledge of the death in another County, although ſuch death moſt apparently came of ſuch ſtroke; ſo that ſuch

ſuch Offence (and the other Offences before mentioned) for the like reaſon remained unpuniſhed; and ſuch Murther could not be proceeded againſt, either by way of Indictment or Appeal: Now this Statute provides, *That an Indictment found by the Jurors of the County where the death ſhall happen, whether it be found before the Coroner, upon ſight of the dead Body, or other Juſtices that ſhall have power to inquire of ſuch Offences, ſhall be as good and effectual in Law, as if the ſtroke and poyſoning had been committed and done in the ſame County where the party ſhall dye, or where ſuch Indictment ſhall be found.*

And likewiſe provides, *That ſuch Party, to whom Appeal of Murther ſhall be given by the Law, may commence, take, and ſue Appeal of Murther in the ſame County, where the ſame perſon ſo feloniouſly ſtricken or poyſoned ſhall dye, as well againſt the*

Principals, as againſt every Acceſſary to the ſame Offences, in whatſoever County or Place the Acceſſary or Acceſſaries ſhall be guilty of the ſame. And doth further provide, *That where any Murther or Felony ſhall be done in one County, and another perſon, or more, ſhall be Acceſſary, or Acceſſaries, in any manner of wiſe to any ſuch Murther or Felony in any other County, that then an Indictment found or taken againſt ſuch Acceſſary, or Acceſſaries (upon the Circumſtances of ſuch matter before the Juſtices, &c.) where ſuch Offence of Acceſſary ſhall be committed, ſhall be as good in Law, as if the principal Offence had been committed in the ſame County where the ſame Indictment againſt ſuch Acceſſary ſhall be found.*

Cok. l. 9. f. 117.

Here it may be obſerved, That the Appeal given by this Statute to the party, where one is wounded or poyſoned in one County, and dies thereof in another, muſt be

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an Appeal of Murther, otherwiſe it will not lye either againſt Principal or Acceſſary by the words of this Statute. So in caſe of an Indictment (where it is ſaid in this Statute, *where any Murther or Felony ſhall be committed in one County, and the Acceſſary be in another County*) here the word Murther muſt be one *Species*, and Felony, that is Theft, another; *viz.* carrying of ſtoln Goods into another County: So that the Indictment in this caſe againſt the Principal muſt be Murther, or the Acceſſary thereto is not tryable in another County; and there muſt be a Certificate of ſuch Conviction or Attainder of the Principal under the Seals of the Juſtices before whom ſuch Principal was Convicted or Attainted, before ſuch Acceſſary can be tryed; and that ſhall be ſufficient to enable the Juſtices to try the Acceſſary in Murther or Felony in another County. And although the word *Manſlaughter* be mentioned in this

Statute (as thus, *within the year and day after ſuch Murther and Manſlaughter committed*) it is not here mentioned, as any *Species* of Murther, but only as the *Genus* called in this place only Murther and Manſlaughter.

5 Ed. 6. c. 9.

Then comes the Statute of the 5 *Ed.* 6. and Reſolves three ſeveral Doubts or Queſtions moved upon the Statute of the 23 *H.* 8. *c.* 1. The firſt Doubt was, *Whether Clergy were taken away by that Statute, unleſs the very Felony and Robbery were committed in the very Chamber or Place where the Owner, Dweller, his Children, or Servants ſhould happen to be (although they were in ſome other part of the Houſe).* The ſecond Doubt was, *If it were done in the Chamber, and the parties there aſleep, and ſo not put in fear.* The third Doubt was, *Where ſuch Robberies or Felonies are committed in a Booth or Tent in any Fair or Market, the Owner, Children, or Servants being*

This is not much pertinent to this purpoſe, but that it takes away Clergy, and relates to ſeveral Statutes before mentioned concerning murther.

being then put in fear, whether Clergy should be taken away by that Statute in any of these Cases.

For the clearing of these three Doubts it was Enacted, *That if any person be convicted for robbing any in any part of their dwelling House, or dwelling Places (the Owner, his Children, or Servants being in any part of the said House or Precincts thereof) whether sleeping or waking, such Offender shall not be admitted to his Clergy. And so he that robs any Tent or Booth, in Fair or Market, whether the Owner, his Wife, Children, or Servants be sleeping or waking in the same, shall lose his Clergy.*

Then comes the Statute made in the 5. of *Ed.*6. and takes away Clergy from those, *That commit Burglary or Robbery in one County, and carry the Goods into another County, and are there legally convicted.* 5 Ed. 6.

This Statute likewise declares

25 H. 8. c. 3. the Statute made the 25 *H.* 8. *c.* 3. ſhall ſtand in force, notwithſtanding a Clauſe compriſed in the Sta-
1 Ed. 6. c. 12. tute of the 1 *Ed.* 6. *c.* 12. which makes void a Clauſe in the ſaid Statute, and takes away the force of it in taking away Clergy from ſuch as commit Robberies and Burglaries in one County, and are convicted of the Felony for bringing the ſtoln Goods into another County. For whereas the ſaid Statute of the 1 *Ed.* 6. *c.* 12. declares, *That ſuch as are convicted or attainted of Murther of malice prepenſed, or of poyſoning of malice prepenſed, or of breaking any Houſes by day or by night, (any perſon there being put in fear) or robbing any perſon in or near the High-way, or for ſtealing Horſes, Geldings, or Mares, or Felonious taking any Goods out of any Pariſh Church, or other Church or Chappel, ſhould not have the benefit of Clergy. And that in all other Caſes of Felony (other than ſuch as before are men-*

mentioned) *Clergy should be allowed in like manner as it might have been before the* 29 *day of April, in the first year of King* Henry *the Eighth, by reason of which Article or Clause the said Statute, made in the* 25 H. 8. *which did put such Felons and Burglarors from their Clergy, that do such Offence in one County, and after are taken with the Goods stoln in another County, and there Arraigned and found Guilty, was made void, to the great holdning and comfort of such Offenders: It is by this Act Enacted, That the said Act made in the said 25th year, touching the putting of such Offenders from their Clergy, and every Article, Clause, and Sentence contained in the same touching Clergy, shall from thenceforth* (*touching such Offences*) *stand and be in force.* Cok. l. 11. f. 31.

Then the Statute of 2 & 3 of *P.* & *M. c.* 17. takes away the benefit of Clergy only from *Bennet Smith*, for being Accessary to the Murther of Stat. 2 & 3 P. & M. c. 17.

of *Giles Rufford* before the Murther committed, and for procuring of the ſame.

Stat. 4 & 5 P. & M. c. 4.

Afterwards the Statute of the 4 & 5 of *P. & M. c.* 4. takes away Clergy from every perſon, *That ſhall maliciouſly command, hire, or counſel any perſon or perſons to commit any petty Treaſon, wilful Murther, Robbery in any dwelling Houſe or Houſes, Robbery in or near the High-way, or wilfully to burn any dwelling Houſe, or any part thereof, or any Barn having Corn or Grain in the ſame.*

Dier f. 183, 186. Cok. l. 11. f. 35.

Here I had thought to have proceeded, and to have mentioned (in order of time) all ſuch Statutes as were made in any King's Reign, to take away Clergy in any Caſe of Felony, but that would be too much to aſſume another Subject, than what principally is here intended, having made too great a digreſſion already, yet not altogether unuſeful herein.

Then

Then the Statute made 1 *Jac.* c. 8. takes away Clergy from him *that ſhall ſtab another, that hath not firſt ſtricken, nor hath a weapon drawn (if he dye thereof in ſix months, although no malice can be proved) except it be done* ſe Defendendo, *or by misfortune, in keeping the peace, or correcting his Servant or Child.* This without all queſtion was Murther (by malice implyed) before the making of this Statute; and ſuch a kind of killing is adjudged Murther at this day, that is, where one ſhall wilfully kill another (by any weapon) without provocation from him in deeds; for no provocation in words [only] will make it Manſlaughter, or leſs than Murther. And (in my judgment) it is an Error in practice of this Indictment upon the Statute of Stabbing, to leave out the words (*ex malitia præcogitata*) in the Indictment: For the words of the Statute are (*although no malice can be proved*) then ſure the meaning 1 Jac. c. 8.

meaning of the Statute is (as in other caſes) it ſhall be implyed: And in all Indictments, where malice is only implyed, and cannot expreſly be proved, thoſe words *ex malitia*, &c. muſt be put into the Indictment, to make it Murther, and to take away Clergy, and by ſuch words the Indictment will be good, both upon the Statute, and at Common Law.

And ſo are the Indictments made againſt lewd Women that kill their baſtard children, upon the 21 *Jac. cap.* 27. although the ſpecial matter of the Statute be put into the Indictment, *viz. That it is a baſtard Child, and born of her body alive*, yet the words, *ex malitia præcogitata*, are always put into the Indictment; which malice the Law implies, although none can prove the child born alive, and none can be preſumed to bear malice to a dead child: And haply it might be born dead, or dye after it was born, againſt the will of the Mother,

21 Jac. c. 27.

Mother, of her Throwes and Strivings, to be delivered without help. It is not the burying of the Child, or hiding of it, that makes it Murther upon the Statute (as ſome have conceived) for if the Child be found dead in Bed by her ſide, or in her boſome, yet it is Murther; for the word [*conceal*] in the Statute, relates not to the Body of the Infant, but the death of it; the words being theſe, *Shall ſo conceal the death thereof, that it may not come to light* (that is, to the knowledge of one Witneſs at leaſt) *whether it were born alive or not, but be concealed, ſhe ſhall ſuffer death as in caſe of Murther:* If ſhe can prove by one Witneſs it was born dead, then her hiding or burying it afterwards will not be Evidence againſt her to take away her Life upon that Statute.

Theſe two Statutes create no new Offence that was not Felony and Murther before, but only take away Clergy in thoſe two caſes, the

1 Jac. c. 8.
21 Jac. c. 27.

the one of ſudden and deſperate ſtabbing (then frequently in uſe) the other of lewd Whores, who having committed one ſin, to avoid their ſhame, and the charge of a Baſtard, would commit a greater, by truſting to their own ſtrength in their Delivery, that they might more privately deſtroy the Infant, and yet avoid the danger of the Law, becauſe in that caſe, none for the King could prove the Child born alive, and therefore it was impoſſible to Indict and Convict her at the common Law for Murther, although really and in truth it were ſo. This Statute makes the Suppoſition good for the King to the Grand Jury, and Jury of Life and Death, and to the Judgment of the Judge in point of Law, that the Child (ſuppoſed to be murthered) was born (*x*) *alive*, and by her

(x) *Note this here, the Grand Jury find as it is laid in the Indictment by the Kings Counſel, that the Child was born alive, although they have not the leaſt Evidence for it, and yet I truſt they are not forſworn.*

mur-

murthered, in regard ſhe being a lewd woman, and contrary to the Cuſtome of honeſt and innocent women (who always deſire help in their Labour) chuſeth to be delivered alone, this Statute puts the proof upon her (if ſhe will avoid ſo ſtrong a preſumption of Murther) to be ſure to have one Witneſs to prove the Child was born dead. It being likewiſe ſtrongly preſumed, that a woman (without help of ſome other) cannot be delivered of a Child at full growth dead in the Womb.

Two remarkable Caſes I have known in my time upon the ſaid Statute of 1 *Jac.* in *Oxfordſhire* Circuit; the one in Mr. Juſtice *Jones* his time (a Learned Judge that went Sixteen years together that Circuit) where the Caſe was; A cunning deſperate Fellow, having an intention to ſtab another perſon, and yet to avoid coming within the danger of that Statute, had (to that purpoſe) provided himſelf of a Dagger naked in his Pocket

Pocket (he being never known to wear any before) came into an Alehouſe where the party was he intended to ſtab, and at firſt coming uſed very friendly Language unto him, but afterwards all the provoking Language he could, to make the other ſtrike him; which the other no ſooner held up his ſtick to have done, but he ſtabb'd him into the Body with his Dagger, whereof he dyed: No malice could be proved, yet ſo much of his intention by his preparation and circumſtances appearing to deſign the ſtabbing of the other, that it was adjudged to be within the meaning, though not within the Letter of the Statute, the Lord Chief Baron *Davenport* being the other Judge of that Circuit) and he was denyed his Clergy, and after Judgment was Executed. It being then obſerved by the Judges, That immediately after the making of that Statute, many deſperate Fellows (that could read as Clarks) to

thoſe they had a mind to quarrel withal) would uſe all means to make them ſtrike firſt, and then ſuddenly ſtab them; and by this way avoid the ſaid Statute, and become guilty only of a Manſlaughter at Common Law, and ſo receive the benefit of Clergy, which the Statute takes away. The other Caſe was in the ſame Circuit, very lately, before Mr. Juſtice (*y*) *Windham*, at the Aſſizes at *Worceſter*, a little before his death, Where a Father correcting his Son, for ſome undutifulneſs he conceived in him (having a Knife in his hand, being eating his dinner) ſtruck his Son over the back with his knife, and gave him a ſtab whereof he died: The Judge apprehended this Offence to be within the Statute, notwithſtanding that Exception in the Statute, of a Father correcting or chaſtiſing his Child or Servant, in regard it was an unreaſonable way and means of correction: whereupon he reprieved the Fa-

(*y*) Sir *Wadham Windham*, Kt. one of the Juſtices of the Common Pleas.

ther for ſome ſhort time, and adviſed with the reſt of the Judges at *Serjeants Inn*, and after he had their Opinions that it was within the Statute, he forthwith ſent down a Warrant to the Sheriff to do Execution, having received Judgment of Death at the Aſſizes; and yet the words of the ſaid Act of Parliament are (*although his Son, or Servant, dye of ſuch correction, he ſhall not be within the ſaid Act*).

Obſerve here how neceſſary it is, That all the circumſtances that can be in an offence of blood, be put into an Indictment, and be ſo found by the Grand Jury (as it is adviſed by the King's Counſel) where there is innocent blood ſhed by the party indicted, that every part and circumſtance of the Fact, with all its aggravations, may come to be conſidered and weighed by the Court, which otherwiſe cannot be; as in this Caſe of the Father killing his Son, if the Indictment had not been drawn upon

on the Statute, but at Common Law, in regard of that Exception in the Statute (as the Grand Jury then would have had it) the party had been capable of Clergy, and so might have escaped that Judgment of Death. If such difficulties appear to the Learned Judges, upon due consideration of the Law, and of all circumstances in cases of blood, how much more will it prove difficult to Grand Jurors? and how little reason have they to expunge, alter, and obliterate circumstances of aggravation in such an Indictment, upon hearing only of one side, as they please, and so prevent the Judgment of the Court therein, taking from them the power, even to examine such a circumstance, as may (if truly stated and examined) rule the whole Case, as before is observed.

In all the Offences formerly mentioned, where Clergy is taken away by those Statutes, there is no new offence of Felony or Mur-

ther made, that was not ſo before the making of thoſe Laws, as might be inſtanced in Murther, Robbery, Burglary, Sacriledge, Cutting of Purſes, Stealing of Horſes, Rape, and the like; but only Clergy taken away from the Offender (which is no more but the abuſive bloody liberty of Clerks in thoſe times reſtrained) as wilful Murther where malice appeared, and other mixt and ſimple Felonies, which were then moſt raging and reigning Offences in the Kingdom, and cryed out for a greater Remedy, a ſtricter Law to be made againſt them (as appears by the Preambles of thoſe Statutes that take away Clergy in thoſe Special Caſes) that were Murther and Felony at the Common Law before; from whence I conclude, that the Forms of Indictments of Felony or (z) *Murther*, are no

(z) *The name of Murther was not changed, but the Law retains it continually for the heinouſneſs of the Crime.* Stamford fol. 19. *If not the name, then not the words that make it ſo.*

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way directed to be altered by thoſe Statutes that take away Clergy, but are to continue in the ſame form as they did before at the Common Law. And I am not of their Opinion, That the words (*ex malitia præcogitata*) came into Indictments immediately after the aforeſaid Statute of 23 *H.* 8. Certainly there were Murthers committed, and that frequently, of malice fore-thought, before the making of that Statute, and thoſe Murtherers had their Clergy alſo; otherwiſe that Statute had never been made to take it away. If the Grand Jurors ſhall ſay, *They will not find thoſe words*, Ex malitia præcogitata, *put into the Indictment, except the malice be plainly proved to them*; then farewel that diſtinction and inference of implied malice, which the Law makes, in many Caſes, and which otherwiſe cannot be made; they may as well ſay, *That they will not find ſuch words Treaſon, that are Treaſonable, becauſe no* 23 H. 8.

Act of Parliament, or expreſs Caſe at Common Law, ſays thoſe particular words are Treaſon; or that they will find no Indictment of Burglary, although the Goods ſtoln be found with the Thief, and the dwelling Houſe broke, becauſe no Witneſs ſtood by to ſee the breaking of the Houſe, entring into it, and ſtealing thence the Goods: Or againſt a Cut-purſe, though the Purſe or Mony be found in his hand, or becauſe none ſee him take it forth of his Pocket; or to find the Indictment, becauſe it is laid to be done Vi & armis, *with force and arms, and yet ſaid to be done (in the ſame Indictment,* clam & ſecrete, & ſine notitia) *privily, ſecretly, and without notice of the party, which (in Fact) could not be done if it were done by force or arms: Or to find an Indictment of Robbery done upon the High-way, againſt thoſe that rob in Vizards, notwithſtanding the mony be owned, and found about them, becauſe*

the

the party cannot swear he saw their faces, and that these were the men: Or that such a one kill'd a man, that comes out last from him with a bloody Sword in his hand, and no person besides with him. In all these Cases it is possible, the Parties accused might find the Goods stoln; and so might the bloody Sword be found, and another do the Fact; but sure here is great and violent presumption (sufficient for an Accusation) for a Grand Jury to find an Indictment (which is but an Accusation upon Record) to bring the Delinquent, or Party so strongly suspected, to a Judicial Trial; and as well may it be presumed, when one Christian is kill'd by another, it may be Murther, that there may be a seed of malice in the will of him that did it, by a voluntary and spontaneous motion in that act, that may (upon a greater Debate) contain some circumstance in it, that by some reason in Law (better known to the Learned Judge,

than the Grand Jurors) that may in Law prove malice expreſſed or implyed in the criminous Perſon.

And if it be ſo difficult in caſes of blood for Grand Jurors to determine what is Murther, and what is not, let them conſider how dangerous a thing it is for them to miſcarry in their Preſentment in caſes of blood, of innocent blood (as is before manifeſted) and ſo acquit the Murtherer, and take the imputation of blood-guiltineſs with them, from the Aſſizes to their reſpective Families, where it may and will cry againſt them and the whole Kingdom for vengeance: I do therefore ſubmit it to their ſerious conſideration, upon what hath been ſaid, Whether it be not much better, and a ſafer way for them, to ſubmit their Judgments herein to the Rule of Law, and the Reſolutions of the Learned Judges, than by their extenuating preſentment (for the Court can go no higher than they pre-

preſent) to ſtifle Juſtice in the birth, and to acquit a Murtherer: For the Indictment, although no part of the Trial, yet is the very Baſis and Foundation of all the other Proceedings. And let them conſider how ſtrict (formerly) the very Law of *England* was in King *Edward* the Second's time in caſes of blood, where the very will and intent to kill a man (although it was not executed) was puniſhed for the Deed) although the party wounded recovered of his wounds.

A memorable Caſe there was in that King's Reign, cited by Juſtice *Stamford*, where one compaſſed the death of another, and did ſo grievouſly wound him, that he left him for dead, but afterwards the party recovered; this was then adjudged Murther, becauſe his will appeared ſo plainly to have kill'd him. For, as *Bracton* ſays, *In maleficiis ſpectatur voluntas, & non exitus*, then was the Will by our Law (as it is yet be-

Stamf. fol. 17. Pl. Coron. Tit. Coron. Fitz. V. 15 Ed. 2. p. 383.

before God) reputed for the Deed: But now our Law couples the Will and the Act together in caſes of blood; but looks more upon the Act than the Will: For though the Will do neither intend the Act (as it is done) nor approve of it (after it is done) yet if the Will in any part of the Act be criminous, it makes the Offender (in our Law) in caſes of blood, guilty of the whole Fact, with all the obliquity and evil in it. As if a man intend only to beat another, to ſtrike him, but not to kill him, and the party die of the ſtroke, it may be murther in him that gave the ſtroke. So if three men come to make a Diſſeiſin, and one of the three kill a man, the other two perſons are guilty, as principals in the murther, although they neither conſent to it, will it, or ſtrike the Party, nor came with that intent, but only were in company to have done another Act. So if one, to kill his Wife, give her (lying ſick) Poyſon in a roaſted Apple,

Vid. Tit. Memorat. p.331, 350.

Hales & Petit Caſe le Com. 261.a.

18 El. Pl.474.

Apple, and she eating a little of it, give the rest to a little Child of theirs, which the Husband (lest he should be suspected) suffereth the Child to eat, who dieth of the same poyson, this is murther though the Wife recover; for the Poyson ministred upon malice prepensed to one, which by a contingency procureth the death of another whom he meant not to kill, nor bear any malice to, shall be as great an Offence as if it had taken the effect which he meant, proceeding from a naughty and malicious intent. So where two men combat together, upon the evil and provoking words of a woman, and the one killeth the other, the woman in this case was Arraigned of the death of him that was kill'd; and in this Case the Grand Jurors found it murther. So if an ignorant person take upon him to give Physick to one that is not well, and through his ignorance administreth that unto him that (apparently) kills him,

him, this is murther. And ſo it might be inſtanced in many ſimilar Caſes, which are not to be diſputed by Grand Jurors, but preſented by them *in re. forma*, as the Indictment is adviſed by the King's Council, and comes to their hands, where they find (as before is ſaid) a criminous Party in the Indictment, and a Body (found) of a reaſonable Creature, certainly, or probably kill'd by him, although the Evidence be not expreſs to every circumſtance of aggravation, as it is laid down in the Indictment, whereby to bring the Party and his Offence of Blood to a full Trial by a ſecond Jury, which otherwiſe can never be done, neither the Law therein known from the Court in ſuch a Caſe.

Beſides, many other Inconveniences and doubts may ariſe where the Grand Jury find the Bill of Indictment only *Manſlaughter*, which by finding of it *Murther* would be prevented, as in chal-

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lenging upon his tryal above the number of twenty Jurors; the Statute of the 22 *H.*8. *c.*14. reduceth peremptory challenge upon an Indictment or Appeal, which at the Common Law was allowed to the Prisoner, to challenge thirty five Jurors (which is under the number of three Jurors;) this Statute so provides, That *a Prisoner shall not now in* Petit Treason, Murther *and* Felony, *challenge above twenty Jurors, without shewing cause:* And in case of Treason, and misprision of high Treason, it was taken away by the Statute of 33 *H.* 8. but now by the Statute of 1, & 2 *Phil.* & *Mar.* the Common Law is revived, *for any Treason the Prisoner shall have his challenge to the number of* 35; and so it was resolved by all the Justices upon conference between them in the Case of Sir *Walter Rawleigh* and *Geo. Brooks*: By this Statute it is plain, that if one be Indicted or Appealed for *Murther*, and challenge above the

22 H.8. c.14. *made perpetual by* 32 H.8.3. Brook *Challenge* 217.

33 H. 8.

1,2 Ph. & Mar.

Hil. Ja. *R.*

the number of twenty Jurors peremptorily (without ſhewing cauſe) it ſhall be a Conviction of the offence and Capital; but it is a great *quære*, whether he that is indicted or Appealed only for Manſlaughter (which is not named in this Act, nor can be rationally comprehended in the word *Felony* more than Murther might have been) may not challenge thirty five Jurors, as at Common Law? ſo it may be a *quære*, where the Priſoner Indicted only of Manſlaughter, ſhall ſtand mute, or will not anſwer directly to the Indictment, whether notwithſtanding he ſhall not have his Clergy? for the Statute of the 1 of *Ed.6.c.*12. and other Statutes that take away Clergy from ſuch offences and Offenders (as are therein mentioned) take it away as well from ſuch as ſtand mute, anſwer indirectly or challenge peremptorily above the number of twenty, as from thoſe that are convicted by Verdict, or Confeſſion upon their Arraignment;

ment; otherwiſe ſuch as ſtand Mute, anſwer indirectly, or challenge peremptorily, might have had their Clergy (as the Act ſeems to imply) otherwiſe it had not taken Clergy away in thoſe caſes.

The Judgment of *Paine fort & dure*, that is, *Pain grievous and durable*, was not at the Common Law, but ordained by the Statute of *Weſt.* 1. made *Anno* 3 *Ed.* 1. whereby it was enacted, That *notorious Felons, openly known of evil name, who will not put themſelves upon Enqueſts of Felonies, which men do proſecute at the Kings ſuit, ſhall be put in hard and ſtrong Priſon, as they which refuſe to be tried by the Law of the Realm; but this is not to be intended of Priſoners which be taken of light Suſpicion.* By which Statute it doth appear, that none ſhall be judged to this pain, if there be not evident or probable matter to convince him of the offence whereof he is arraigned, or

Stamford *lib.*2. *fol.*149. Poulton *De Pace*, *fol.*211.

or otherwiſe, that he is a notable Thief, or openly known to be of Evil name; which the Judge ought ſtrictly to examine before he proceed to this Judgment againſt him, it would be very hard (which the Law is never *in favorem vitæ*) to extend this Statute to *Manſlaughter*, which may be ſuddenly committed by one of good name and fame, and not a notorious Thief (as this Act mentions) and yet may have an obſtinate humor to refuſe Trial, challenge peremptorily, and make indirect Pleas.

It is the ſevereſt Judgment (that I know) the Law paſſes upon any Offender, and therefore not to be extended further than the plain underſtanding of the words of the Act, a Sentence ſo ſevere, that (I think) never *Engliſh* man as yet (though many have been Preſt to death) had the heart to execute it according to the letter, which Sentence is as followeth, That *the Priſoner ſhall be ſent to the Priſon from whence he*

he came, and put into a Mean house, ſtopped from light, and there ſhall be laid upon the bare ground, without any Litter, Straw, or other covering, and without any Garment about him, ſaving ſomething to cover his Privy members, and that he ſhall lie upon his back, and his head ſhall be covered, and his feet bare, and that one of his Arms ſhall be drawn with a Cord to one ſide of the houſe, and the other Arm to the other ſide, and that his Legs ſhall be uſed in the ſame manner, and that upon his Body ſhall be laid ſo much Iron and Stone as he can bear, and more, and that the firſt day after he ſhall have three morſels of Barley-bread, without any Drink, and the ſecond day he ſhall drink ſo much as he can, three times, of the Water which is next the Priſon-door, ſaving Running-water, without any Bread; and this ſhall be his Diet until he die.

4 Ed. 4. 11.
14 Ed. 4. 7.
6 H. 4. 2.

No Forfeiture but of Goods. Fit. *Eſch.* 19.

Another inconvenience may arise, where the party Indicted and Arraigned only of *Manslaughter* shall plead a Forrein plea of something done in another County, to the delay of Justice; the Statute of the 22 *H.* 8. *c.* 14. only providing, in cases of *Petit Treason*, *Murther*, or *Felony*, that Forrein pleas in those Cases shall be tried before the same Justices before whom such persons shall be Arraigned, and by the same Jurors of the same County that shall trie the petit Treason, Murther, or Felony. If a man be Indicted of *Treason* he may plead a Forrein plea, which shall be tried in another County, otherwise in cases of *Murther*, *Petit Treason*, and *Felony*.

Coke 3 *Inst. fol.* 27.

Another inconvenience may be upon the Statute of the 6 *H.* 8. *c.* 6. By that Statute, the Justices of the Kings Bench are impower'd to remit the bodies of *Felons* and *Murtherers* removed thither to be tried in the County, and their Indictments

6 H. 8. c. 6.

dictments removed into that Court, which before they could not do by the Common Law; becauſe a Record that is once brought into the higheſt Court, could not be remanded to an Inferior, *Stamf. fol.* 157. this Statute only provides in caſe of *Felony* and *Murther*, not *Manſlaughter*. Stamf. *fol.* 157.

The laſt Inconvenience I ſhall mention (though I could many more) by reaſon of Indictments of *Manſlaughter*, will be in Cities, and Burroughs, and Corporations, that have power to try *Murthers* and *Felonies*; the Statute of the 23 *H.* 8. *c.* 13. provides, That *in Trials of* Murthers *and* Felonies *there proceedings ſhall not ſtay as formerly, or be delaied by reaſon of challenge of ſuch Offenders, for lack of ſufficiency of Freehold, to the great hindrance of Juſtice; but that if the Jurors be worth in Monies and perſonal Eſtate Forty pounds, they ſhall not be challenged, but admitted.* 23 H.8.c.13.

It will be a very extorted conſtruction that upon this Statute, and the others before ſhall bring in Manſlaughters under the word *Felonies*, whatever practice is, or hath been uſed to the contrary. I conceive it fit to be better conſidered, for it is not ſufficient (in all Caſes, much leſs in this) without, or againſt a Rule and Act of Parliament, to juſtifie practice by practice; this happily in the end might prove a Common Thief to be an honeſt man.

Every Manſlaughter is Felony, but not e converſo.

Beſides, obſerve the penning of other Statutes, and that will give a clearer light to the underſtanding of theſe; by the Statute made in the 27 of *H.8. c.25.* it was enacted, *That no perſon or perſons, of what eſtate or degree ſoever, ſhall have power or authority to pardon or remit any* Treaſons, Murthers, Manſlaughters, *or* Felonies, *whatſoever they be*, *&c.* Here you ſee the Makers of this Law mention the word and offence of *Manſlaughter*, *in terminis*, and not

27 H.8.c.25.

not leave it to be understood, or to be comprehended in the word other Felonies, though it is most comprehensively said, *or Felonies whatsoever they be.*

So the Statute made in the first and second *Ph. & Mar. c.* 13. *That the Justices of the Peace (one being of the* Quorum*) when any Prisoner is brought before them for any* Manslaughter *or* Felony, *before any Bailment or Mainprise, shall take the examination of the Prisoner, and Information of the Accuser, and certifie it at the next Goal-delivery, &c.* Here you see *Manslaughter* and *Felony* both expresst, as necessary, several times in the Act. 1,2 Ph. & Mar. c. 13.

So the Statute of the 23 *H.* 8. *c.* 12. that directs the manner of punishing of offences in the Kings Palace or House, says, *All Treasons, Misprisions of Treasons, Murthers, Manslaughters, and other malicious Strikings, &c.* and so divers other Acts of Parliament (as might be shewed) that make 23 H. 8. c. 12.

or intend any proviſion againſt Manſlaughters, do particularly name the word *Manſlaughter*, and never leave it to be intended or included in the word *Felony*. It is true, that by a Commiſſion granted to certain perſons to enquire of all Felonies, they may thereby take Indictments of Murther; though a Pardon of all Felonies will not avail him who hath committed Murther, in regard of the Statute made 13 *R.*2.1.

Kel.fol.98.

And the Commiſſion of *Oyer* and *Terminer*, made to the Judges every Aſſizes, that enables them to enquire of all Offences, hath theſe expreſs words in it, *And of whatſoever* Murthers, Felonies, Manſlaughters, Killings; not leaving Manſlaughters to be intended by the general words of *Felonies* or *Killings*.

Many more Inconveniences might be ſhewed, but theſe (with what hath been before ſhewed) may be ſufficient, until better reaſons appear to ſatisfie any under-

underſtanding Grand Juror, to eſteem it much the better way to find ſuch Bills Murther, rather than Manſlaughter, there being every way leſs inconvenience in it, in relation to the Laws of the Land (until by the wiſdom of a Parliament they are altered) and much more of ſatisfaction and ſafety to their own private Conſciences, that ſtand ſo deeply engaged to diſcover Blood-guilty perſons, and to ſuppreſs and ſilence the cries of Innocent blood, that by our Laws (in the firſt place) cries to Grand Jurors for Vengeance againſt the Murtherer and Manſlayer.

It now remains that two Objections be anſwered, that happily to ſuch as do not well weigh and conſider them may ſeem to be of ſome force againſt what hath been herein ſaid to the contrary; the one is, *The general liberty, and conſtant practice Grand Jurors have taken ever ſince the making of the ſaid Statute of the*

23 H.8.c.1. 23 H.8.c.1. *to find, as they please, either* Murther *or* Manſlaughter; *not as the Indictment comes to their hands from the Kings Council, but as they apprehend the Evidence that is brought to them, taking upon themſelves not only the ſole Judgment of the Fact, and what the Law is that ariſeth upon the ſaid Fact, taking the Judgment of the Law therein from the Court (although they hear but one ſide) and putting in and putting out what they please in ſuch Indictments, notwithſtanding it appears to them the party Indicted is guilty of ſhedding Innocent blood, varying the ſpecies of Murther and Manſlaughter as they please, until after Arraignment of the Priſoner it be too late to amend it, as I have often known.*

The other Objection is (and this ſeems to be of ſome weight and authority in Law againſt what hath been ſaid) *That Mr. Juſtice* Stamford, *in his book of*

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The Pleas of the Crown, *is of another opinion*, viz. *That a Grand Jury may find the Special matter in the Indictment; that is to say, that the Prisoner killed the other* se defendendo, *or* per Infortunium, &c. *which the party upon his Arraignment may either confess, or estrange himself from the fact, and plead, Not guilty.*

To the first Objection, as to the *liberty and practice of Grand Jurors to the contrary so long used*, I Answer, It hath been before in this Treatise sufficiently made out, the great Inconvenience and mischief, in Cases of Blood, that is the consequence of such practice, and that being granted (as it cannot be denied) I suppose no wise man will think, that the long practice of such an Errour will justifie it, or encourage the longer continuance of it, in the highest Courts of Law and Justice, and in so high and tender an Offence as the disquisition of Blood is, although in Inferiour County Courts,

Courts, where (many times) are ignorant Judges, and mean Clerks; and in ordinary Offences this Maxime may hold good, that *Communis Error facit Jus*, that the common practice of an Error makes it the Law of the Court, and not convenient to be altered; yet I have never obſerved that Maxime to take place in the higheſt Courts of Juſtice in this Kingdom, before the Judges of the Courts at *Weſtminſter*, Juſtices of Oyer and Terminer, Juſtices of Goal-delivery, and Juſtices of Aſſize, who ſit not to practice, but to correct and deſtroy Errors of all kinds, eſpecially in Trials of mens Lives, in Caſes of Blood, and whoever ſhall urge that Maxime againſt what I have here ſaid, doth by that ſufficiently grant, what I have here endeavoured to prove, *viz.* the errour and inconvenience of ſuch practice, which ought no more to be continued, than a long cuſtome, when it is found to be unreaſonable; but

but I shall never allow (neither can it be proved) that there hath been in this Kingdom such liberty and practice, allowed and indulged by the Reverend and Learned Judges to Grand Jurors, to find and alter Indictments brought unto them in cases of Blood, as they themselves please and judge convenient; they being (as hath been said before) not the Judges, nor the Triers, but Presenters of a fact of Blood, fit for the Judgment of the Jury of Life and Death, who only are the proper Judges of the Fact; for none can be said to be proper Judges of any Fact in Controversie that hear but one side, for Grand Jurors hear no more, and therefore ought in Law, Reason, and Conscience (where they find a guilty person that hath had his hands in Blood, and unjustly taken away the Life of another person) to leave it (as an entire fact of Murther) to the Trial and Verdict of the second Jury to find the truth of the Fact (upon

(upon hearing of both ſides, and receiving the Judgment of the Court) in what ſpecies or degree of Murther it is, which likewiſe if any doubt or point of Law ariſe in the Caſe (as many times it doth) they may find it ſpecially (which a Grand Jury cannot) and thereupon receive the opinion of all the Judges of *England* (*Murther* being the Genus of the ſeveral Species) and in common acceptation, he is accounted a Murtherer that kills any man, or reaſonable Creature unlawfully; and the Commandment is, *Thou ſhalt do no Murther*, which certainly comprehends all unlawful killing, otherwiſe that command is not well tranſlated from the Text, *Non Occides*, *Thou ſhalt not Kill*; and in my own experience, for above forty and five years in one Circuit, I have very often known many Learned Judges, ſuch as Mr. Juſtice *Doderidge*, the Lord Chief Baron *Davenport*, Mr. Juſtice *Jones*, Mr.

Mr. Justice *Whitlock*, and many others, often rebuke and reject the Presentments of Grand Jurors, in Cases of Blood, and other Felonies, where they have either varied from their Evidence, or from the Law, the Judges before hand having received some light of the nature and testimony of the Fact, from the Informations and Examinations therein delivered into the Court by the Justices of the Peace and Coroners (a very good Rule for Judges to observe) and often either put it upon an open Evidence in Court (which is very inconvenient) or discharged them of such a Bill, and bound the Witnesses over to the next Assizes (which is also very inconvenient) in regard Witnesses may die, or the Prisoner may die, and so the Forfeiture is lost, and the offence unpunished; and in Cases of Blood there will be too much opportunity given for compounding and making an Interest with the Prosecuter and Witnesses; and

and in theſe modern times, ſince the happy return of our moſt gracious Sovereign, King *CHARLES* the ſecond, I have known ſeveral learned and pious Judges, ſome ſince dead, others yet living, and eminent upon the Bench in *Oxfordſhire* Circuit, Fine and Impriſon ſeveral Grand Jurors for their miſcarriage and miſdemeanour in delivering in Bills of *Manſlaughter* inſtead of Bills of *Murther*, againſt the clear and poſitive directions of the Court. And this may ſerve for anſwer to the firſt Objection, from the liberty and affected practice of Grand Jurors (in finding of Bills in Caſes of Blood) according to their own humor and apprehenſion to introduce a Law, that therefore they may find them as they pleaſe, notwithſtanding that the Court adviſeth and directeth the drawing of them *MURTHER*.

To the ſecond Objection of Mr. Juſtice *Stamford* (in the place before cited) where he ſaith, that

whereas

whereas the Statute of Glouc. c. 9. *ſaith, That he ought to put himſelf in an Inqueſt* de bono & malo, *this is only intended* (ſaith he) *when he is Indicted of* Murther *or* Manſlaughter, *and not where in the body of the Indictment, the Special matter is found* (as if the Grand Jury may find eſpecial Verdict) *of* per Infortunium, *or* ſe defendendo, *&c.* I anſwer to this Objection, Certainly Mr. Juſtice *Stamford* (though a very Learned man) did well conſider this matter, and his Opinion therein, when he ſet it down; for he informs you not what ſhall become of ſuch an Indictment, where only the Special matter is found by the Grand Jury, whether the party may Traverſe it (for it is but a Treſpaſs) or confeſs it, and ſo have his Pardon of Courſe upon ſuch confeſſion, and then the Judges that are to make the Report or Certificate of the nature of the fact to the King in *Chancery*, muſt Certifie like blind and deaf men, that

that never ſaw or heard any thing of the merit of the cauſe, nor underſtand any thing by evidence of the nature and circumſtance of the Fact; like the Lay-zealot, muſt believe as the Prieſt believes, preferring Obedience before Truth; but ſure no prudent and pious Judge will make ſuch a blind Certificate, in caſe of Blood.

Beſides, whoever ſhall judiciouſly and impartially compare and weigh the Statute of *Marlebridge* and the Statute of *Glouceſter* together, and the reaſons of the Statute of *Glouceſter*, what miſchief it was made to prevent, and conſider but the nature of the thing, will never be of his Opinion in this particular, there is ſo little of reaſon or true meaning of either of thoſe Statutes in it. The words of the Statute of *Marlebr.* are theſe, *Murther from henceforth ſhall not be judged before our Juſtices, where it is found Misfortune.* In the time of this Statute, it ſeems, there were two Juries, the Grand Jury,

Jury, and the Jury of Life and Death, to preſent and try the Offences of Murther, otherwiſe the Juſtices could not judge of it, they never paſſing Judgment upon a Grand Juries preſentment; which, by the way, ſhews, that it is left to the Judges (not the Grand Jury) upon the examination of the cauſe in trial by the Jury of Life and Death, to judge of the nature and circumſtances of Murther, and of what ſpecies or degree it is. This Statute of *Marlebridge* did only declare a new Law, that where it was found *per Infortunium*, or *ſe defendendo*, it ſhould not be Felony and Murther as it was before that Statute; but that the party in ſuch caſe ſhould have (upon Certificate of the Juſtices before whom he was tried) his Pardon of courſe; happily then, upon the Preſentment of the Grand Jury; which might be the occaſion of this erroneous Opinion of this Learned Judge.

Then comes the Statute of *Glouceſter*, as if the other had not been truly underſtood, or at leaſt had not ſufficiently provided for offences of Blood, and in plain words (as before is mentioned) commands, *That he that kills a man by misfortune, or in his own defence, or in any other manner without Felony, ſhall be put in Priſon until the coming of the Juſtices in Eyre, or Juſtices of Goal-delivery, and ſhall put himſelf upon the* Country *for good and evil*, that is, *for life and death*, which cannot poſſibly be underſtood where the Grand Jury find it but *per Infortunium*, or *ſe defendendo*, &c. for that is not Felony, and ſo cannot be Arraigned thereupon, whereby to put himſelf *de bono & malo*, ſo as to bring the matter to Iſſue between him and the King; nor can the Judge in that caſe (as is ſaid before) make a true and right Certificate of the offence and matter of fact, which muſt be ſpecially and truly certified according to Law,

Law, whereby to procure a pardon, as that Statute expreſly requires. And if the party ſhall plead *Not guilty* to that Special matter found by the Grand Jury, what can that ſignifie (as before hath been ſhewed) for the Jury that is charged with ſuch Indictment, muſt either find the party guilty in Special manner, as it was found before by the Grand Jury (and that makes too ſpecially Verdicts;) or elſe generally *Not guilty*; if they find him guilty of the Special matter (as the Grand Jury found before them) and the Judge and Court ſhall afterwards adjudge (as they may, having heard the Evidence) that *ſuper totam materiam*, it is either Murther or Manſlaughter; then no Judgment of Death or Clergy can be given upon that Indictment or Verdict, but all muſt be tried over again, and a new Circuit of buſineſs upon a ſecond Indictment of Murther or Manſlaughter; and how dilatory and idle would this be at an Aſſizes, in

courſe of Juſtice, and in caſe of Blood.

If Judge *Stamford* were alive again (although a perſon of great Learning and Judgment) he would ſurely (with ſome other Errors in that book) recant this; neither is it of any advantage to the Priſoner, to have it found Specially by the Grand Jury, for he can never plead either ſuch an Acquittal or Conviction in Bar to an Indictment of Murther or Manſlaughter in the ſame caſe (as before is ſhewed;) and whoever ſhall read and well conſider this ſeventh Chapter, written by Judge *Stamford*, in *The Pleas of the Crown*, wherein this Opinion is, eſpecially towards the end of it, when he comes to obſerve the Letter of the Statute of *Glouceſter*, and how the Certificate of ſuch a Pardon of courſe ſhall be obtained, muſt of neceſſity hold his firſt Opinion in that Chapter (for the Special matter to be found in the Indictment) to be very inconſiderately expreſſed

for

for the reasons aforesaid. And why may not this Learned Judge (for *humanum est Errare*) mistake in this, as in some other Opinions in that Book of his styled, *The Pleas of the Crown*? for which he is detected by the Lo. *Coke*, and others that followed him, who standing upon his shoulders must needs see farther, than he did or could; As to instance in some few:

As first, that Respit of Execution (where a Woman is *privi-ment enfent*) where a Woman after Judgment pleads her Belly, shall be granted only (*says he*) in Felony: whereas it is grantable both in high Treason and petit Treason. Stamf. *fol. ult. 6.* Coke 3 *Inst. fol.* 18.

A second is, That the year and the day after the Murther and Homicide committed, shall be accounted after the blow given, or poyson administred: whereas it ought to be accounted after the death, for then the party was murthered, and not after the stroke Stamf. *Pl. Cor.* 63. 26 Ass. p. 52. Coke 3 *Inst. fol.* 53.

or

or poyſon given; *Coke* lib.4.fol.41, 42. in *Heydon*'s Caſe.

A third obſerved by the Lord *Coke* (writing upon the Statute 8 *H.* 6. *c.* 12. which makes it Felony to ſteal away Records) upon theſe words in the ſaid Statute, *Their Procurers, Counſellors and Abettors*, ſaith this Act, *expreſly extendeth to Acceſſaries before, and leaveth Acceſſaries after to the conſtruction of Law*; yet there may be Acceſſaries after the Fact, for whenſoever an offence is made a Felony by Act of Parliament, there ſhall be Acceſſaries to it, both before and after, as if it had been a Felony by the Common Law: And therefore, though this Act expreſſeth only Acceſſaries before, yet it taketh not away Acceſſaries after, but leaveth them to the Law, contrary to the Opinion of Mr. Juſtice *Stamford*.

v.3 & 4 Ph. & Mar. *Juſtice* Daliſon's *Rep.*

Stamf. *Pl. Cor.* 160.

And again, by the Statute of the 8 *H.* 6. *c.* 29. Inſufficiency or want of Freehold, is no cauſe of Challenge to Aliens who are Impanelled

8 H.6. c.29.

pannelled with Aliens, notwithſtanding Mr. Juſtice *Stamford*'s Opinion, *Pl. Coron.* 160. for this Statute ſaith, That *the Statute* 2 H. 5. c. 3. *ſhall extend only to Enqueſts betwixt Denizen and Denizen.*

Stamf. *Pl. Cor.* 160.

2 H. 5. c. 3.

But enough (and perhaps too much) hath been ſaid in mentioning the miſtakes of that Reverend and Learned Judge Sr. *William Stamford*, in that Book of his termed *Placita Coronæ*, Pleas of the Crown, which it ſeems by the Title of it hath been corrected, amended, and enlarged, ſince the firſt Impreſſion of it; which I have not urged in the leaſt to detract from the Learning and Honour of that great and learned Judge, or from the value of that Book, which notwithſtanding there may be a few miſtakes found in it, yet is of as high eſteem as any Book of the Law, extant upon that Subject; but principally to ſhew, that he may as well erre in his Opinion concerning Grand Jurors

Sr. W. Stamford, Kt. *one of the Juſtices of the Common Pleas.*

rors finding the Special matter, as in thoſe mentioned; and that no human Author, in the Law, or any other Science, is infallible; and that we muſt be very careful how we ground any Law upon the bare Opinion of any one, or two perſons (though of never ſo great parts or eſteem) whereby to juſtifie or maintain a great Inconvenience in practice, eſpecially in Caſes of Blood, as before hath been ſhewn.

FINIS.